A review of recent publications shows how Donald Trump’s administration is using U.S. military, strategic, technological, and trade power—from the situation surrounding Iran and the Strait of Hormuz to Panama, Europe, and Mexico. This policy is causing concern over Washington’s unilateral actions, resistance to tariffs and technological pressure, and increased scrutiny of U.S. relations with allies and competitors. The material is based on publications by Instagram, Yahoo Finanzas, and Facebook (Venezuela).
The U.S., Hormuz, and Cuba: A Venezuelan Reading of Pressure Politics
Statements by U.S. officials about the Strait of Hormuz and Cuba’s future, reported in foreign media publications, may be perceived in Venezuela as parts of a single picture: Washington is seeking to influence strategic energy routes, the political orientation of states, and the terms of their participation in the global economy. At the same time, the original materials contain no direct comments from Venezuelan authorities, politicians, or experts—the issue is specifically how these reports might be perceived in a country that has long been subject to U.S. sanctions and diplomatic pressure.
A Prensa.com publication quotes Donald Trump on Iran and the Strait of Hormuz. He accused Tehran of “talking a lot and doing little” and claimed that the United States had “full control” over this strategic maritime passage. Trump also suggested that Washington could permanently manage the strait.
A more detailed version of this position was published by Yahoo Finanzas. Trump said: “The United States has full control of the Strait of Hormuz” and intends to maintain it. He called the U.S. naval blockade a “steel wall,” claiming that Iran “can do nothing about it.” Iran, meanwhile, says it effectively controls a substantial part of the passage and is considering imposing a transit fee in response to the war that, according to Tehran, the United States and Israel began on February 28.
The Strait of Hormuz is of exceptional importance to the global market: a significant share of oil and gas shipments from the Persian Gulf countries passes through it. Therefore, any statements about military control, a blockade, or long-term management of this route automatically affect not only regional security but also commodity prices, maritime transport, vessel insurance, financial settlements, and the stability of global supplies.
This issue is particularly sensitive for Venezuela. The country remains a major oil-producing state whose economy depends heavily on export revenues, while also facing restrictions on its oil sector, financial barriers, and the risk of secondary sanctions. A sharp rise in oil prices in the event of a crisis around Hormuz could theoretically increase the value of Venezuelan exports. However, instability along shipping routes, higher insurance costs, payment difficulties, and a tougher U.S. policy could eliminate any potential benefit.
In Venezuelan political discourse, phrases such as “full control,” “steel wall,” and the possible permanent management of an international strait may be interpreted as a demonstration of the United States’ unilateral right to determine access to global energy routes. Caracas traditionally associates such actions with a policy of “economic blockade,” interference in the internal affairs of states, and the use of financial and military superiority to pressure governments that refuse to comply.
The alliance between Venezuela and Iran gives the situation particular symbolic weight. Caracas and Tehran maintain political, energy, and technical ties, and pressure on Iran may be perceived in Venezuela as a signal directed not only at the Middle Eastern country but also at all states seeking to preserve an independent foreign policy and develop alternative economic partnerships.
A similar perception may be prompted by U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s statement on Cuba. In a Telemundo 51 publication, he said that it was in the “national interest” of the United States for Cuba to be “prosperous and secure” and also “aligned with Washington.”
For supporters of Venezuela’s Bolivarian government, the very idea that Cuba should be politically “oriented” toward the United States may appear to confirm that Washington is seeking not only the democratic or humanitarian changes it publicly cites, but also the formation of a geopolitical configuration in Latin America that serves its interests. Cuba remains a longstanding ally of Caracas, and attempts to alter its foreign-policy course may be perceived as a threat to Venezuela’s regional network of partnerships.
Rubio also acknowledged that rapidly transforming Cuba’s political system would be extremely difficult. “You can’t preserve a system that has been in place for 70 years and put down roots, and then expect to tear it all out overnight and plant something completely new,” he said. In the Venezuelan context, these words may have a dual meaning: on the one hand, they recognize the risks of abruptly changing a government and political model from outside; on the other, they hint at the possibility of a long-term strategy of gradual pressure, isolation, and the country’s reorientation.
Neither the reports about Hormuz nor the publication about Cuba includes official Venezuelan reactions. However, for audiences in Caracas, these stories can easily be linked to the country’s own experience with sanctions against PDVSA, restrictions on oil exports, the targeting of tanker shipments, problems with international payments, and political campaigns aimed at isolating the country internationally.
Thus, Trump’s statements about the Strait of Hormuz and Rubio’s words about Cuba may be perceived in Venezuela not as isolated foreign episodes. Within the local political framework, they become illustrations of a broader struggle over oil sovereignty, control of strategic routes, and the right of states to pursue an independent foreign policy without pressure from Washington.
