In recent days, events in the United States have been discussed in South Africa, Saudi Arabia and France not as yet another domestic political drama, but as a test of how far American decisions can reshape their own economies and security. The Republican rout in the November 3, 2026, congressional elections became the main story. But local observers see three more consequential issues behind it: the US war with Iran and the fate of the Strait of Hormuz, Washington’s use of trade as political leverage, and the limits of American democracy’s ability to restrain the president.
In France, the election result is seen above all as punishment for Donald Trump’s combination of authoritarian political style, rising living costs and foreign war. An editorial in Le Monde calls the vote a “sanction” against the president and links his defeat to the Iran conflict, which risks turning into a strategic quagmire. In his commentary, columnist Alain Frachon puts French hopes more cautiously: this is “a serious brake, not a stop, on unbridled Trumpism.” In other words, Democrats’ return to control of both chambers of Congress does not change the fact that the president retains sweeping powers over foreign policy, including the right to launch or expand a military operation before Congress can impose a financial barrier. (lemonde.fr)
For Riyadh, that caveat is no abstraction. The Saudi press views the American election through a question that may seem distant to Europe but is existential for Gulf countries: will Washington resume massive strikes on Iran, and who will pay the price in terms of shipping security, energy prices and threats to infrastructure around the Persian Gulf? In an article for Arab News, Abdulaziz Aluwaisheg, assistant secretary-general of the Gulf Cooperation Council, warns that the election’s impact on US policy toward Iran will be limited in the short term. His conclusion is thoroughly practical: mediation by Qatar, the “Mecca Alliance” and China must continue, while GCC countries should also prepare their defenses in case of further attacks. This is not a call to choose between America and Iran; it is a characteristically Saudi effort to make regional security less dependent on the unpredictability of a single American decision. (arabnews.com)
The Saudi newspaper Al Riyadh expressed the same idea in the form of a question: “Who pays the bill for American power?” In its account, the war with Iran became entangled in American domestic politics: rising fuel and food prices came back to haunt voters, who turned foreign intervention into a punishment for the government. This is an important local interpretation: not simply “America is tired of war,” but “any US war in the Gulf is now politically dependent on American inflation.” (alriyadh.com)
In South Africa, the same interplay of war, prices and presidential caprice is viewed through the lens of economic vulnerability. Daily Maverick commentator Peter Fabricius notes that if Trump expands the war against Iran again and Tehran disrupts shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, South Africa will feel the impact on oil prices just as quickly as other importers. But Pretoria has already been hit directly from another direction: on November 2, Washington notified the country of its intention to remove its benefits under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) from January 1, 2027. (dailymaverick.co.za)
South Africa’s response is notable for its lack of public capitulation. In a government statement, Trade Minister Parks Tau acknowledged the concerns of workers, exporters and communities tied to supply chains, but stressed: “This decision does not define the broader relationship between South Africa and the United States.” The authorities point out that bilateral trade reached $28.8 billion in 2025, that more than 600 American companies operate in the country, and that South Africa supplies the United States with critical minerals and a significant share of the isotopes used in medicine. This is less an argument about the moral injustice of the sanction than about the mutual cost of politicizing trade. (gov.za)
At the same time, the debate in South Africa shows why local commentators are not overestimating the Democrats’ victory. Bob Wekesa, director of the African Centre for the Study of the United States at the University of the Witwatersrand, called the shift in control of Congress “excellent news” and saw an opportunity to challenge South Africa’s exclusion from AGOA. But Elizabeth Sidiropoulos, head of the South African Institute of International Affairs, notes in a Daily Maverick analysis that it is the president who determines a country’s eligibility for benefits. A Democratic Congress can investigate, criticize, influence tariffs and advance new legislation, but it may not be able to reverse a White House decision quickly. (dailymaverick.co.za)
The French response reaches a similar conclusion, but from a different direction. An editorial in Le Monde says Europeans have “nothing to expect” from Trump’s defeat. Not because Congress is unimportant, but because the president can still conduct foreign policy through executive orders, bilateral deals and pressure on allies. This is the basis of the French idea of strategic autonomy: Europe should not build its security on the expectation that the next shift in US domestic politics will automatically bring back the America of the past. (lemonde.fr)
This is where Paris, Pretoria and Riyadh converge. France sees the American election as a sign of how fragile transatlantic guarantees are. South Africa sees confirmation that trade preferences can become an instrument for pressuring a country over its sovereign domestic and foreign policy. Saudi Arabia is reminded that even an electorally weakened president can alter the military balance around Iran in a matter of days. Their shared conclusion is not anti-American, but more clear-eyed: the United States remains an indispensable power, but is no longer seen as a predictable center of order. So each of the three countries is looking not for a “new patron,” but for more safeguards of its own: European autonomy, diversification of South Africa’s markets, and regional diplomacy and defense among the Gulf states.
