Several weeks have passed since the announcement of the US-Iran memorandum of understanding on June 17, and its implementation is moving forward, albeit with extreme caution. Early results are already visible on the ground: the ceasefire regime is being observed, there have been no reports of large-scale military clashes, the Strait of Hormuz has been reopened to navigation, and the “risk premium” on oil markets has fallen. In addition, the sides have established a permanent negotiation mechanism—technical meetings are being held in Doha to maintain communication channels and prevent new incidents.
Qatar and Pakistan’s intermediary role has become noticeably stronger: having helped draft the memorandum itself, they have moved to directly monitoring its implementation. Diplomats coordinate contacts, track compliance with the points in question, and step in when disputes arise. Meetings have taken place both in Switzerland’s Bürgenstock and in Doha, and a communications line has been set up for reporting possible violations. The mediators prepare joint progress reports and hold separate consultations with US and Iranian delegations.
Despite positive signals, serious disagreements over the interpretation of key provisions have already emerged. The sharpest is the future governance of the Strait of Hormuz. Tehran insists that the memorandum gives it the primary role in regulating shipping through the strait in coordination with Oman. Mohammad Bagher Kalibaf, speaker of the Iranian parliament, said that the “fifth clause” provides for exactly such an arrangement, and that Iran will not allow the United States to interfere. Iran’s deputy foreign minister, Garab-Abadi, stressed that the strait is not a place for the display of military force from outside.
The United States, by contrast, views the Strait of Hormuz as an international waterway and rejects any attempts by Iran to collect fees or impose restrictions. This position was supported by a joint document from the Gulf Arab states, and the International Maritime Organization warned that introducing passage fees would set a dangerous precedent for global navigation. The dispute is not limited to the strait: in the Lebanese question, Iran links implementation of the memorandum to the withdrawal of Israeli forces from southern Lebanon, while Washington, at this stage, sees only de-escalation—and ties any withdrawal to the disarmament of Hezbollah and the transfer of control to the Lebanese army.
The nuclear file remains outside the discussion for now: technical consultations have not touched on uranium stockpile levels or enrichment rates—those decisions have been postponed to later rounds of talks. Disagreements also persist over sanctions relief and the unfreezing of Iranian assets. The United States is proposing step-by-step, conditional lifting of restrictions with monitoring of how the money is spent, while Iran demands full control over its assets without external conditions. As a result, the memorandum is currently succeeding in reducing tensions and stabilizing energy markets, but low trust, differing interpretations of the provisions, and mutual linkages are turning it more into a crisis-management mechanism than a solid, comprehensive agreement.
Comments on the news
Who is Mohammad Bagher Kalibaf, and why do his statements about the memorandum’s “fifth clause” matter for understanding the position of Iran’s conservative circles? — Mohammad Bagher Kalibaf is the speaker of Iran’s parliament (Majlis) and a prominent conservative, and he previously served as mayor of Tehran. His reference to the “fifth clause” (likely relating to some Iran-Russia or bilateral agreement) signals that conservative elites are insisting on strict implementation of commitments without concessions—especially on issues affecting national sovereignty and regional security. This matters because it shows that conservatives in Iran are demanding a hard line from the authorities and are unwilling to accept compromises in negotiations with external players.
On what legal basis does Iran insist on its leading role in regulating shipping in the Strait of Hormuz, and how does this relate to international maritime law? — Iran cites the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), as well as its national legislation, which establishes sovereignty over territorial waters (up to 12 nautical miles) and the right to regulate transit through the Strait of Hormuz, which partly falls within Iran’s zone. Tehran argues that it can restrict the passage of ships for security and environmental reasons—something that is formally permitted under Article 25 of UNCLOS. However, the international community typically interprets these rights more narrowly, insisting on “transit passage”—and Iran’s position is disputed by the United States and other countries, but it remains a key tool of pressure.
Why does Iran link implementation of the memorandum to the withdrawal of Israeli forces from southern Lebanon, and how does this linkage reflect its regional priorities? — For Iran, supporting Lebanon’s Hezbollah and resisting Israel’s presence in southern Lebanon is part of the “axis of resistance” strategy, which is a central element of its regional policy. By tying implementation of the memorandum to Israel’s withdrawal, Tehran signals that it places the fight against Israel’s influence above any other agreements. This highlights the priorities of Iranian policy: strengthening proxy forces and creating buffer zones along the borders with Israel, as well as countering normalization of Arab-Israeli relations.
Full version: هل ينجح الوسطاء في منع انهيار التفاهم الأمريكي الإيراني؟