The Abu Dhabi Office of Public Relations announced that the United Arab Emirates will accelerate the construction of a new pipeline with twice the capacity through the port of Fujairah, aiming to strengthen the country’s ability to bypass the strategically vulnerable Strait of Hormuz by 2027. Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Sheikh Khalid bin Mohammed bin Zayed instructed ADNOC to speed up the implementation of the "West-East-1" pipeline project, which is already under construction and is expected to become operational next year. The move is part of national efforts to increase export resilience and reduce dependence on the Strait of Hormuz, through which a significant portion of the world’s oil supplies passes.
Abu Dhabi already operates the ADCOP (Habshan–Fujairah) pipeline with a capacity of up to 1.8 million barrels per day, which has proven its importance by enabling increased exports directly from the Gulf of Oman coast. The new project does not compete with Saudi Arabia’s East–West pipeline, which, according to Saudi Aramco CEO Amin Nasser, is a “critical artery.” He noted that Aramco increased its capacity to 7 million barrels per day in eight days to preserve flows at about 60% of the volumes the kingdom exported before the conflict.
The UAE and Saudi Arabia are the only producers in the Persian Gulf with pipelines that export oil bypassing the Strait of Hormuz, while Oman has an extensive coastline on the Gulf of Oman. In contrast, Kuwait, Iraq, Qatar and Bahrain are almost entirely dependent on the strait for ship passage, making them vulnerable to maritime and political risks. Therefore, developing alternative export routes, such as the ports of Fujairah and Khor Fakkan, is a strategic priority for the Gulf Cooperation Council countries, especially amid maritime unrest.
The statement came two weeks after the UAE left OPEC, freeing it from production quota obligations and giving it greater flexibility in oil policy. ADNOC aims to reach production capacity of 5 million barrels per day by next year, after announcing capacity of 4.85 million barrels per day in May 2024. However, UAE production earlier fell from about 3.4 million barrels per day in January to less than half after the de facto closure of the strait, forcing ADNOC to halt some operations.
The region has seen a notable escalation since the start of the Iran war: Iran has expanded its definition of the strait and maritime zones it claims to control. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) released a map on May 4 showing a new zone of control covering much of the UAE’s coast in the Gulf of Oman. This coincided with a drone attack on an ADNOC tanker and shelling of an oil area in Fujairah, which the UAE called “unacceptable aggression and economic blackmail.” Iran effectively kept the strait closed after US and Israeli strikes on February 28, disrupting about 20% of global oil supplies, sharply pushing up energy prices, prompting fuel rationing measures in some countries and raising fears of an economic downturn from rising inflation. The ports of Fujairah and Khor Fakkan became a lifeline for the UAE not only for energy but also for non-oil trade and essential goods, despite repeated attacks that Abu Dhabi blames on Iran and that led to a temporary suspension of some oil shipments in April.
News commentary
What is the role of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in control of the Strait of Hormuz and what authority does this organization have within Iran’s political and military structure? — The IRGC plays a key role in control of the Strait of Hormuz, as its naval forces are responsible for protecting and patrolling this strategic waterway. Within Iran’s political and military structure, the IRGC holds significant authority: it reports directly to the Supreme Leader, has its own ground, naval and air forces, and controls missile programs and intelligence. This enables it to act autonomously from the regular army and make security decisions, including management of the strait.
Which specific maritime zones did Iran extend under its control in the Gulf of Oman according to the map published by the IRGC, and how does this affect navigation of UAE vessels? — According to the map published by the IRGC, Iran extended zones of maritime control in the Gulf of Oman, including waters around the islands of Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs, which are subject to territorial disputes with the UAE. This expansion implies the imposition of stricter navigation rules for ships transiting these waters, including possible inspections or transit restrictions. For UAE vessels, this creates risks of delays and additional costs, and heightens regional tensions.
On what historical or legal grounds does Iran claim the right to close the Strait of Hormuz and use it as a tool of economic pressure on neighboring countries? — Iran refers to international maritime law, notably the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which allows for certain measures in exclusive economic zones but does not explicitly permit the closure of straits. Historically, Tehran bases its stance on sovereign jurisdiction over its coastal waters and argues it may block the strait in cases of national security threats, for example during military conflicts or sanctions. Iran uses economic pressure via the Strait of Hormuz as leverage in negotiations over its nuclear program and regional disputes, which conflicts with the principle of freedom of navigation upheld by the international community.
Full version: الإمارات تسرّع بناء خط أنابيب نفط لتعزيز قدرتها على تجاوز هرمز