The focus is on Donald Trump’s statement about an agreement that would allegedly allow the United States to control Venezuelan oil. Venezuelan and U.S. officials, as well as regional commentators, assess the arrangement differently: some confirm and defend it, while others question it and see it as a threat to Venezuela’s sovereignty. The discussion also addresses the deal’s democratic legitimacy, Washington’s increasing pressure on the country’s oil sector, U.S. migration policy, and Trump’s nationalist rhetoric toward neighboring states. This overview is based on materials from Instagram (Venezuela) and Yahoo Finanzas (Venezuela).
Venezuela Views the U.S. Oil Deal Through the Lens of Sovereignty
Donald Trump’s statement about an alleged large-scale oil agreement with Venezuela has prompted discussion not only about future investment, but also about control over the country’s main national resource. As reported by Radio Mitre and Yahoo Finanzas, citing EFE, Trump said the United States would gain “majority control” over more than 65 billion barrels of Venezuela’s proven oil reserves.
The U.S. president called the arrangement “the largest oil deal in world history.” According to his account, it would more than double U.S. oil reserves, increase supplies, and help lower gasoline prices for American consumers. This presentation is particularly concerning from the Venezuelan perspective: among the publicly stated benefits, U.S. energy security and domestic prices in the United States take precedence over Venezuela’s independent development.
For Caracas, oil is much more than an export commodity. It is the foundation of foreign-currency earnings, a key element of the state model, and a symbol of national sovereignty. Following the nationalization of the oil industry in 1976 and the subsequent expansion of state control over the deposits in the Orinoco Belt, ownership of oil assets acquired not only economic, but also historical and political significance. The very wording about U.S. “majority control” over the reserves could therefore trigger serious controversy, even if the agreement is accompanied by investment pledges.
According to reports, Secretary of State Marco Rubio presented the potential deal as an opportunity to restore Venezuela’s economy. He spoke of roughly $100 billion in private investment, the creation of thousands of jobs, and the possibility of “stimulating the reconstruction of Venezuela’s economy.” For a country that has endured a prolonged decline in production, inflation, emigration, deteriorating infrastructure, and limited access to international financing, these promises have practical appeal.
The potential return of capital, technology, and equipment could help restore wells, refining capacity, and export infrastructure. The materials mention Chevron—still the only major U.S. oil company with an active presence in Venezuela—Halliburton, and the possible participation of other private companies. Amid sanctions restrictions and a chronic investment shortage, access to such resources could become an important incentive for Caracas to pursue pragmatic cooperation.
However, the key terms of the alleged deal remain unclear. The published materials contain no comments from independent Venezuelan economists, oil-sector workers, trade unions, opposition politicians, PDVSA representatives, or the country’s official government. It is unknown what share of the revenue would remain in Venezuela, under what legal regime foreign companies would operate, how national assets would be protected, what role PDVSA would retain, and whether future revenues could translate into higher wages, restored public services, and social investment.
The political context is another factor. The EFE report says that after Nicolás Maduro was captured by U.S. forces on January 3, 2026, Venezuela entered a new phase in its relations with Washington. Delcy Rodríguez is described as the “acting president” and was recognized by the Trump administration as an acceptable negotiating partner. In this interpretation, the oil agreement is connected not only to commerce: it becomes part of a political realignment, the gradual normalization of relations, and the possible lifting of sanctions.
For many Venezuelans, the prospect of investment, jobs, and increased exports may represent hope for an exit from the protracted crisis. But that hope will compete with fears that opening the sector to foreign capital could turn into a transfer of control over the country’s national wealth. The historical memory of oil nationalism makes any terms that could be perceived as subordinating resources to outside interests especially sensitive.
Thus, the announced deal appears to bring two different approaches into conflict. Washington speaks of new reserves, reliable supplies, and cheaper gasoline for Americans. Venezuela, meanwhile, will have to determine whether the promised wave of investment can truly restore the country’s production, revenue, and infrastructure—without losing control over the oil that remains a vital part of its economic and political sovereignty.
