World about US

The main issue shaping reactions to the United States in Ukraine, Australia and South Korea is not so much the outcome of the US midterm elections on November 3 as the question of whether a Democratic victory in both chambers of Congress can curb Donald Trump’s foreign-policy improvisation. All three countries are discussing the same American story—the US war with Iran, tariff pressure and Congress’s return as an independent center of power—but view it through very different risks: for Ukraine, the risk of a deal with Moscow; for Australia, the cost of living and the reliability of its ally; and for South Korea, US troops on the peninsula, supply chains and access to the American market.

The broadest conclusion among local commentators is this: American domestic politics has once again ceased to be purely domestic. Abroad, the Republicans’ defeat is seen not as an automatic change in US policy, but as the emergence of an institutional brake. South Korea’s National Assembly Library National Strategy Portal explicitly warns that the president will retain a leading role in foreign policy and can exercise his veto, but that Democrats will gain tools for investigations, budget oversight and legislative pressure—including on tariffs and the wars in Iran and Ukraine. This is an important qualification to allies’ hopes: Washington may become less predictable not because Congress is powerless, but because the White House and the Capitol will pull policy in opposite directions. (nsp.nanet.go.kr)

The war with Iran has become the issue that most closely links the American election drama to everyday life in Australia. Prime Minister Anthony Albanese called the war in Iran and tariffs hitting the Australian economy “the main factors” behind the Republicans’ defeat. In his view, this is not some distant Middle Eastern problem: a prolonged conflict drives up global costs, while the closure of the Strait of Hormuz hurts trade and energy prices. After the Commonwealth summit, he said that “every country wants the war to end and the Strait of Hormuz to reopen,” and pledged to keep urging Washington to de-escalate—while avoiding a public break with Trump. (abc.net.au)

This caution reflects an Australian paradox. Distrust of America has risen markedly: according to a Lowy Institute poll, just 31% of Australians in 2026 trust the US to act responsibly in the world, while only 21% trust Trump personally. Yet 73% still consider the US alliance important to the country’s security. Lowy analyst Charles Lyons-Jones says this reflects not a fondness for Trumpism, but the pragmatism of a country living in a deteriorating strategic environment. Another detail is particularly striking: as disappointment in the US has grown, Australians’ views of China have softened. One expert puts it this way: “China is the clear beneficiary of declining trust in Trump.” (abc.net.au) Australia’s response is therefore not directly anti-American. It is a demand for America to be both a military guarantor and an economically responsible partner—a role that, in the view of many in Canberra, the current administration has failed to combine.

For South Korea, tariffs are an even more immediate concern. After the Republicans’ defeat, Trump publicly confirmed that he had no intention of abandoning his protectionist course, saying that companies that do not build factories in the US could face tariffs of “up to 300%.” In the same speech, he specifically mentioned imports from South Korea, alongside those from China, Japan and the Philippines. South Korea’s Yonhap News Agency interprets these remarks as a demonstration that, after its electoral defeat, the White House may use trade even more aggressively—a sphere in which the president’s powers are particularly broad. (yna.co.kr)

However, Seoul does not see protesting tariffs as the only response. The South Korean approach is almost engineering-like: US interests must be tied to the country’s own industrial and defense role. This is especially clear in the Ukrainian debate, in a column by Marina Hrytsenko, executive director of the Serpens Center for International Security, in Ukrainska Pravda. She presents South Korea as an example of how an ally can turn political vulnerability into a network of material interests: Seoul offers investment in the US, including in shipbuilding, works with Congress, and South Korean companies establish a presence in American states. Her phrase “Kachi gapsida” [“Let’s go together”] describes not rhetoric but a method: an alliance must benefit US voters, workers and members of Congress, rather than rest solely on presidential promises. (pravda.com.ua)

This is where the Ukrainian and South Korean responses converge. Seoul is watching the size of the US contingent on the Korean Peninsula, the defense budget, shipbuilding cooperation and supplies of critical materials; Kyiv is watching weapons, intelligence, sanctions and the prospect of US rapprochement with Moscow. But neither capital increasingly believes that a conversation with the White House alone is enough. Ukraine wants to work with the new Congress through concrete proposals: joint production, counter-drone efforts and the exchange of battlefield data. Hrytsenko stresses that aid to Ukraine should be presented to Americans as an investment in their jobs and in technology tested in combat—not as a one-sided act of charity. (pravda.com.ua)

In Kyiv, the Democrats’ victory has prompted cautious hope rather than euphoria. The author of another column in Ukrainska Pravda writes that opportunities to change course are emerging, but quick decisions should not be expected. The most telling local detail is her conversations with Trump voters in Texas. Some still support the president’s hard-line immigration policies, but are frustrated by his attitude toward Vladimir Putin. Their position is summed up in the phrase: “I didn’t sign up for America to become Putin’s friend.” (pravda.com.ua) For Ukrainians, this matters more than the party arithmetic: opposition to rapprochement with the Kremlin may be broader than liberal support for Ukraine.

Kyiv also understands the limits of change. Congress can investigate administration decisions, restrict funding and make concessions to Moscow more politically costly; it cannot instantly replace presidential diplomacy, supply missiles or overturn every White House decision. Ukraine’s response to the US election is therefore essentially twofold: it offers a chance to restore the system of checks and balances, but also marks a dangerous transition period before the new Congress takes office in full on January 3, 2027. (nsp.nanet.go.kr)

Ultimately, Australia, South Korea and Ukraine see one common problem in today’s America—not a lack of power, but a lack of predictability. Australians fear that America’s war and tariffs will export inflation; South Koreans fear that trade coercion will threaten their export model and defense guarantees; Ukrainians fear that presidential freedom of maneuver could turn their security into a bargaining chip. Their responses differ, but the logic is the same: less reliance on personal diplomacy with Washington, and more emphasis on Congress, regional ties, industrial interdependence and the price the US itself will pay for continuing on its current course.

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