Despite the theoretical military superiority, the United States is shying away from the idea of seizing the Strait of Hormuz by force, prioritizing instead a negotiating process. Geographic constraints, the high cost of a possible operation, and the complexity of the situation on the ground are pushing American command to look for diplomatic routes. Rather than a direct confrontation, Washington is focusing on ensuring the safety of sea lanes—especially amid ongoing escalation and mutual strikes between the parties. At the same time, the strait has become an informal negotiating topic between the United States and Iran in Muscat, where navigation data indicates a sharp reduction in transit—now involving only vessels flying the Iranian flag.
Colonel Nidal Abu Zeyd notes that having military power does not automatically mean using it. The operating environment imposes serious constraints, making direct intervention extremely difficult and costly. The narrowness of the Strait of Hormuz significantly limits the use of ground forces, while naval and airborne landing operations are far harder than in open terrain. A key factor is the impact of Iran’s defenses: since 1979, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has built its system along the western coast, preparing specifically for such a scenario.
According to Abu Zeyd, the latest military campaigns, including recent strikes, have been aimed above all at “softening the target”—weakening defensive lines rather than immediately making a broad change to the situation on the ground. A cost-benefit analysis does not work in Washington’s favor: the price of an operation is so high that achieving the objective becomes meaningless compared with political and diplomatic options. This is precisely what explains the United States’ desire to lock in understandings with Iran rather than impose its will by force.
As an alternative, support for the southern route through Oman’s territorial waters is being considered—an option believed to be safer for shipping. In negotiations in Muscat, the Omani side proposes managing vessel traffic through separate corridors, with the “middle corridor” and the routes passing through Hormuz coming to the fore. Abu Zeyd emphasizes that the U.S. Fifth Fleet, based in Bahrain, has not conducted regular transit operations since the start of the confrontation, despite the ongoing need for maintenance and logistical resupply.
The southern corridor is of operational interest to U.S. forces because it allows ships to move around restrictions imposed by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Iran’s refusal to grant full freedom of movement along this route is explained not only by sovereignty concerns—since the corridor lies in Omani waters—but also by its maritime characteristics. The depth of the Omani corridor ranges from 65 to 110 meters, while the Iranian corridor is only 35 to 60 meters, making the former far more suitable for oil tankers, cargo ships, destroyers, and aircraft carriers.
Additional challenges include mines—some of which, due to being dragged by currents, have turned into “drifting” mines. Losing minefield maps or damaging them during bombardments greatly complicates mine clearance and increases risks for both civilian and military vessels. European countries sent minehunters as part of a coalition led by France and the United Kingdom, which prompted Tehran’s rejection, fearing that an international presence would reduce the mines’ impact on transit. The clearance process requires careful reconnaissance, sweeping, and locating using specialized equipment, so Western forces, including NATO, are not eager to get directly drawn into a clash inside the Strait of Hormuz.
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Why has the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, since 1979, been building its defensive system along the western coast of the Strait of Hormuz, and what geographic and strategic factors are involved? — The western coast (the Iranian side) controls the strait’s narrowest section (about 33 km), which makes it possible to use artillery, missile installations, and fast patrol boats to block passage. Geographic factors: the proximity to shore enables minelaying in the channel and attacks on ships from land. Strategic factors: about ~20% of the world’s oil passes through the strait, and Iran seeks to have the ability to shut it in the event of a conflict, creating a “no-go zone” for the opponent’s naval forces.
What role does Oman play in talks between the United States and Iran, and why did Muscat become the venue for discussing shipping in the strait? — Historically, Oman has acted as a neutral mediator, maintaining diplomatic ties with both sides (unlike Saudi Arabia or the UAE). Muscat was chosen due to trust in the sultanate, its geographic proximity to the strait, and the absence of a formal military alliance with the United States—allowing confidential meetings to take place. Oman has repeatedly helped with prisoner exchanges and with indirect consultations on the nuclear deal.
What are “drifting mines,” why are they especially dangerous for shipping in the Strait of Hormuz, and how does Iran use minefields in its defensive tactics? — “Drifting mines” are uncontrolled explosive devices that are carried by currents and winds without a fixed position. They are extremely dangerous because they cannot be predicted; they can damage civilian tankers and trigger an environmental disaster. In its asymmetric tactics, Iran uses rapidly laid minefields (often from disguised vessels) to temporarily block the strait, forcing ships to maneuver in ways that put them into the kill zone of shore-based missile systems.
Full version: Why is Washington avoiding opening the Strait of Hormuz by military force?