Two opposing camps have formed inside the U.S. administration, viewing the negotiating tactics with Iran and Lebanon differently. As the daily Maariv reports, citing a source close to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, the first camp is led by Vice President J.D. Vance, and includes special envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner. The second camp is led by Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who is closely coordinating with Israeli politician Ron Dermer, recently returned by Netanyahu to the Lebanon file.
According to the outlet, Vance’s team has already secured a partial agreement with Iran and, previously, a ceasefire in Gaza. In contrast, Rubio’s camp, coordinating with Israel, insisted on a deal with Lebanon—one that was ultimately reached last Friday in Washington. Maariv emphasizes that the agreement meets Israel’s “vital interests and security requirements”—a view in which this camp interprets its victory.
At the same time, internal rivalry between Vance and Rubio does not prevent them from remaining loyal figures for Donald Trump. As the Axios portal notes, citing an official, both are merely “different tools in a multifunctional Swiss Army knife,” which Trump himself controls. Experts already see them as likely rivals in the 2028 presidential election, but for now their task is to carry out the will of the current occupant of the White House.
The signed agreement provides for a phased withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanese territory in exchange for Beirut’s commitments to disarm “Hezbollah.” However, the group itself has rejected the understandings. In Israel, this has caused a split: some in the military and political establishment, including Netanyahu, call the deal a “historic achievement” that allows the army to maintain its presence in southern Lebanon. Others warn that the pause will give “Hezbollah” a chance to rebuild its strength, which, according to assessments, had been on the brink of collapse.
A senior Israeli security source, quoted by The Monitor, expressed concern: “We are not complacent. ‘Hezbollah’ was on the verge of collapse, and now we are giving it time to regain its strength.” Thus, in both Washington and Jerusalem, the Lebanon deal has produced not only optimism but also serious concerns, and the struggle between the two approaches in the White House has reflected a broader global confrontation between lines of hard diplomacy and targeted compromises.
Comments on the news
What exactly is the “partial agreement” between the United States and Iran mentioned in the article, and what issues (nuclear program, regional influence, sanctions) does it address? — A “partial agreement” usually refers to a temporary arrangement under which Iran pauses uranium enrichment above 60% and allows IAEA inspections, while the United States eases some oil and financial sanctions and unfreezes Iranian assets abroad. Issues related to regional influence (for example, support for the Houthis or “Hezbollah”) are often not addressed in such an agreement, which draws criticism from Israel and U.S. conservatives. The deal is not a comprehensive replacement for the JCPOA; rather, it is a tactical step aimed at reducing tensions.
How does Iran finance, arm, and support “Hezbollah” in Lebanon, and why is disarming this group a key demand of Israel despite its rejection of the deal? — Iran supplies “Hezbollah” through air shipments (mainly to Beirut) and overland routes through Syria: the deliveries include precision rockets, drones, air-defense equipment, and financial assistance (estimates put it at hundreds of millions of dollars per year). Funding flows through banking networks, exchange houses, and cash courier routes. For Israel, disarming “Hezbollah” is critical because the group has an arsenal capable of striking across the entire territory of Israel and does not recognize Israel’s right to exist. “Hezbollah’s” rejection of the deal does not change Israel’s position, since Iran can distance itself from the group in words while maintaining support behind the scenes.
Which internal political forces in Iran (IRGC, the supreme leader, economic pressure) affect Tehran’s willingness to compromise with the United States, and how is this reflected in the negotiation process? — The Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, retains a final veto over any negotiations, and his stance remains hardline on issues of regional influence and the missile program. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) often opposes concessions, as they threaten its economic and military interests. However, economic pressure (inflation, unemployment, the devaluation of the rial) pushes reformers, including President Pezeshkian, toward seeking temporary relief from sanctions even without a broad agreement. This creates a split: the IRGC and conservatives block deep compromises, while pragmatists are willing to take tactical pauses in the nuclear program in exchange for easing sanctions—leading to the cautious format of a “partial agreement.”
Full version: Maariv.. Internal conflict in Washington over talks with Iran and Lebanon