A Damascus court sentenced former President Bashar al-Assad, his brother Maher al-Assad, and Atif Najib to death. These are the first domestic judicial decisions against the former head of state and members of his inner circle since the fall of the previous government. The court linked the case to the suppression of protests in Daraa in 2011 and to a broader system of repression: Najib, who was present at the trial, was responsible for charges directly connected to events in the city, while the Assad brothers were convicted in absentia on broader charges of serious crimes.
The verdict’s historical significance does not yet mean that it has unquestionable legal force in Syria or abroad. Confidence in the decision will depend on the publication of a reasoned text accessible to the public, explaining the court’s authority, the facts established, the evidence, the standard of proof, and the guarantees afforded to the defense. The safety of witnesses and transparency at every stage of the proceedings are also important. A swift verdict does not in itself prove that justice was absent, but cases involving crimes against humanity and the responsibility of senior officials generally require extensive disclosure of materials and a fully functioning defense.
The key issue is proving individual criminal responsibility. Bashar al-Assad’s presidential office or Maher al-Assad’s military leadership, by themselves, are not sufficient grounds for a conviction. The court must establish the specific form of responsibility attributable to each defendant: issuing orders, instigation, aiding and abetting, participation in a joint criminal plan, or command responsibility for subordinates under his effective control. It must also be shown that the leader knew, or had reason to know, about the crimes and failed to take measures to prevent them, stop them, or punish those responsible.
Additional difficulties are connected with Syrian law. It does not contain comprehensive, standalone offenses covering crimes against humanity, war crimes, enforced disappearances, and the responsibility of commanders and superiors. The court must therefore apply existing provisions without creating new crimes retroactively, and must explain in detail the connection between the defendants’ specific actions, the scale of the violations, and the chain of command.
The death sentences handed down in absentia against Bashar and Maher al-Assad raise serious concerns regarding the right to a fair trial and the possibility of enforcing the decision. International standards permit trials in absentia only in limited circumstances—for example, when the accused was timely and effectively notified and given a genuine opportunity to participate in the proceedings. In addition, after being arrested or voluntarily appearing, the accused must have a clear and practically accessible opportunity for a retrial in their presence. The death penalty increases the risks, since a judicial error can no longer be remedied, and many states will not extradite suspects without reliable guarantees that the sentence will not be carried out.
The verdict could serve as a basis for international requests for wanted notices, travel restrictions, extradition, and cooperation, but it does not by itself guarantee the arrest or punishment of those convicted outside Syria. An Interpol Red Notice is not an international arrest warrant: it requests that a person’s location be identified and that the person be provisionally detained, while further action depends on the law of the country concerned, its relations with Syria, and its assessment of the case’s political nature. Bashar al-Assad’s presence in Russia demonstrates the limits of this mechanism. Bilateral extradition requests, cooperation with countries exercising universal jurisdiction, and the transfer of case materials to foreign prosecutors are also possible, but everything will depend on states’ willingness to cooperate and independently assess the legality of the case.
Finally, this verdict cannot replace a comprehensive system of transitional justice. Syria needs truth-seeking, efforts to locate the missing, protection of security-service archives and detention facilities, the identification of mass graves, compensation for victims, support for survivors and families, and reform of security and judicial institutions. Complex international crimes may require a specialized court or a hybrid Syrian-international mechanism. The decision will constitute a genuine turning point only if it is accompanied by independent justice, the right to a defense, the presumption of innocence, reasoned and appealable judgments, and accountability for those responsible on all sides of the conflict—from perpetrators to political and military leaders.
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How were Syria’s government bodies and chain of command structured in 2011, and what documents could confirm Bashar or Maher al-Assad’s effective control over units accused of crimes? — Formally, Syria was a presidential republic: the president was commander in chief, while the army was subordinate to the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff. In practice, a significant role was played by the presidential administration, security services, the Ba’ath Party, and informal ties within the security apparatus. Evidence of effective control could include orders concerning appointments and redeployments, operational instructions, communications logs, meeting minutes, intelligence reports, supply records, testimony from commanders and subordinates, and materials showing that leaders knew about the crimes and failed to take measures to prevent or punish them. Political status or kinship with a commander is usually not enough: the court must prove an actual ability to issue orders and control a unit.
Why is Daraa considered the symbolic starting point of the Syrian uprising, and what significance do the events of 2011 have for current debates on transitional justice? — Daraa is regarded as the symbolic starting point of the uprising following the arrests and mistreatment of teenagers who wrote anti-government slogans in March 2011. The protests and their suppression soon spread to other cities. For transitional justice, the events of 2011 are important as a possible starting point for systematic violations: they raise questions about which crimes should be investigated, who should be held responsible, how the chain of command should be documented, and how criminal proceedings can be combined with truth-seeking, reparations, and institutional reform.
What provisions of Syrian criminal law can a court apply to crimes against humanity if separate international offenses and command responsibility are not expressly established in national legislation? — Depending on the specific facts, the court could apply general offenses under Syrian law, including intentional homicide, causing bodily harm, unlawful imprisonment, torture, rape, abduction, destruction of property, and other crimes, as well as provisions on participation, instigation, and aiding and abetting. The court may treat the widespread or systematic context as a circumstance of the case, but this does not always replace a separate crime against humanity provision. Establishing a superior’s responsibility would require proof of participation, ordering, or assistance, or—if the court finds such a provision applicable—effective authority over subordinates, knowledge of the crimes, and failure to act. The retroactive application of more serious or new provisions is restricted by the principle of legality.
Which countries use universal jurisdiction in cases involving crimes committed in Syria, and how do their procedures differ from possible prosecution inside the country? — The most prominent cases have been brought or pursued in Germany, France, Sweden, the Netherlands, Austria, and Belgium; investigations have also been conducted in other European states. Universal jurisdiction allows genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes to be prosecuted regardless of where they were committed or the nationality of the victims, although national laws often require a link to the country—for example, the suspect’s presence there or the victim’s residence. Such proceedings generally rely on the principle of individual responsibility and evidence collected abroad, while the trial takes place in the courts of the country handling the case. Prosecution inside Syria could encompass a broader range of suspects and provide access to national archives, but it would require an independent judiciary, security guarantees, access to crime scenes, and solutions to questions involving amnesties, immunities, and political interference.
Full version: After the death sentence: How Syria could arrest “Assad”