Following the fall of the Assad regime, Israeli actions in Syria have ceased to be limited to repeated strikes and raids. A new phase has begun in the Quneitra area: a return to excavation, bulldozer clearing and the fortification of positions. All of this is being carried out במסגרת a project Israel calls “Sufa 53” (“Great Storm”), prompting the question: is Israel building a new “Bar-Lev Line” on Syrian soil? This is not merely about walls or barbed wire—the project is part of a broader attempt to create new Israeli “security borders” within Syria’s geography.
The project is being carried out in the demilitarized zone established by the 1974 Disengagement of Forces Agreement, at a depth of 300 to 1,000 meters, according to the Sijill Center. The Israeli army is using bulldozers to level the ground, digging trenches, building embankments and erecting fortifications, destroying extensive areas of vegetation, pastureland and trees. In terms of its engineering logic, this work resembles the historic Bar-Lev Line, built by Israel in Sinai after 1967: it too relied on embankments and trenches to impose a new reality on the ground.
The system includes a parallel military road up to 8 meters wide and approximately 70–90 kilometers long, facilitating the movement of patrols and equipment. Deep and wide trenches are also being dug to impede armored vehicles and infantry, while earth barriers around 5 meters high are being built to block visibility and conceal movements. These measures are supplemented by technological systems, including observation towers, sensors and permanent cameras.
The work began in mid-2022 with the construction of a military road for heavy equipment near the village of Hader in northern Quneitra, and later expanded southward through areas near Jubata al-Hashab, Hamidiyah, Qahtaniyah, Bir Ajam and Brika, reaching the vicinity of al-Asha. Israel links the project to an old security concept supposedly intended to prevent possible attacks by Iran-backed armed groups. However, these claims are contradicted by the fact that the project has continued even after the departure of Iranian militias and the fall of the Assad regime on December 8, 2024. In September, Israel’s defense minister called the area a “security zone,” while Israel’s representative to the United Nations justified the actions as necessary to prevent cross-border threats and a repeat of an attack like October 7 from Syrian territory.
“Sufa 53” raises questions not so much about the project’s engineering features as about Israel’s goal of unilaterally redrawing the military-geographical space. What began as a defensive project along the occupied Golan Heights has evolved into broader incursions into Syrian lands occupied after December 8, 2024, and an attempt to replace the 1974 arrangements with new facts on the ground. The danger lies in the absorption of a significant part of the buffer zone and movement beyond the observation lines into Syrian territory, violating the international agreement and the legal and practical status of the zone and the border. If the project becomes a long-term military structure, it could turn into a bargaining chip and a political basis for redefining Israel’s “security borders” in Syria.
From the outset, the Syrian administration adopted a pragmatic position, prioritizing the restoration of the state, but it took a firm stance toward “Sufa 53.” Syria’s Foreign Ministry condemned the Israeli violations and practices, calling them “a flagrant violation of the 1974 Disengagement of Forces Agreement and a gross disregard for the principles of international law and national sovereignty.” Damascus insists on a return to the arrangements that existed before December 8 and to the Disengagement of Forces Agreement. Israel’s actions are testing the international community’s commitment to international law and its refusal to legitimize the imposition of facts by force. Recent wars have shown that defensive lines, embankments and trenches do not provide absolute security: the Bar-Lev Line held out against the Egyptian army for only a few hours during the October 1973 war.
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What did the 1974 Disengagement of Forces Agreement between Syria and Israel provide for, and what role did UN forces (UNDOF) and the demilitarized zone around Quneitra play in it? — The agreement, signed on May 31, 1974, under UN mediation, ended the active phase of the Yom Kippur War. It provided for a ceasefire, the withdrawal of Israeli forces from territory occupied in 1973 east of the 1967 line, including Quneitra, and the creation of a buffer, or demilitarized, zone between the parties. Israeli and Syrian military forces were prohibited from being present there; Syrian civilian administration and police were restored in Quneitra, but without the army. Established under UN Security Council Resolution 350, the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) monitored the ceasefire, patrolled the buffer zone and arms-limitation zones, investigated violations and reported them to the Security Council. The demilitarized zone around Quneitra served as a physical barrier, reducing the risk of direct clashes and separating Israeli forces from Syrian forces.
What was the Bar-Lev Line in Sinai, why was it considered a powerful defensive system, and why was it breached by the Egyptian army within a matter of hours in October 1973? — The Bar-Lev Line was a system of Israeli fortifications along the eastern bank of the Suez Canal, created after 1967 and named after Chief of Staff Haim Bar-Lev. It included a chain of forts, sand embankments 20–25 meters high, minefields, wire obstacles, artillery positions, pipelines for pumping burning oil into the canal and early-warning systems. It was considered powerful because it was intended to delay an Egyptian offensive, give Israel time to mobilize its reserves and allow its air force and armored units to launch a counterattack. However, on October 6, 1973, Egypt launched a surprise offensive on Yom Kippur. Massive artillery fire, airstrikes, water cannons used to breach the sand embankments, pontoon bridges and infantry equipped with anti-tank weapons enabled the line to be overcome quickly. Israel was caught off guard, the forts were lightly staffed, reserves had not been mobilized, and the line had been designed as a warning barrier rather than an impenetrable wall. As a result, the Egyptians established bridgeheads on the eastern bank within a few hours.
Who were the “Iranian militias” mentioned in the article, and why did Israel associate them with a threat from Syrian territory before the fall of the Assad regime? — “Iranian militias” is a collective term for armed formations created, financed, trained or directed by Iran and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, primarily through the Quds Force, to support the Assad regime and advance Iranian interests in Syria. They include Lebanon’s Hezbollah; Iraqi Shiite militias such as Kata’ib Hezbollah, Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, the Badr Organization and Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba; Afghanistan’s Fatemiyoun Brigade; Pakistan’s Zainabiyoun Brigade; and local Syrian formations loyal to Iran. They operated in southern Syria, including the Quneitra and Golan Heights areas. Israel regarded them as a threat because Iran was using them to expand its military presence near Israel’s border, potentially transfer missiles, drones and precision-guided munitions to Hezbollah, create a new front on the Golan Heights and use Syria as a land corridor for supplying its proxies. Before Assad’s fall in December 2024, Israel carried out strikes against these militias’ facilities and Iranian forces in Syria to prevent Iran from entrenching itself and opening a second Lebanese front. After the fall of the Assad regime, Iran’s presence in Syria weakened, but the threat did not disappear entirely.
Full version: Is Israel Building a New “Bar-Lev” Line in Syria?
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