At a UN Security Council meeting devoted to Syria, Damascus, Israel and Türkiye exchanged sharp accusations, while international participants called for an end to Israeli operations on Syrian territory. Syria’s Permanent Representative Ibrahim al-Alabi said Damascus wanted to pursue diplomatic solutions and was ready for a security agreement mediated by the United States and supported by the Security Council. At the same time, he stressed that this “in no way” meant accepting occupation or abandoning the rights of the Syrian people.
Al-Alabi accused Israel of incursions into Syrian villages and strikes on sites inside the country. According to him, Damascus had engaged in the US initiative in good faith and opened the door to dialogue, but Israel responded with strikes, raids and violations. The Syrian diplomat also said that the country was building institutions, completing military and administrative integration, intensifying the fight against the “Islamic State” and drug-trafficking networks, and cooperating with the UN, the OPCW and the IAEA.
In response, Israel’s representative Danny Danon said that his country was holding direct talks with the Syrian government in pursuit of a security agreement. Israel’s conditions, he said, were that Damascus must establish control over all its territory and that foreign forces or armed groups must not use it to threaten Israel. Danon explained the retention of the buffer zone in the Golan Heights as a security measure intended to prevent a cross-border attack like that of October 7, 2023. He also accused Türkiye of stationing around 20,000 troops, operating 100 bases and outposts, and controlling approximately 5% of Syrian territory, as well as expanding its military influence and supporting Hamas and Hezbollah.
Türkiye’s representative, Ahmet Yıldız, rejected the accusations, saying that Ankara’s military cooperation with Damascus was conducted with the consent of the Syrian government. He refused to compare what he called lawful bilateral cooperation with Israel’s presence, stressing: “Strengthening Syria’s national capabilities is a sovereign right that poses no threat to a third party.” Yıldız described Israel as an occupying power and demanded an end to the escalation, the withdrawal of troops from Syrian territory and full compliance with the 1974 Disengagement Agreement. In his closing remarks, the Israeli diplomat said Israel would like to see Syria and Lebanon independent, but that actions rather than statements should be the basis for judgment. He accused Damascus of failing to fulfill its commitments to combat terrorism and implement the “road map.”
In an additional statement, al-Alabi referred to reports by the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) and an international commission which, he said, had documented continuing Israeli violations of Syrian sovereignty and international law, as well as their consequences for civilians. He added that Druze and Kurdish officials had rejected attempts at external contact or support and had joined the work of state institutions. Damascus, he said, would continue to engage with efforts led by US President Donald Trump, but in a way that did not undermine Syrians’ rights or legitimize the occupation. Claudio Cordone, the UN Deputy Special Envoy for Syria, called for an end to Israeli violations of Syria’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, describing Israel’s presence and actions in the south of the country as violations of the 1974 agreement. The United Kingdom, Denmark, Russia, China, Bahrain, Greece and Latvia also called on Israel to withdraw its troops and respect the agreement, while Latvia linked the continuation of military activity in the disengagement zone and on the Golan Heights to Security Council Resolution 2824 and the 1974 arrangements.
The situation in As-Suwayda was also discussed separately at the meeting. Cordone said that resolving the province’s problems and determining the future of its Druze community should remain in the hands of Syrians themselves and take place within a united Syria. He called for work on the province’s “road map” to resume, detainees to be released and the fate of missing people to be determined. The United States expressed concern about the escalation in As-Suwayda, called for restraint and dialogue, supported the provincial “road map” and welcomed steps to integrate the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) into state institutions. Türkiye’s representative, by contrast, accused Israel-backed armed Druze groups of destabilizing As-Suwayda, blocking supplies and aid to civilians, and obstructing examinations for students.
