On the November 17 episode of The Opposite Direction, host Faisal al-Qassem spoke with writer and political analyst Kamal al-Labwani and journalist Ayman al-Haddad about the work of Syria’s new authorities and the progress of the transition. The debate quickly moved beyond a simple tally of successes and failures. The central question became how to judge this period: by the legacy the authorities inherited, or by what people are experiencing and the institutions being built now. Beneath the heated exchanges lay a shared question: what genuinely takes time, and what—oversight, participation and accountability—must begin immediately?
Ayman al-Haddad built his defense around the scale of the destruction left by Bashar al-Assad’s regime. In his view, the new authorities cannot be judged without taking into account that they inherited a country in a state of profound devastation: “This is a legacy, and the world must acknowledge that the Assad regime destroyed the people, their homes and the country itself.” The host reinforced this point, noting that some countries had needed years to recover after wars. He also cited a World Bank estimate published in October 2025: damage to Syria’s physical assets between 2011 and 2024 was estimated at around $216 billion, meaning that reconstruction could not happen overnight.
Kamal al-Labwani shifted the objection from the pace of repairing the damage to the nature of the rule itself. He accused the authorities of seeking to reproduce authoritarianism and argued that the transition should build institutions that allow Syrians to take part in decision-making, rather than turning temporary arrangements into a permanent reality. This revealed two different points of reference: al-Haddad focused on what the authorities had inherited, while al-Labwani asked what they were laying the foundations for in the future.
To show that recovery was beginning, al-Haddad pointed to the return of refugees, UNHCR figures, the restoration of medical facilities and schools, judicial measures and improvements in press freedom indicators. Al-Labwani brought the discussion back to the prices of bread, electricity and fuel, to wages and whether they could cover basic needs. “Ask an ordinary citizen today,” he insisted, describing someone buying fuel in tiny amounts because he could not afford to heat his home. The exchange of figures produced no shared yardstick: the gap between institutional progress and citizens’ lived experience remained clear.
The economic debate shifted from the availability of resources to how they were managed. Al-Labwani asked about treasury accounts, undisclosed contracts and the sovereign wealth fund: who manages it, and how is its income spent? Al-Haddad urged viewers to check the Finance Ministry’s website, arguing that information was available. He defended bringing in foreign companies to operate in economic sectors and invest in resources, rejecting the view that their arrival in itself proved that national wealth was being squandered. Another divide emerged here: willingness to discuss investment met demands for transparent terms and oversight of revenues.
On elections, al-Haddad pointed to practical obstacles: the lack of sufficient data and problems with civil records for Syrians abroad. He argued that a democratic transition needed an institutional and administrative foundation that could not simply be declared ready. Al-Labwani, by contrast, insisted on steps that should precede elections—transitional justice, an independent judiciary and local participation—and warned that organizational difficulties must not be used as a pretext for retaining a monopoly on decision-making indefinitely. The context is set by the March 2025 constitutional declaration: it established a five-year transitional period, which will end after a permanent constitution is adopted and elections are held. Two-thirds of lawmakers are to be elected through electoral colleges, while the president appoints the remaining third.
In closing, al-Labwani stressed that he was not calling for the regime to be overthrown, since that would plunge the country into chaos. His demand was to change course and return to the will of the Syrian people: the transitional period must not become permanent, and it cannot succeed without institutions and an independent judiciary. Al-Haddad continued to insist that the state was moving in the right direction, though he acknowledged mistakes and noted that corruption cases had already been referred to the oversight and inspection body. After the heated exchange, Faisal al-Qassem remarked: “We thought the old Syrian episodes were over—but they weren’t.”
News Q&A
What are Syria’s “electoral colleges,” through which two-thirds of lawmakers are to be elected under the 2025 constitutional declaration? — These are indirect elections, not nationwide direct elections: under the March 2025 constitutional declaration, two-thirds of the People’s Assembly are to be elected through special colleges, while the remaining third is expected to be appointed by the president. The colleges’ exact composition, voting procedures and allocation of seats are to be set out in a separate electoral law. They are intended to take local, professional and community interests into account when parties are weak and reliable population data is lacking.
Who is Kamal al-Labwani, and which Syrian political or intellectual circles is he associated with? — Kamal al-Labwani is a Syrian doctor, human rights activist and veteran of the secular democratic opposition who spent years in prison under Assad. He is associated with the liberal-democratic and human rights wing of the Syrian opposition, the Damascus Declaration circles and former political prisoners. He advocates a civil state and a nonviolent transition, and distances himself from radical Islamist armed groups.
What is known about Syria’s sovereign wealth fund: which assets and revenues does it control, and who decides how the money is spent? — Few details have been publicly confirmed so far. The fund is conceived as a state instrument for managing assets and investments during the transition. Its remit may include stakes in state-owned companies, real estate and land, assets confiscated from former Assad associates, and revenues from oil, gas, phosphates and ports. Decisions are likely made by a board of directors or trustees, with the president and government playing leading roles, while parliamentary and public oversight remains weak and opaque.
How does Syria’s civil registration system work, and why has restoring documents for millions of Syrians abroad become an obstacle to elections? — Syria’s civil records are maintained by the Interior Ministry through local civil registration offices, which record births, marriages and deaths and issue identity cards and family records. The war destroyed some archives and offices, while millions of refugees were left without documents. Replacing them requires people to appear in person, provide witnesses, pay fees and undergo checks, while consular services abroad are limited. Because voting requires verified identity, citizenship and place of registration, the lack of access to documents for Syrians abroad is a serious barrier to elections.
Full episode: Syria two years after Assad’s fall: Between achievements and challenges