Relations between Moscow and Damascus are once again in the spotlight. Russia has appointed Dmitry Dogadkin as the new ambassador to Syria, Syrian authorities have announced the launch of regular direct flights between the capitals starting August 16, and the Russian House in Damascus is resuming operations after a break of more than a year and a half. These moves prompt a question: is this merely routine diplomatic procedure, or the beginning of a new phase in strengthening Russian influence and expanding partnership?
Russian experts believe that the ongoing contacts show that Damascus does not want to break with Moscow and is using manoeuvres to steer away from Western demands. On the agenda are security issues, the fate of military bases, the rebuilding of the economy, and even the printing of national currency. In their view, Syria needs Russia to protect its interests on the international stage, while Russia needs Syria to preserve bases and supply lines in the region—especially against the backdrop of discussions about the “four seas” and new logistics routes.
Now the relationship is in a phase of reconfiguration after the fall of the Assad regime. Moscow clearly does not intend to leave Syria, but it seeks to reshape its presence to fit the new political reality, while keeping the Hmeimim airbase and the Tartus naval base. For Russia, this is an important foothold in the Eastern Mediterranean, a springboard for activity in Africa, and a tool for countering the West. The new Syrian leadership, in turn, is trying to diversify partnerships and reduce dependence on Moscow where alternatives exist, but it continues cooperation in areas that require Russian expertise and technologies.
The relationship has a long history: it began back in the mid-20th century, and took on a strategic character after Hafiz Assad came to power in 1970. In 1971, the Soviet Union received a naval base in Tartus, and in 1980 the countries signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation. After the collapse of the USSR, ties revived under Bashar Assad and Vladimir Putin: Moscow wrote off Syrian debts and expanded military cooperation. A turning point came in 2011: from the end of 2015, Russia provided Damascus with political cover and decisive military support, which shifted the balance of forces in the conflict and allowed Syrian authorities to regain control over significant territories.
After Assad fell and fled to Russia, the new Syrian authorities chose a pragmatic line: not to let things come to a rupture, but to renegotiate their interests anew. Analysts explain this by saying that relying too heavily on the United States is too risky, the security situation remains fragile, and Israel’s policy and the broader geopolitical instability in the region add uncertainty. Damascus needs Russian support in the military, economic, and agricultural spheres. Moscow, for its part, wants to keep Syria as a foothold in the Mediterranean and a card in dialogue with the West.
According to the International Crisis Group, Syria maintained constructive ties with Russia even after its break with Iran and Hezbollah: Ahmad ash-Sharaa visited Moscow twice and allowed Russia to keep key bases. Experts see a clear pattern—Russia’s role is reduced where alternatives appear, but it is preserved where the need remains: military equipment, oil and wheat supplies, and printing money. Switching to other suppliers would require many years and billions of dollars that Damascus does not have. At the same time, it is not easy for society to forget Russia’s role in the killing of Syrians, even if policy is usually driven by interests and looks ahead.
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What is the “Russian House” in Damascus and what role does it play in Russian-Syrian relations after its work was resumed? — The Russian House is the Russian Center for Science and Culture, operating under the aegis of Rossotrudnichestvo. After the fall of the Assad regime and the arrival of the new authorities, its work was temporarily suspended and then resumed. It performs “soft power” functions: teaching Russian, cultural events, humanitarian projects, and maintaining direct contact between societies. In addition, it serves as an unofficial channel of communication between Moscow and Syria’s transitional government, allowing Russian presence and influence to be maintained even amid changes in the political regime.
Who was Ahmad ash-Sharaa before coming to power, and why is his position on Russia considered pragmatic? — Ahmad ash-Sharaa, previously known as Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani, was born in Riyadh into a family of people from the Golan Heights. He moved from being a member of the Iraq branch of al-Qaeda to the founder of Jabhat al-Nusra in 2012, then cut ties with global jihadism, reformed the group Hay’at Tahrir ash-Sham, and became ruler of Idlib. In December 2024, he led an offensive that overthrew Bashar Assad and became the de facto leader of transitional Syria. His position on Russia is considered pragmatic because he puts the rebuilding of the destroyed country, lifting sanctions, and economic stability ahead of ideological struggle against Moscow. He is willing to negotiate with Russia and even keep its military bases if that helps legitimize his rule and develop Syria.
What is implied by the concept of the “four seas” in Russian geopolitical thinking, and how is it connected to preserving bases in Syria? — The concept of the “four seas” describes Russia’s desire to ensure its presence in four key maritime basins: the Baltic, Black, Caspian, and Mediterranean. The first three are “border” seas near Russia’s coasts, where it feels confident, and the Mediterranean is a strategic gateway to global trade routes and to the Middle East. The naval base in Tartus and the Hmeimim airbase in Syria are the only way to maintain a permanent military presence in this “fourth sea.” Therefore, Moscow is interested in agreements with the new Syrian authorities to keep the bases: without them, Russia loses its status as a global maritime power and its ability to project power into Africa and the Middle East.
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