In recent days, the Oman route in the Strait of Hormuz has moved into the stage of practical trials: dozens of vessels began using it despite Tehran’s open dissatisfaction, which insists on coordinating all transits through the strait. Against the backdrop of fears that, without agreement with Iran, vessel safety cannot be guaranteed, many ships have started reconsidering their routes between the Iranian and Omani zones. According to data collected by Al Jazeera’s analytical division via the MarineTraffic platform, between 24 June and 3 July, 313 transits were recorded: 124 (about 40%) used the Oman route, while 189 (60%) went on the Iranian route passing south of Qeshm Island.
Traffic varied by day. In the first two days (24–25 June), 92 ships transited—an average of 46 per day—which became the peak for the entire analysis period. Then the flow declined: on 26 June there were 27 transits, on 28 June there were 31, on 29 June there were 24, before rising again to 35 (30 June), 33 (1 July), 34 (2 July), and 36 (3 July). Such fluctuations show that shipping did not stop, but operated under pressure from the changing political and military situation, forcing captains to choose one route or another depending on the day’s news about rising tension.
Statistics on the types of vessels that used both routes are as follows: tankers for crude oil lead (52), followed by bulk carriers (34), container ships (26), general cargo ships (25), and tankers for oil products and chemicals (19). The data also notes 16 transits by liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) tankers and 6 by liquefied natural gas (LNG) tankers. On the Oman route, the leading categories were the same oil tankers (36), followed by bulk carriers (19), while LNG tankers, container ships, and dry bulk carriers each recorded 10 transits in their respective categories.
The Oman route tests coincided with direct threats to its safety. According to U.S. military command, on 25 June an Iranian suicide drone attacked the container ship Ever Lovely, which was travelling along the Omani coast from the strait. Iran did not claim responsibility. The 27 June attack on the oil tanker Kiku was even more serious: carrying more than two million barrels of oil, it was also struck by a suicide drone. After these incidents, satellite data—according to the report—show that the Oman route temporarily emptied: from noon (dohiem time) until the morning of the next day, ships preferred to go by the Iranian route south of Qeshm Island.
The diplomatic situation also affected developments. In Muscat, the first meeting took place of the joint Iran–Oman committee on managing shipping in the Strait of Hormuz. Iran’s Deputy Foreign Minister Kazem Garibabadi said Tehran informed Oman that it needs to change routes and that “the situation in the strait will not return to the pre-war state.” Iran’s parliament speaker Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf stressed that control over shipping in Hormuz is Iran’s right, which it will not give up, and that sovereignty over the strait belongs to Iran and Oman, with which Tehran intends to discuss further steps.
Iran also warned the United Kingdom and France against any military maneuvers in the strait. Garibabadi noted that Hormuz is “not a place to display military force,” and that the safety of the strait is the responsibility of coastal states, while those who create crises must be ready for the consequences of “adventures.” Thus, the data indicate that the Oman route received real but fragile recognition right at the outset, and then faced a strict test—both militarily and politically. Its future now depends directly on Tehran’s and Muscat’s ability to develop a mutually acceptable formula for governing this strategic passage.
Comments on the news
- What is the strategic significance of Qeshm Island in the Strait of Hormuz, and why does the Iranian route run south of it? - Qeshm Island is the largest island in the Persian Gulf, located at the entrance to the Strait of Hormuz. Its strategic significance is that it allows Iran to control a key oil transit hub (about 20% of the world’s supplies). The route south of Qeshm appears to be used by Iran to demonstrate a military presence or as part of exercises, to underscore the ability to block or regulate shipping in the strait in the event of a conflict.
- What is meant by “the pre-war state” in Deputy Minister Garibabadi’s statement? What period or conflict is it referring to? - The term “pre-war state” likely refers to the period before the Iran–Iraq war (1980–1988) or the era before the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was signed in 2015. In this context, the deputy minister may be referring to a return to a more tense military or nuclear confrontation characteristic of those periods.
- Who is Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, and what role does he play in Iran’s political system? - Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf is a conservative politician and the current Speaker of the Iranian Parliament (Majles) since 2020. Previously, he served as Mayor of Tehran (2005–2017) and was the commander of the Air Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Qalibaf is an influential figure in a system closely linked to the Supreme Leader and is considered one of the potential candidates for the presidency in the future.
- On what historical or legal grounds does Iran claim control over shipping in the Strait of Hormuz? - Iran justifies its claims to control the Strait of Hormuz based on international maritime law (in particular, the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, which it signed but did not ratify), as well as historical rights as a coastal state. Tehran argues that the strait is within its territorial waters (within 12 nautical miles) and that it can regulate ship passage for its national security, citing “innocent passage” and “transit passage” in international norms.
Full version: في أسبوعين.. كم سفينة عبرت هرمز من المسار العماني؟