US-Syrian relations are entering a new phase, unlike the decades of rupture, isolation and sanctions. Washington has lifted a broad package of restrictions and removed Syria from the list of state sponsors of terrorism, where it had been listed since 1974. This opens the way for Damascus to rebuild its economy and integrate into the global financial system. A key step was the repeal of the Caesar Act, signed by Donald Trump on December 18, 2025, as part of the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2026. This completed the dismantling of the comprehensive sanctions program launched on July 1, 2025, although targeted sanctions against Bashar al-Assad and individuals involved in human rights violations, drug trafficking and terrorism remain in place.
The lifting of sanctions does not mean an alliance. It means new relations built around overlapping interests, mutual understanding and coordination on political and security issues. Washington is pursuing conditional, pragmatic diplomacy and is prepared for a functional partnership with Damascus. The Trump administration has set four objectives regarding Syria’s new authorities: to support Syria’s stability and territorial integrity; prevent terrorist organizations from finding a safe haven; protect religious and ethnic minorities; and ensure that Syria does not threaten its neighbors and lives peacefully alongside them. This reflects a shift in US policy: a stable Syria now serves US interests, while instability could bring back ISIS, chaos, migration, and Iranian and Russian influence.
In the economic sphere, the changes are reflected in the opening of channels for international financial transfers, including SWIFT. This should facilitate imports and exports and restore confidence in Syrian financial transactions. US companies Mastercard, Visa and Chevron have already taken initial steps into the Syrian market, while an American business delegation representing 50 major companies visited Damascus to discuss investment, reconstruction and long-term partnerships. The lifting of sanctions does not benefit only American businesses: it removes the legal risks that prevented companies from the Gulf states, Turkey and Europe from entering the market. However, full reintegration requires Syria to establish a legal and financial environment that improves banking compliance and provides suitable financial infrastructure.
The fight against terrorism remains central to relations between Washington and Damascus. It is a test of the Syrian state’s ability to control security and prevent extremist groups from returning. Syria’s joining the international coalition against ISIS in 2025 demonstrated its desire to be regarded as a partner in strengthening stability, but the United States expects concrete results that will reduce the threat. A new formula is taking shape: the more effectively Syrian state institutions combat extremists, the less Washington needs to rely on independent armed groups. This was reflected in the dissolution of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the beginning of the integration of their units and territories into state institutions; Presidential Decree No. 13, which granted Kurds cultural and language rights; the appointment of Mazloum Abdi as a presidential adviser in August 2026; and the appointment of Ilham Ahmed as a member of the People’s Council.
The most difficult test remains the question of relations with Israel. Washington wants Syria to be stable, but Israel’s security remains a priority for it. This creates a contradiction: Israeli strikes and incursions continue, as does the right wing’s refusal to withdraw from the occupied Syrian territories. Syria needs US pressure on Israel to restrain its aggressive policy, as well as a security agreement that would restore arrangements resembling the 1974 disengagement agreement without reducing the security of southern Syria to Israel’s demands alone. In return, Washington wants guarantees that the border will not become a threat to Israel, and therefore continues its mediation. The first round took place in August 2026, followed by four more, but Israel’s intransigence led to a deadlock.
From its relations with Washington, Damascus expects not only political and economic support, but also a tool for deterring Israeli aggression and managing the conflict with an aggressive policy aimed at undermining Syria’s stability and territorial integrity. The lifting of sanctions is seen as removing economic and legal threats: Syria is moving from requests for exemptions to requests for financing and investment. It needs long-term financial openness, as the cost of reconstruction is estimated at approximately $216 billion. On the diplomatic front, it is seeking the full restoration of relations with Washington and the reopening of the US embassy, although the travel advisory remains at Level 4.
At the same time, Syria needs more than the United States. Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, other Gulf states, the Arab world and Europe are important to it, as are carefully calibrated relations with Russia and China. It is in Syria’s interest not to replace old dependencies with new ones. Despite the lifting of sanctions and removal of the main restrictions, the path ahead will not be entirely smooth: strategic and security-related conditions and demands continue to determine its pace, limits and speed.
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What exactly did the Caesar Act prohibit, and why is its repeal considered more significant for foreign banks and investors than Syria’s removal from the US list of state sponsors of terrorism? — The Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act of 2019 imposed sanctions on the Assad government, its officials and any foreign individuals providing substantial financial, material or technological support to Damascus—in the oil, construction, military, aviation, telecommunications and other sectors. The key element was secondary sanctions: under the threat of being cut off from the dollar system and the US market, foreign banks and companies avoided any transactions with Syria. That is why the repeal or suspension of the act is more important to them than removal from the list of state sponsors of terrorism. SST status primarily restricts US aid, arms exports and certain financial operations, whereas the Caesar Act created a global “sanctions shield” against investment and reconstruction.
What territory and forces did the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) control before their dissolution, and why does their integration into the Syrian army and state institutions remain one of the most difficult issues in northeastern Syria? — Before their dissolution or integration, the SDF controlled northeastern Syria: Hasakah, Qamishli, Raqqa, eastern Deir ez-Zor, parts of the Aleppo countryside, the al-Hol camp, oil and gas fields, border crossings with Iraq and part of the border with Turkey. Their core consisted of the Kurdish YPG and YPJ, but the coalition also included Arab, Assyrian, Turkmen and Armenian units. Integration is difficult because of Turkey’s opposition, as it considers the YPG and PKK terrorist organizations; Damascus’s concerns about losing control over the army, oil and borders; demands for Kurdish autonomy versus a unitary state; interethnic and tribal tensions; and unresolved questions concerning the chain of command, disarmament and the future of US support.
Who are Mazloum Abdi and Ilham Ahmed in Syria’s Kurdish political movement, and what political disagreements accompanied their appointments to state positions? — Mazloum Abdi (Ferhat Abdi Şahin) is the commander-in-chief of the SDF and one of the leading Kurdish military figures, associated with the YPG. Ilham Ahmed is a prominent Kurdish politician, co-chair of the Syrian Democratic Council and a representative of the autonomous administration in northeastern Syria. Their appointments to state positions as part of the integration process were viewed controversially. Turkey and its allies saw them as legitimizing “terrorist” structures; Damascus feared the emergence of parallel centers of power; some Arab tribes and minorities demanded equal representation; and Kurdish groups insisted on preserving autonomy and their military force. Disputes concerned powers, federalism, control over resources and borders, and whether the appointments would genuinely integrate the SDF rather than simply rename its structures.
What was the 1974 Agreement on Disengagement of Forces on the Golan Heights, and why might Washington and Damascus view it as a model for a new security agreement with Israel? — The 1974 Agreement on Disengagement of Forces was signed by Israel and Syria with US mediation after the Yom Kippur War. It provided for a ceasefire, the withdrawal and separation of forces, the creation of a buffer zone under the control of UN forces (UNDOF), limited-arms zones and an exchange of prisoners. The agreement maintained relative calm on the Golan Heights for decades. It may serve as a model for a new agreement because it offers a framework of demilitarized zones, UN monitoring, force limitations, phased withdrawals and security guarantees. For Damascus, this would be a way to restore its influence over the Golan Heights and avoid Israeli strikes; for Washington, it would provide a model for stabilization without a comprehensive peace treaty. The difficulties include Israel’s annexation of the Golan Heights in 1981, US recognition of that annexation in 2019, Syria’s demand for the full return of the territory, and Israel’s concerns about an Iranian presence.
Full version: How Syria Avoided Israel’s Difficult Traps in Washington