The postponement of Iraqi Prime Minister’s visit to Saudi Arabia turned out to be more than just a change to the diplomatic calendar—it was a clear signal of mounting tensions between the two countries. The planned trip, intended to strengthen rapprochement, coincided with a wave of attacks on Saudi oil facilities that, according to Riyadh, were carried out from Iraqi territory. In response, joint U.S.-Saudi strikes hit the positions of armed groups accused of carrying out the attacks, highlighting the depth of the crisis and its potential consequences for regional stability.
The conflict has gone far beyond a bilateral quarrel between Saudi Arabia and Iraqi factions, becoming part of a broader struggle for influence across the Middle East. With its complex web of forces, Iraq is turning into one of the most sensitive arenas for regional rivalry. As noted, some pro-Iranian groups are embedded in a wider “deterrence network” stretching from the Persian Gulf to the Levant, meaning that any military move within Iraq has implications that reach well beyond its borders.
From Saudi Arabia’s and the United States’ perspective, attacks using drones and rockets have ceased to be a symbolic threat and have become a direct strike on energy infrastructure—one that affects global security. Riyadh emphasizes that the strikes are carried out from Iraqi soil, providing political and legal grounds to demand an end to Iraq being used as a staging ground, while reserving the right to respond under the doctrine of self-defense. Washington views the pro-Iranian groups as posing a dual threat: to its own forces and interests, as well as to the stability of partners in the Gulf—so each response carries a message of deterrence.
As for losses among “Hashd ash-Shaabi” (Popular Mobilization Forces), exact figures vary due to conflicting information from Iraqi authorities, the factions themselves, and Western sources. However, it appears that the strikes focused on headquarters, storage facilities, and command posts—aimed at reducing the groups’ operational capabilities rather than only physically eliminating fighters. The point is stressed that the impact is not just about the number of killed and wounded, but about undermining command-and-control systems, drone capabilities, and logistics.
The most difficult task falls to the Iraqi government: military measures alone are not enough without political and security decisions capable of preventing the use of Iraqi territory for attacks on neighbors. Baghdad faces a dual challenge—on the one hand, it rejects turning its land into a platform for aggression; on the other, it confronts influential armed factions that are hard to rein in through traditional methods. Hence statements about investigations and refusals to use Iraqi territory to attack “brotherly and friendly states,” but repeated attacks force the government to prove its ability to monopolize the use of force.
In the most likely scenario, according to the authors, it is not an open war between Saudi Arabia and Iraq—official relations tend to favor preserving rapprochement—but the continuation of “cross-border” strikes and retaliatory actions, which could gradually turn Iraq into an arena for proxy confrontation. The key condition for escaping this spiral remains the state’s restoration of a monopoly on decision-making in the security sphere. Success in this course would protect not only ties with Riyadh, but also the prospect of Iraq regaining its Arab and regional role, preventing the country from becoming a permanent battleground for settling scores between competing powers.
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What is “Hashd ash-Shaabi,” and what does Iran have to do with this organization? — “Hashd ash-Shaabi” (Popular Mobilization Forces) is an umbrella structure that brings together dozens of mainly Shiite militias in Iraq, created in 2014 to fight ISIS. Iran has close ties to the organization through the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC/KСИР): Tehran provides funding, military training, weapons, and strategic guidance to key factions within Hashd ash-Shaabi, such as Kataib Hezbollah and Asaib Ahl al-Haq. Iran uses these groups to strengthen its influence in Iraq and as a tool of regional deterrence.
What role does Iran play in the regional standoff with Saudi Arabia on Iraqi territory? — Iraq has become one of the theaters of a proxy conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Through its network of allies within Hashd ash-Shaabi, Iran seeks to weaken Saudi influence by backing Shiite political blocs and militias that counter Saudi interests, especially in areas with mixed populations. Tehran also uses Iraqi territory as a rear base for supplying its allies in Syria (for example, via a land corridor), which Riyadh views as a threat. Iran’s strategy in Iraq is aimed at preserving the dominance of a pro-Russia/pro-Iran government, blocking attempts by Saudi Arabia to strengthen Sunni and anti-Iranian forces.
What is meant by the “deterrence network” from the Persian Gulf to the Levant, and what place do pro-Iranian groups play in it in Iraq? — The “deterrence network” is an Iranian military-political concept that involves creating a belt of proxy forces capable of threatening the interests of Israel and the United States in the Middle East. It stretches from Yemen (the Houthis) through Iraq and Syria to Lebanon (“Hezbollah”). Pro-Iranian groups in Iraq play a key role as the central link in this network: they provide land connectivity between Iran and Syria, control borders, deploy short- and medium-range missile launchers, and also serve as a reserve for rapid redeployment of forces to the Israel-Syria border and to the Persian Gulf. Iraqi militias thus turn Iraq into a forward bastion for deterrence against both potential ground invasions and maritime threats from the U.S. Navy.
Full version: بعد الضربات.. هذا السيناريو الأكثر ترجيحا لإزالة تهديد “الحشد الشعبي”