For the past two days, Venezuelan politicians, experts and journalists have been focused on a single event: the unexpected visit to Caracas by U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, who on November 18 signed an agreement to resume military-technical cooperation at Miraflores Palace. It was the first visit by a Pentagon chief—now renamed the “Department of War”—since the January U.S. special forces operation in which Nicolás Maduro was captured. The event has brought several disputes to the fore in Venezuela: from the “sham surrender” of Chavismo to a possible deal over Essequibo and attempts to determine who is really running the country.
Military agreement seen as humiliation for Chavistas
For pro-government and pro-communist commentators, the signing of the military package has been one of the most painful episodes in the ten months since Maduro’s abduction. Former Chavista lawmaker and TV host Mario Silva, considered a mouthpiece of the movement’s hardline wing, called the meeting at Miraflores a “shameful surrender” and said that “the legacy of Comandante Hugo Chávez and the Liberator Simón Bolívar has been mocked and trampled on” (quoted by La Patilla). Silva was outraged that Defense Minister Gustavo González López, whom the UN suspects of involvement in human rights abuses, had personally signed the document, and warned that U.S. bases could be established in the country. His remarks illustrate how, for the first time, people in the Chavista camp are openly speaking of “betrayal” as an accomplished fact rather than a propaganda label aimed at the opposition.
Opposition journalist Omar González Moreno focused on another detail: in Caracas, Hegseth recalled that the operation to capture Maduro took “just 48 minutes” and was carried out “without a single American casualty.” In his view, this was “a public slap in the face to the entire Chavista military high command, which for years touted its impregnable defenses” (La Patilla). At the same time, he raises a question shared by both the opposition and some on the left: what commitments have been made, and could the agreement be used to postpone elections, given that “no international deal can replace the will of the people”?
Dispute over the constitutionality of Delcy Rodríguez’s signature
The most unexpected attack came from former vice president Elías Jaua, once a close ally of Maduro. On X, he pointed out that under Venezuela’s Constitution, a vice president temporarily serving as head of state has no authority over military, financial or foreign policy—“these are the exclusive prerogatives of the head of state” (La Patilla). Jaua called such decisions “detrimental to security, national assets, independence and national dignity” and urged “political, civic and popular struggle to restore the authority of the Constitution.” It is rare for Delcy Rodríguez’s legitimacy to be challenged not by the democratic opposition but from within the Chavista camp itself. The agreement could therefore become a legal weapon for those seeking to have it declared invalid.
Rodríguez herself, by contrast, framed the deal as a “historic opportunity.” She said that, “thanks to the geopolitical maturity of the two governments, we have been able to turn very difficult moments into a space of cooperation and mutual interest,” and that the agreement “helps equip the armed forces and facilitates access to new technologies” (L’Humanité). This “glass half full” framing reflects the position of her inner circle: isolation and sanctions must be rolled back, even if the price is a deep U.S. military presence.
Expert assessment: from coercion to institutionalized dependence
Venezuelan political scientist and human rights advocate Fabiana Garanton gave perhaps the clearest analysis of the moment in an interview with France 24. Hegseth’s visit, she said, means “the institutionalization of deeply asymmetric power relations established after the U.S. intervention,” since the man responsible for the military operation and kinetic strikes is now “coming to negotiate cooperation with the country’s armed forces.” Garanton warns that Venezuela risks “moving from authoritarianism that claims geopolitical autonomy to a system of governance shaped from abroad, without Venezuelans regaining their sovereignty.” She nevertheless acknowledges that Washington may revise its three-stage strategy—stabilization, recovery and transition to democracy. This is the main divide among experts: some see the agreement as an opportunity for managed stabilization, while others see it as entrenching the Chavista apparatus under U.S. patronage.
Essequibo: a secret deal comes to light
A subject receiving far less attention in Venezuela than the military agreement, but with potentially far more serious consequences, is a Reuters report that senior State Department official Jeremy Lewin proposed in September that Guyana “consider ceding part of its territory to Venezuela.” According to the news agency, the talks began after Delcy Rodríguez wrote to Donald Trump on May 11 asking him to mediate the Essequibo dispute. The territory, covering 160,000 square kilometers, has been claimed by Caracas as the state of Guayana Esequiba since 2024 (Reuters via La Patilla). Lewin confirmed that he had held “preliminary” consultations “under the direction of the White House,” but the State Department was quick to stress that the U.S. position on the border “has not changed” and is based on the 1899 arbitration award (EFE).
For Venezuelan analysts, this story matters because it suggests that, in exchange for Caracas’s loyalty, the government is trying to secure not only sanctions relief from Washington but also a geopolitical prize that had previously been the subject of rhetoric alone. It is telling that Caracas itself has barely responded publicly to the report: the issue is unhelpful both to the government (admitting that it is bargaining over territory through the Americans is risky) and to the opposition (which does not want to be associated with redrawing borders). Yet this is precisely where the divide runs between the “pragmatists” around Rodríguez and Chavista hardliners such as Jaua and Silva: the former are open to deals, while the latter call them “selling off the homeland.”
Sovereignty and the risk of resignation
There is also a distinct opinion-writing thread. In La Patilla, columnist Fredy Rincón Noriega writes of “external tutelage,” under which “sovereignty is severely constrained,” and warns of two dangers posed by collective pessimism: “submission to subordination” and “shifting one’s own responsibility onto external actors.” He cites a November 14 report by The Washington Post on preparations for an executive order facilitating U.S. operations in the energy, finance and critical minerals sectors, and insists that “sovereignty can be violated, restricted or subjected to external pressure, but no event makes this condition historically irreversible.” His article gives voice to the segment of Venezuelan society that supports neither Chavismo nor U.S. tutelage and is seeking a third position—one rooted in republican and legal principles.
Significantly, even critics of the agreement do not dispute that society is tired of sanctions. The argument is not about whether Venezuela needs dialogue with Washington, but what it will pay for it: military dependence, abandoning its claims to Essequibo, postponing elections—or all of the above. And while Hegseth speaks of a “natural and historic alliance” and Delcy Rodríguez of the “maturity of the governments,” Venezuelan commentators on both sides are asking the same question: who will be accountable to voters for this alliance, and on what terms, when they have not yet been consulted?