On the nuclear issue, the United States, the United Kingdom, Denmark and Türkiye welcomed Damascus’s cooperation with the IAEA. Washington urged Syria to continue strengthening its safeguards system and adopt the Additional Protocol. On September 9, the IAEA Board of Governors decided to terminate the provisions of its 2011 resolution concerning Syria’s previous non-compliance with its safeguards agreement. The agency said Syria had provided the necessary information and access. At the same time, the Board confirmed that Syria remained bound by its safeguards agreement under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and remained subject to routine IAEA safeguards, although the provisions of the 2011 resolution had been terminated and the Board was no longer dealing with a separate item on Syria’s implementation of the safeguards agreement.
During the humanitarian segment of the meeting, Tom Fletcher, UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, said that more than two million internally displaced people had returned home in Syria since December 2024—the highest return figure in two decades. However, around 5.5 million people remained displaced within the country, including approximately 800,000 in camps. Fletcher warned that a lack of investment and funding could lead to a new wave of displacement and worsening services; the food and education sectors had received only 26% of the funds required. He called for support for the Syrian government’s “Syria Without Camps” initiative, while the United Kingdom announced £68 million in humanitarian assistance for Syria this year.
On economic recovery, Cordone said that during his latest visit he had seen progress in the work of institutions despite difficult economic conditions, as well as increased cooperation between the Syrian authorities and the UN. Syria, he said, sought to strengthen its role as a regional energy and trade corridor, and he urged donor countries to facilitate investment and economic engagement. China called for action on unemployment and inflation, support for reconstruction, and continuation of the Syrian-led and Syrian-owned political process in line with Resolution 2254. Somalia stressed the need for constructive international economic engagement, while Greece said political openness should be reflected in economic recovery and opportunities for young people. Latvia noted that full recovery required sustained international support, structural reforms and long-term investment, while Denmark pledged $76 million in development assistance and said it intended to increase its support for reconstruction beginning in 2027.
The meeting’s conclusion showed that deep disagreements lie beneath discussions of Syria’s stability. Damascus is demanding respect for its sovereignty and an end to Israeli strikes; Israel insists on firm security guarantees and the preservation of control; and Türkiye rejects the accusations and is calling for the withdrawal of Israeli forces. International appeals once again focused on the 1974 agreement, Resolutions 2824 and 2254, and humanitarian and economic assistance. Whether these words turn into concrete steps—troop withdrawals, funding, reconstruction and improvements in Syrians’ lives—will depend on diplomacy, including US mediation efforts.
News Commentary
What is the 1974 Disengagement Agreement between Syria and Israel, and what zones and restrictions does it establish in the Golan Heights? — The 1974 Disengagement Agreement is a military accord between Syria and Israel concluded after the Yom Kippur War with US and UN mediation. It established a ceasefire line and three main elements: 1) a zone of separation, or buffer zone, between the Alpha Line on the Israeli side and the Bravo Line on the Syrian side, where military presence is prohibited except for UN forces (UNDOF); 2) zones limiting weapons and troops on both sides of the buffer zone, restricting the number of soldiers, tanks, artillery pieces and other weapons; and 3) additional zones farther inside the territory with even stricter restrictions. The agreement is not a peace treaty and does not determine the final status of the Golan Heights; the 1974 line remains the de facto line of separation. Israel annexed the Golan Heights in 1981, a move not recognized by most countries, with the exception of the United States, which recognized it in 2019.
How does As-Suwayda differ from other Syrian provinces, and why does its Druze community play a special role in Syrian politics? — As-Suwayda is a southern Syrian province whose population is predominantly Druze, along with Christians and Bedouins. The Druze are an esoteric monotheistic community distinct from Sunni and Shia Islam, with their own religious leaders and strong internal cohesion. The province is distinguished by its relative autonomy, mountainous terrain and lower level of involvement in the civil war: it was not under the permanent control of ISIS or major opposition groups, although local armed formations operated there. The Druze community plays a special role because the province is strategically located near the borders with Jordan and Israel, has cross-border ties with Druze communities in Lebanon and Israel, retains influence in the security services and can mobilize large numbers of people for protests. In 2023–2024, As-Suwayda became a center of anti-government protests over the economic crisis and demands for decentralization. The Druze balance between Damascus, local autonomy and external actors, making their position important for stability in southern Syria.
