At the height of the Iran–Israel confrontation, prominent Egyptian thinker and constitutionalist Muhammad Salim al-Awa offers his analysis of the conflict, arguing that the traditional equations of security in the Gulf and the Arab world are collapsing before our eyes. In his view, military action against Iran has finally dispelled the illusion of American patronage. The region may be on the verge of a complete restructuring of the geopolitical balance, where the maps of influence and military calculations have demonstrated Washington's inability to protect either its bases or the security of Gulf states accustomed to "imported security."
Al-Awa calls for a reassessment of Arab–American relations and of the very concept of "imported security." He notes that the war has opened the way for radical rethinking: the retreat or inaction of American power in the face of strikes and conflicts has left peoples feeling unprotected. Military agreements and bases are no longer guaranteed sanctuaries. In this context, al-Awa insists that the Gulf states need to reconsider the presence of American bases on their territory — now is the most appropriate time to do so, before it is too late.
Addressing the legality of the war, al-Awa characterizes the American–Israeli military actions against Iran as "pure aggression" from the standpoint of international law, since Tehran did not declare war on either the US or Israel, which moreover struck civilian targets. However, he concedes that Iranian retaliatory strikes on bases in the Gulf could be qualified as self-defense if those bases were indeed used against it. Al-Awa emphasizes the need for an on-the-ground investigation to clarify this point and notes that the confrontation is not merely a military campaign but a deep regional conflict between two forces: one backed by the US and another whose doctrine is based on autonomous defense.
The thinker strongly criticizes the "Abraham Accords" — the normalization process with Israel. He condemns countries that rushed to normalize relations and mass-grant citizenship without apparent reasons, calling it "madness" and asserting that the peoples of those states do not support such steps. "The future will completely destroy the idea of normalization," al-Awa declares, rejecting attempts to use religion as a cover for rapprochement with Israel. His criticism extends to Egypt: while he himself opposes normalization, he acknowledges that Egyptian–Israeli relations are historically and politically complex. He notes that public sentiment in the Arab world tends toward solidarity with Palestine, and that propaganda campaigns against Egypt were unjustified.
Instead of outdated Arab projects, al-Awa proposes a new regional concept — an Islamic economic union involving Turkey, Egypt and the Gulf countries, focused on cooperation in industry, economy and culture. He suggests creating an economic axis combining Turkish manufacturing, Egyptian intellectual resources and the financial capabilities of the oil monarchies. In his conviction, such a format of integration is far more productive than sectarian conflicts or attempts to establish regional hegemony. "The current conflict is essentially economic," he asserts, linking it to attempts by some powers, such as the US, to dominate and to other actors' resistance to that domination.
Touching on internal Arab issues, al-Awa states that resolving crises lies in the plane of intra-Arab reconciliation, and that the League of Arab States has failed due to outdated mechanisms and the principle of compulsory consensus. He insists that al-Azhar should play the role of spiritual reference for Muslims worldwide, and that Sunni–Shia dialogue will be restored, as scholarly minds gravitate toward mutual understanding despite political noise. Regarding the dossier of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, al-Awa believes it is not yet closed and combines political and security aspects. He calls on both sides to reread the situation, not ruling out political settlement if they reassess their positions. The thinker warns that the moment for a solution still exists, and whoever takes the first step will gain the advantage. In conclusion he predicts a short-term "freeze" of the conflict and long-term escalation due to Israeli ambitions and the influence of American policy.
Comments on the news
What are the main elements of Iran's doctrine of "autonomous defense" and how does it differ from the approaches of Gulf states accustomed to "imported security"? — Iran's doctrine of "autonomous defense" (also called "defensive independence") is based on the development of its own military-industrial complex, including the production of missiles, drones and cyber capabilities, as well as reliance on proxy forces (for example, Hezbollah or the Yemeni Houthis) to create "deep defense" beyond its borders. This approach differs from Gulf states, which traditionally rely on purchasing Western arms and hosting foreign military bases (US, UK, France) to ensure security — the so-called "imported security," where a state's protection depends on external guarantees.
Which specific military bases in the Gulf countries (for example, in Qatar, Bahrain, the UAE) could have been involved in strikes against Iran and why is their location strategically important? — Key bases include: Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar (the hub of US CENTCOM air operations), the naval base in Bahrain (US Fifth Fleet), and Al Dhafra Air Base in Abu Dhabi, UAE (where F-35s and reconnaissance aircraft are stationed). Their locations are strategically important because they are in close proximity to Iran across the Persian Gulf, allowing for rapid strikes and control over the Strait of Hormuz — a critical chokepoint for oil shipments.
How can Iranian proxy forces (for example, in Yemen, Syria, Iraq) be used to attack targets in the Gulf, and what is their origin? — Iranian proxy forces can be used for asymmetric attacks: the Yemeni Houthis (Ansar Allah) — for missile and drone strikes against Saudi Arabia and the UAE; Shiite militias in Iraq (for example, Kata'ib Hezbollah) — for attacks on bases with American personnel in Iraqi Kurdistan and Kuwait; and in Syria — for threats to Israeli and Jordanian targets. The origins of these groups are linked to Iranian support after the 1979 revolution: through the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Tehran trained, financed and armed ideologically aligned Shiite and insurgent cells to expand its influence and create a buffer zone against external threats.
Full version: العوا يتحدث للجزيرة نت حول: وهم الحماية الأمريكية والردع الإيراني وانهيار التطبيع