Syria’s economy is entering 2026 at a turning point: a faster recovery is expected, along with improved confidence among investors and consumers, driven by the return of about 1.5 million refugees and the gradual reintegration of the country into regional and international economic life. According to the International Monetary Fund, GDP growth this year could exceed 10%, despite ongoing regional tensions. However, the durability of this upswing will directly depend on addressing deep imbalances in the banking sector and continuing structural reforms.
The IMF links the expected surge in growth to improved conditions in agriculture, expanded hydrocarbon production, the restoration of electricity supply, and steady growth in trade and services. There is also a clear improvement in public finances: in 2026, projections call for a significant increase in tax, customs, and energy revenues. Inflation has risen this year due to higher import costs amid external pressures, but the fund expects it to ease by 2027 if a sound fiscal-monetary and monetary policy is implemented.
Syria’s Finance Minister Mohammed Yasser Barnia described the IMF statement as an important signal of confidence in the government’s reform drive, aimed at restoring macroeconomic stability, improving the efficiency of public finances, and creating a more attractive environment for investment and the private sector. An Al Jazeera correspondent in Damascus noted that the fund’s praise followed progress by Syria in public finance management and transparency. The IMF and the World Bank have tied these achievements to the possibility of increased grants for Syria by 2027. The World Bank has already approved two key projects: $20 million to improve the efficiency of public financial management, and $225 million to support healthcare, water supply, and basic services.
The fund emphasizes that Damascus’s needs go far beyond traditional humanitarian aid. The country requires rapid international financial support that will enable job creation, the restoration of infrastructure, and an acceleration of restructuring in the banking sector to facilitate domestic and international payments. Osama al-Kadi, First Adviser at Syria’s Ministry of Economy, said that the current results are the result of 16 months of intense work on developing monetary-policy tools and external openness. He also noted that Syria has risen by more than 70 places in the economic index of Reporters Without Borders between 2025 and 2026.
Among the key steps to rebuild the monetary system are an agreement between the central banks of Syria and Turkey to gradually withdraw the Turkish lira from northern areas and switch to the Syrian lira, as well as the opening of joint deposit accounts to simplify payments. Consulting firm Oliver Wyman has been tasked with conducting a gap assessment to connect Syria to the SWIFT system. In the coming weeks, it is expected that the country’s name will be removed from the list of states supporting terrorism, which by the end of 2026 should improve cooperation with correspondent banks. The plan also includes settling historical imbalances involving roughly 15 banks established earlier with the participation and influence of Rami Makhlouf, pending approval of a new banking law by parliament.
Osama al-Kadi forecasts stabilization of the monetary and financial system by the end of 2027, as well as the entry of Arab, Turkish, and American banks by mid-year. This should improve the quality of banking services and deepen economic recovery. That said, these expectations are directly linked to the continuation of reforms, the rebuilding of industrial production sectors, and infrastructure restoration. For now, there is hope that positive assessments by international institutions will translate into real support and tangible improvements in the lives of Syrians in the coming years. Thus, Syria faces a real test: whether it can turn positive macroeconomic indicators into sustainable, inclusive growth and long-term stability.
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Who is Rami Makhlouf and why did the banks created with his involvement become a source of “historical imbalances,” as mentioned in the article? — Rami Makhlouf is Bashar Assad’s cousin and one of the most well-known Syrian oligarchs close to the regime. Through his companies and ties to state banks, he controlled entire sectors of the economy—from telecommunications to construction and finance. Banks created with his participation served the interests of a narrow elite, operated through non-transparent arrangements, and were effectively used to siphon funds and enrich the clan. This led to “historical imbalances”: excessive concentration of assets, politicization of lending, capital flight, and the distortion of the banking system, which began to serve the ruling circle rather than the economy. After Assad fled, Makhlouf’s legacy remained as weak, non-transparent, and distrusted financial institutions.
How did the Turkish lira end up in circulation in northern areas of Syria, and what does its gradual withdrawal mean for the local economy? — The Turkish lira appeared in northern Syria due to many years of control over these territories by pro-Turkey armed groups and their close economic dependence on Turkey. Local trade, fuel imports, food, and construction materials were geared toward the Turkish market, while wages and prices were often tied to the lira. The gradual withdrawal of the lira means a shift to the Syrian pound or other payment instruments. For the local economy, this is a double-edged process: on one hand, it pulls the region back into the orbit of the official Syrian financial system and reduces dependence on foreign currency; on the other, it may trigger a sharp rise in prices, the loss of savings for the population, and a temporary paralysis of trade, because old contracts and transactions will have to be recalculated using new exchange rates.
What financial restrictions does Syria face due to being on the list of states supporting terrorism, and why would removal improve how banks operate? — Syria’s inclusion on this list (especially on the US list) means severe sanctions: bans for American companies and banks from doing business with Syria, asset freezes, restrictions on dollar operations, and de facto isolation from the international payment system SWIFT. Foreign banks refuse to open correspondent accounts for Syrian banks, fearing secondary sanctions. This makes normal external trade settlements impossible, blocks access to loans from the IMF and the World Bank, prevents attracting investment, and even disrupts remittances from the diaspora. Removal would lift these barriers: Syrian banks would be able to restore correspondent relationships, service foreign trade, attract foreign capital, and use international financial instruments. This is critical for the country’s reconstruction and for stabilizing the national currency.
Full version: اقتصاد سوريا 2026.. زخم التعافي يصطدم باختبار "سويفت" والإصلاح المصرفي