As of July 28, Iran has rejected a proposal from Oman to temporarily resume shipping through the Strait of Hormuz. Tehran also resumed attacks on U.S. forces in Jordan, and the very next day Washington carried out strikes on Iranian military facilities. As the article notes, hopes for a diplomatic solution—one that would revive the previous ceasefire and open the strait—are now nearly gone: the gap between the military course and economic pressure is only widening, and instead of dying down, hostilities are intensifying.
Everything began when, on June 25, Iran violated the ceasefire enshrined in a memorandum of understanding and resumed attacks on merchant vessels in the Persian (Gulf of) Oman. The Trump administration responded by renewing military strikes, pursuing two goals: to destroy Iranian military assets threatening shipping and to force Tehran to agree to a new ceasefire. However, neither objective has been achieved so far: Iran remains able to strike ships using inexpensive drones and cruise missiles.
Meanwhile, Iran rejects all intermediate options. According to The New York Times, it turned down a ceasefire offer that Trump relayed via Iraq’s Prime Minister, Ali az-Zaydi, during his visit to Tehran on July 23. Iranian officials say they are not interested in a “temporary agreement” that does not resolve disputes around the Strait of Hormuz. In response to American strikes, Tehran began striking foreign forces in Bahrain, Kuwait, and Jordan, while also stepping up attacks on merchant vessels.
The escalation is building momentum. On July 7, the United States revoked licenses that had suspended sanctions on Iranian oil exports; on July 13, it introduced a naval blockade of Iranian vessels; and starting July 17, it began hitting infrastructure inside Iran—roads, railways, and bridges. In response, Iran attacked targets in the Persian Gulf, including a power plant and a desalination plant in Kuwait. The conflict has gone beyond the old boundaries: on July 20, the Houthis, backed by Iran, announced a blockade of Saudi shipping in the Red Sea and the Bab el-Mandeb strait, and on July 25, Yemen and Saudi Arabia were already striking each other’s territory.
Before Trump, there are now two main options, and both carry risks. The first is to wait, hoping that the economic blockade will force Iran to negotiate. But the impact on oil revenues may only be felt after months, while energy prices are already rising amid a reduction in international reserves due to the closed strait. The second option is to expand the military campaign, up to a “massive strike.” However, this could push Iran to attack energy infrastructure in the Gulf states and broaden strikes on Israel. Limited air raids and ground operations are also dangerous: retaliatory fire, ammunition depletion, losses, and growing discontent inside the United States.
Despite the bellicose rhetoric, Trump’s choice, judging by the available signs, is leaning toward diplomacy. Pakistan’s and Qatar’s mediators are active. An Omani delegation has arrived in Tehran to negotiate new terms for opening the strait. Reports say that Trump ordered daily strikes on Iran to be suspended and postponed a major escalation in order to preserve munitions and give diplomacy a chance. Still, the success of any new agreement remains highly questionable.
The main problem is that neither Washington nor Tehran is willing to yield on fundamental positions. Iran demands control over shipping and special conditions, including transit fees, whereas the United States and the Persian Gulf states insist on free passage as before the war. In theory, a short ceasefire regime with deferred details in a separate traffic management system would be possible, but it is unclear whether Iran is ready to guarantee “safe and free passage” after the collapse of the previous memorandum. So Trump faces the same dilemma again: wait or escalate.
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What is the Yemeni movement “Ansar Allah” (Houthis), and how long has it been linked to Iran?
“Ansar Allah” is a political and armed movement of Yemeni Zaydi Shiites that emerged in the mid-1990s in northern Yemen. It came to be known as the “Houthis” after its founder, Hussein al-Houthi. The movement began as a protest against discrimination against Zaidis and corruption in the government, before taking an anti-American and anti-Israeli stance. In 2014, the Houthis captured Sana’a and, in practice, a significant part of the country. Links to Iran can be traced back to the early 2000s, but Tehran began actively supporting the Houthis with military, financial, and technical aid after 2014. Iran views “Ansar Allah” as an important element of its strategy to exert influence in the Middle East, although the degree of Tehran’s control is not total: the Houthis retain their own ideology and autonomy.Why does Iran insist on charging transit fees in the Strait of Hormuz, and how does that align with international law?
Iran argues that it bears the costs of ensuring the security of shipping, pilotage, and maintaining navigation aids in its territorial waters, and therefore it has the right to charge fees to vessels passing through. However, under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the Strait of Hormuz is an international strait, where a regime of transit passage applies: ships and aircraft may pass freely without any charges. Charging for transit itself contradicts international law. Only fees for specific services provided by mutual consent are permissible—for example, for pilotage escort. Thus, Iran’s demand for universal transit fees is legally disputed and is more often interpreted as a means of political and economic pressure.What explains the special role of Oman and Qatar as intermediaries between the United States and Iran?
Oman traditionally maintains a neutral and friendly stance toward all sides of the conflict. It keeps working contacts with both Washington and Tehran, and its geographic proximity to the Strait of Hormuz makes it a convenient venue for confidential talks—for example, during Iran’s nuclear consultations in 2012–2015. Qatar, meanwhile, is simultaneously an important U.S. ally (a major American military base is located on its territory) and a partner of Iran (they have a joint gas field, South Pars/North Dome). Therefore, Doha is interested in stability in the region and successfully combines the roles of mediator and connector. Through their mediation, both countries seek to strengthen their own influence and avoid a direct military confrontation between the United States and Iran.
Full version: The Trump dilemma with Iran