What are the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), and why is their integration into Syria’s state institutions controversial? — The SDF is a coalition made up primarily of the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG/YPJ), along with Arab, Assyrian, Turkmen and other formations. It was established in 2015 with US support to fight ISIS. The SDF controls northeastern Syria, including oil fields and camps holding ISIS detainees. The debate over integration has several causes: Damascus demands the restoration of centralized control and the dissolution of the SDF as a separate army; Türkiye considers the SDF linked to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and threatens military action, demanding disarmament; the SDF wants to preserve its forces, secure decentralization and Kurdish rights, and integrate as a separate corps or collectively; while the United States and the coalition favor integration to stabilize the country and combat ISIS but face a Turkish veto. Russia is acting as a mediator. Command structures, oil revenues, the status of Kurdish areas and the future of the US presence are also disputed.
What are the main provisions of UN Security Council Resolution 2254, and why does it remain a key framework for a political settlement in Syria? — UN Security Council Resolution 2254 (2015) sets out a road map for Syria’s political process. Its main provisions are: a ceasefire, except in the fight against terrorist groups designated by the Security Council; negotiations among Syrian parties under UN auspices; the creation, by mutual consent, of a transitional governing body with full executive powers to prepare a new constitution and hold elections; free and fair elections under UN supervision within 18 months, with the participation of all Syrians, including those in the diaspora; preservation of Syria’s sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity; humanitarian access; protection of civilians; and the release of detainees. It remains a key framework because it is the only political basis agreed at the Security Council level and supported by Russia, the United States, Türkiye, Arab countries and European states. The Geneva talks and the Constitutional Committee also refer to it. However, it has not been implemented because of disagreements over Assad’s role, the definition of terrorism, foreign intervention and the lack of unity among the major powers.
What is the IAEA Additional Protocol, and what obligations does it impose on a state that ratifies it? — The Additional Protocol to an IAEA safeguards agreement is a legal instrument that expands the agency’s ability to verify the absence of undeclared nuclear activities. It was developed after the 1991 Gulf War to strengthen safeguards. A state that ratifies the protocol must: provide the IAEA with broader information about its nuclear fuel cycle, research and development, and imports and exports of sensitive materials and equipment; grant IAEA inspectors wider access to nuclear facilities and other locations, including with short notice and through repeated visits; issue entry visas to inspectors without delay; permit environmental sampling, satellite imagery and other methods; and submit annual declarations on nuclear materials and activities. The protocol allows the IAEA to verify that all nuclear material is under safeguards and that no undeclared nuclear material or activities exist. Ratification is voluntary, but it is often required for cooperation in the nuclear field.
Why does Türkiye maintain a military presence in northern Syria, and how is this connected to its campaign against Kurdish formations and support for certain opposition groups? — Türkiye maintains a military presence in northern Syria primarily to prevent the establishment along its border of an autonomous Kurdish entity linked to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which Ankara considers a terrorist organization. Following Operations Euphrates Shield (2016), Olive Branch (2018), Peace Spring (2019) and Spring Shield (2020), Türkiye controls the areas of Afrin, Azaz, al-Bab, Jarabulus, Ras al-Ayn and Tel Abyad. It supports the Syrian National Army (SNA), a coalition of opposition groups that serves as a proxy force: it administers territory, fights the SDF/YPG and ISIS, and provides security. The presence is also connected to plans to return Syrian refugees, the struggle for influence against Russia, Iran and Damascus, and the protection of Turkmen and Arab populations. Türkiye’s priority is to prevent Kurdish formations from growing stronger; it therefore demands the dissolution of the SDF and uses the SNA to pressure it. At the same time, Ankara balances its support for the opposition with negotiations with Russia and Damascus.
Full version: Syria, Israel and Türkiye exchange accusations at the Security Council as calls are made to end incursions