The Israeli strikes on the Abu al-Duhur military airfield east of Idlib were not only a preemptive attack but also an attempt to determine what military capabilities would be acceptable for the new Syria. Although the airfield has not been used for several years and no active air operations are taking place there, Israel apparently sought to destroy its potential future significance—above all, the possibility of rebuilding aviation infrastructure that could eventually pose a threat.
The attack marked a notable expansion of Israel’s operational zone: it was the first strike in the far north of Syria, approximately 70 kilometers from the Turkish border. It came several hours after a Turkish military delegation visited the airfield. Israeli sources claimed that Ankara planned to establish a military base there, but Syrian and Turkish officials denied this. Against the backdrop of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s harsh rhetoric toward Turkey and President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the strike was a direct signal to Ankara.
Abu al-Duhur forms part of a broader Israeli campaign that began after the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime on December 8, 2024. Since then, according to the data cited, Israel has carried out more than 480 airstrikes and approximately 900 ground incursions into Syrian territory. The targets included facilities linked to the restoration of military infrastructure and Syrian-Turkish cooperation, including the Tiyas Air Base near Palmyra and Hama Military Airfield. At the same time, Israel has expanded its areas of control and established new military positions, seeking not merely to contain threats but to shape a reality on the ground that serves its interests.
Israeli policy has been accompanied by statements describing Syria as an “expanded Gaza” and asserting that confrontation with it is inevitable. Some Israeli officials have already referred to Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa as Israel’s “next enemy.” According to the authors of the article, Netanyahu’s government is distributing strikes across several fronts in order to ease restrictions on expanding the war and strengthen the prime minister’s position ahead of the October elections, with the support of far-right forces.
Damascus, by contrast, is attempting to present itself as a party interested in stability, reconstruction and the establishment of state institutions. The Syrian authorities are avoiding direct military action, taking part in indirect negotiations mediated by the United States and seeking a security agreement, while rejecting Israeli conditions as a form of surrender. Following the strikes, Syria continued its diplomatic and legal efforts, condemning the attacks through international channels and seeking support from Arab, regional and other international partners.
For Turkey, the strike posed a threat to its national security. U.S. envoy Thomas Barrack called the attack an “unjustified escalation” and warned that Syria could become a flashpoint between two U.S. allies—Israel and Turkey. According to him, a coordination mechanism is being established to prevent further incidents; Turkey, however, was not notified of the strike in advance. Ankara said it would continue its determined cooperation with the Syrian government and would not allow the country to be destabilized.
Despite the tensions, a direct military confrontation between Turkey and Israel is unlikely: its cost would be too high, given Israel’s military capabilities, Turkey’s NATO membership and its close ties with the United States. Nevertheless, the strike demonstrates the desire of Israel’s right wing to reshape Syria according to its own security perceptions and prevent its recovery. After more than 14 years of war, Syria needs a chance to rebuild its state. Its new leadership will therefore likely continue pursuing a pragmatic policy, rely on Arab countries and friendly partners, contain Israeli aggression and strengthen cooperation with Turkey.
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What is the strategic significance of the Abu al-Duhur airfield for controlling northwestern Syria, and why is its location near the Turkish border important to Israel and Turkey? — Abu al-Duhur airfield is located in Idlib province and could serve as a base for intelligence gathering, troop transfers and control of the roads connecting Idlib, Aleppo and central Syria. Its proximity to Turkey is particularly important for Ankara: the site would allow it to support allied forces more quickly and influence security in the border area. For Israel, the airfield’s significance is mainly connected to the possibility of monitoring the movements of Iranian, Syrian or other armed formations; direct Israeli military presence there has not been confirmed.
What does Syrian-Turkish military cooperation look like after the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime, and what specific Turkish interests could be linked to the restoration of airfields? — Following Assad’s fall, cooperation, according to open-source reports, includes contacts with Syria’s new authorities, training and advisory activities, security coordination and the possible restoration of military infrastructure. Ankara is interested in preventing the strengthening of Kurdish armed groups along its border, facilitating the return of Syrian refugees, expanding its own influence and creating a manageable security system in northern Syria. Restored airfields could facilitate supply operations, surveillance and the rapid movement of forces, although specific agreements concerning individual sites require confirmation.
What role do the Tiyas Air Base, Hama and other former Syrian army facilities play in the current balance of power in Syria, given the presence of various foreign forces? — These sites remain important hubs for logistics, surveillance and air support. Tiyas in central Syria is particularly important because of its location between desert areas and major cities; Hama is significant for controlling the central-western axis and transport routes. Their actual role depends on who physically controls the bases and whether their infrastructure can be restored. Russian, Turkish, American, Israeli and other forces pursue different objectives, so the airfields may be used as elements of deterrence, supply and efforts to combat extremist groups rather than as parts of a unified national system.
Who is Ahmed al-Sharaa, how did he come to lead Syria after Assad’s fall, and how firmly does his government control the country and its armed formations? — Ahmed al-Sharaa is a Syrian Islamist political and military leader formerly known as Abu Muhammad al-Julani. He headed Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, an organization that emerged from the former structures of Jabhat al-Nusra. Following the opposition forces’ offensive and the fall of Assad’s regime, his movement became the core of the new authorities. However, the government’s control cannot be considered fully consolidated: autonomous armed groups, Kurdish forces, local formations and foreign military forces remain present in various regions. Al-Sharaa’s authority therefore depends not only on formal state institutions but also on his ability to reach agreements, integrate armed groups and preserve the country’s territorial unity.
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