The main topic of discussion about America in Ukraine, South Africa and France was not so much the results of the US midterm congressional elections on November 3 as the question of whether Donald Trump’s politically weakened administration can change its foreign policy—or, on the contrary, will pursue it even more aggressively. The three countries agree on one point: the transfer of both chambers of Congress to Democratic control creates new pressure points on the White House. But in Kyiv, this is seen as a chance to stop a diplomatic drift that could be dangerous for Ukraine; in Pretoria, as a possible brake on economic punishment; and in France, as a reason to finally abandon the illusion that European security can once again depend on Washington.
The Ukrainian debate is the most pragmatic and least euphoric. The Democrats’ victory is not seen as an automatic return of US military aid, but as an opportunity to make White House decisions more transparent, politically costly and harder to impose unilaterally. In a column for Ukrainska Pravda, analysts stress that from January 2027, Democrats will be able to lead the committees on armed services, intelligence, foreign affairs and appropriations, hold hearings and demand explanations for delays in Patriot deliveries, Ukraine’s access to Starshield and the easing of sanctions against Russia. But they will not be able to “ship a missile” themselves: intelligence, export licenses, delivery schedules and many sanctions decisions will remain in the president’s hands.
That limitation sets the tone in Ukraine. Ihor Petrenko, a professor at Kyiv National University and an expert at the United Ukraine Center, called the Democrats’ success a “blue tsunami” [as phrased in the Ukrainian text], but cautioned that US voters had voted primarily to check Trump, not to adopt a new strategy for helping Kyiv. His conclusion is that Ukraine must maintain bipartisan support: future security guarantees cannot be built solely on an anti-Trump majority. Ukrainian officials make the same point. Volodymyr Zelensky said that new members of Congress and representatives of the Democratic Party had assured Kyiv they were ready to remain on Ukraine’s side, “without balancing between Kyiv and Moscow,” as reported by Interfax-Ukraine.
Behind the hope, however, lies fear about the coming weeks, not the next Congress. Ukrainian commentators point to talks between the US, Ukraine, European countries and Russia in Abu Dhabi on November 10–11: the new Congress has not yet begun work, while the Trump administration still has considerable latitude to try to impose a framework for a settlement. So in Kyiv, the discussion is not about an abstract “thaw” in Washington, but about the risk that a president who has lost legislative support may try to secure a foreign-policy achievement at any cost. The concern is stated bluntly in a ZN.UA report: Ukrainians fear that Trump may link his own political defeat to the need to force Kyiv into concessions to Moscow.
The French response goes further: Parisian intellectual circles are discussing not only how to constrain Trump, but why Europe has found itself in a position where a shift in the balance of power in Congress is seen as an event that could determine its security. An editorial in Le Monde warns that Europeans “have nothing to expect” from Trump’s defeat in the midterms: a weakened president cannot undo two years of damage to trust between allies, nor guarantee a change in US policy.
In the French view, today’s America is no longer merely a difficult ally, but a source of strategic uncertainty. A study published by Le Grand Continent identifies a symbolic shift in public opinion: only 23% of French people consider the US an ally of France. The authors link this to both the trade war and what the French perceive as the White House’s humiliating treatment of European leaders. The emotional dimension matters: for Paris, the conflict with Washington is not just about tariffs or defense contracts, but also about France’s status as an independent power.
This also shapes the French interpretation of a settlement in Ukraine. Paris fears not only a bad deal for Kyiv, but a process in which the US and Russia determine a new European security architecture without meaningful political participation by Europeans themselves. The French press sees this as a direct challenge to the idea of European “strategic autonomy”—the continent’s ability to defend itself, produce weapons and negotiate without waiting for Washington’s permission. That is why the US elections have also become a mirror for France’s own 2027 presidential campaign: the left and centrists saw the Republicans’ defeat as a warning against copying Trumpist policies, while the National Rally is trying to distance itself from the American president, Le Monde noted.
South Africa’s perspective differs markedly from those of Ukraine and France: here, Trump is seen not as an unreliable security guarantor, but as a direct source of economic and diplomatic pressure. The central concern is Washington’s decision to end South Africa’s participation in the AGOA program on January 1, 2027. The program gives certain African goods preferential access to the US market. For South Africa, this is not an abstract dispute between elites: it affects citrus farms, the automotive industry, supply chains and jobs in the country’s most vulnerable regions.
The government in Pretoria insists that during negotiations, the US began raising new objections that had not previously been under discussion. Trade Minister Parks Tau put the position cautiously: “This decision does not define the full breadth of relations between South Africa and the United States, but the outcome depends on both sides’ willingness to find a way forward” [translation]. But a Mail & Guardian analysis also reflects a harsher assessment: US accusations concern not only trade barriers and investment, but also Pretoria’s foreign-policy ties, meaning that economic measures are being used to pressure the country into adopting a diplomatic line more convenient for Washington.
South Africans are especially troubled by the way trade is being linked to US political narratives about life inside the country—including claims that white farmers are being persecuted. Welcoming the Republicans’ defeat, African National Congress Secretary-General Fikile Mbalula said, “He has been very nasty to South Africa” [translation], and accused Trump of continuing to believe the claim that white people are being killed in the country, even when white South Africans themselves reject it. His remarks were reported by Mail & Guardian. Here, US policy is seen as interference not only in foreign trade, but also in South Africa’s highly sensitive domestic debates over land, racial inequality and economic transformation.
South African commentators, however, are under no illusion that a Democratic Congress will quickly fix the situation. Bob Wekesa, director of the African Centre for the Study of the United States at the University of the Witwatersrand, considers the Democrats’ victory “good news” [translation] and suggests that skilful diplomacy could restore the country’s AGOA benefits. But Elizabeth Sidiropoulos, chief executive of the South African Institute of International Affairs, points out that although Congress created the law, the president retains the authority to determine whether a country meets AGOA’s criteria. In an analysis by Daily Maverick, the point is put vividly: after his defeat, Trump may turn out to be not merely a “lame duck,” but an “angry duck” [translation]—a president who finds it harder to pass domestic legislation and may therefore use foreign policy even more actively as a personal tool.
This is how a common international conclusion is taking shape. Ukraine, France and South Africa are not expecting the US elections to bring back the America of the past. They are counting only on the emergence of counterweights: congressional oversight, judicial and procedural constraints, and pressure from allies and business groups. Kyiv wants to turn Congress into a barrier against a deal made behind its back; Paris, into an argument for independent European defense; Pretoria, into a channel for protecting trade from politically motivated sanctions. The most unexpected common feature of these different reactions is the loss of faith in US predictability. Even where the Democrats’ victory brings relief, it is seen not as a restoration of order, but as a brief window in which to prepare for America’s next turn.
