On November 3, 2026, the day of the U.S. midterm elections, discussions in Turkey, Germany and India focus less on the party arithmetic in Washington than on a practical question: can Donald Trump’s domestic weakening reduce the external risks already affecting these countries’ energy supplies, trade and security? The common answer from local commentators is unexpectedly skeptical. A possible Democratic victory is seen as a way to strengthen oversight of the White House, but not as a guarantee that America will return to its former, more predictable self.
The main issue shared by all three countries is the U.S. war with Iran and the risk of a new strike immediately after the vote. For Turkish commentators, this is first and foremost an immediate regional crisis. In an analysis by the Anadolu Agency, Marmara University lecturer Bilgehan Alagöz considers the resumption of U.S. operations after the elections highly likely: in his view, Trump’s rejection of Iran’s offer of a seven-day ceasefire and the deployment of forces to the region point in that direction. What stands out in the Turkish debate is the way it links military escalation not to abstract geopolitics, but to the vulnerability of the national economy: higher oil prices and disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz would mean another inflationary shock for a country already sensitive to energy prices.
Former Turkish ambassador to Washington Namık Tan develops this line of reasoning. In his commentary, he warns that “the Iranian and oil crisis could put the Turkish economy in a difficult position” [translated from Turkish]. From this perspective, the U.S. elections matter not because Ankara favors one party over another, but because Congress may at least be able to limit the president’s freedom to launch or expand costly operations. But expectations are modest: Turkish commentators point out that even a divided Congress does not strip the president of broad foreign-policy powers.
In Germany, the same Iran issue is framed more sharply as a warning about Europe’s strategic dependence on U.S. decisions. The Heinrich Böll Foundation describes the war as a conflict that has tied U.S. foreign policy to the cost of everyday life through rising prices for fuel, transport and goods. The German perspective is notable because it rejects the idea that Trump is simply responding to his voters’ demand for strength. On the contrary, author Jason Moyer stresses that the war is dividing even the “Make America Great Again” movement [the political movement of Trump supporters], since some of its members opposed new foreign wars.
In Berlin, another conclusion is causing particular concern: a Republican defeat may not soften Trump’s foreign policy, but make it even more impulsive. As ARD reports, transatlantic relations expert Brandon Born expects that a president no longer needing to seek reelection could act “more erratically and confrontationally” [translated from German]. German observers are therefore watching more than just Iran. They are concerned about the prospects for U.S. support for Ukraine, tariff policy and the planned review of the U.S. military presence in Europe, including in Germany. What is being voiced is no longer a plea for Washington to be more reliable, but a call for Europe to reduce its critical dependence on an ally that remains essential but is no longer seen as unfailingly predictable.
India’s response links the war in Iran to a much broader debate over New Delhi’s right to an independent foreign policy. In a column in The Indian Express, Koan Advisory director Deep Pal writes that India-U.S. relations have become “transactional” [translated from English]: trade talks have stalled, Washington is pressuring India over its purchases of Russian oil, and tighter immigration rules are hurting Indian professionals and technology companies. However, the author cautions against excessive optimism in the event of a Democratic victory: the House of Representatives could investigate tariff decisions and step up political pressure, but it could not automatically reverse measures taken by the executive branch.
For India, this is a crucial distinction. The dispute is no longer only about the level of U.S. tariffs, but also about the reliability of any agreements with Washington. In another analysis in The Indian Express, an expert from the Observer Research Foundation urges New Delhi to seek not a temporary preferential rate, but a legally robust cap on tariffs and consultation mechanisms. The point is simple: India does not want to trade long-term market access for U.S. concessions that the White House could reverse with an administrative decision.
Ram Madhav, vice president of India’s ruling Bharatiya Janata Party, offers a more explicitly nationalist formulation. In his article, he accuses Washington of applying a double standard: the United States threatens India with punitive tariffs over Russian oil while granting exemptions to European allies and itself looking for ways to ease energy pressures on its domestic market. His conclusion is that “the weaponization of trade, technology and sea lanes must stop” [translated from English]. This is not a call to break with America: Indian commentators also stress the importance of defense, technology and investment cooperation. But they increasingly see the partnership with the United States as one in which strategic closeness does not eliminate the need to protect India’s autonomy.
Against this backdrop, it is particularly striking that the three countries draw different practical conclusions from the same uncertainty in the United States. Germany is thinking about greater European defense independence and how to weather a possible U.S. retreat from Ukraine and Europe. Turkey is focused on regional war, oil prices, the Strait of Hormuz and the need to work not only with the White House but also with Congress—including on fifth-generation aircraft and engines for its domestically developed fighter, as noted in a Turkish overview. India is considering how to turn strategic autonomy into negotiating leverage without giving up either U.S. technology or its own energy flexibility.
The most counterintuitive common conclusion in these local debates is that Trump’s possible domestic weakness does not necessarily mean America will be weaker abroad. Indian international relations scholar C. Raja Mohan warns in his column today that presidents facing legislative gridlock often turn even more actively to diplomacy and foreign policy. So in Ankara, Berlin and New Delhi, the elections are not expected to bring automatic relief. Instead, they will test a much more important hypothesis: can U.S. institutions once again constrain presidential power—and can they do so before Washington’s next decision becomes another global crisis?
