A tougher and more pragmatic U.S. foreign policy is causing concern and political debate across the region. Possible changes regarding the Malvinas (Falkland) Islands, pressure and sanctions against Cuba, military escalation around Iran and the Strait of Hormuz, as well as Washington’s interest in Venezuelan oil, could affect sovereignty disputes, energy control, and the balance of power in Latin America. Argentina, Chile, Venezuela, and opposition representatives have already responded to these steps—directly or critically. This material is based on posts published on Facebook and Instagram (Venezuela).
Oil, the United States, and Venezuela: Debate over Sovereignty and Privileges
Venezuela’s debate over possible contacts between Donald Trump’s administration and Caracas has once again come down to the country’s central issue: control over oil and the right to manage its revenues. In a political commentary published on Instagram, the subject is presented in a strongly pro-government and polemical manner. The author links the alleged agreements between Washington and Delcy Rodríguez to the defeat of traditional elites and part of the Venezuelan opposition aligned with émigré circles in Miami.
The author claims that the “Venezuelan oligarchy” sought U.S. intervention for many years and hoped to remove Chinese, Russian, and Iranian partners from the state oil company PDVSA. However, according to this interpretation, Washington is guided primarily by its own commercial interests, rather than by a desire to restore the influence of former Venezuelan groups. “The Americans came to do business, not to return their lost paradise,” the post says: “los gringos vinieron a hacer negocio, no a devolverles el paraíso perdido.”
A central place in this rhetoric is occupied by the memory of the Fourth Republic—the period before Chavism came to power. The former political and economic system is portrayed as a time when influential families and elite groups gained access to oil rents, state resources, and commissions. The reference to “their golden days of the Fourth Republic”—“sus dorados tiempos de la Cuarta República”—is used not as historical analysis, but as an accusation: opponents of the current authorities are portrayed as people who supposedly want to restore not democratic institutions, but the former system for distributing oil revenues.
For Venezuela, oil remains not only its main export resource, but also the foundation of its social and political model, budget, international relations, and notions of national sovereignty. Against this backdrop, the author contrasts elite interests with those of society, arguing that “for them, Venezuelan oil only makes sense if it first passes through their pockets”—“para ellos el petróleo venezolano solo tiene sentido si pasa primero por sus bolsillos.”
The mention of Delcy Rodríguez in the material has particular political significance. She is presented as a representative of the authorities capable of discussing relations with the United States directly, without the mediation of the traditional opposition. In this logic, potential negotiations with Washington do not mean a surrender of sovereignty; instead, they are portrayed as evidence that Caracas can defend its interests independently without handing control of the oil sector back to formerly privileged groups.
The post also uses a familiar feature of Chavista discourse: contrasting Venezuela with part of the diaspora in the United States. The image of people “crying in Miami and Caracas” is intended to reinforce the claim that part of the diaspora supports sanctions and external pressure in the hope of regaining lost economic positions. The mocking call to “go cry at the mausoleum of your former privileges”—“a llorar al mausoleo de sus antiguos privilegios”—turns the text into a tool of political mobilization rather than a neutral analysis. The original comment was published on Instagram.
At the same time, the material contains no confirmed data on any agreements between the United States and Delcy Rodríguez, the terms of possible cooperation, any actual change in the status of PDVSA’s foreign partners, or the consequences for production, the budget, and the sanctions regime. Its conclusions are based on an emotional interpretation: any direct contact between Washington and the Venezuelan authorities is declared a defeat for anti-government elites.
It should also be noted that another post, presented as an analysis of the escalation between Iran and the United States, Trump’s actions toward Venezuela, and Russia’s role, in fact does not correspond to its headline. The Facebook link leads to a text about the death of a sea lion in Santa Teresita, Argentina: specialists from Fundación Mundo Marino found a gunshot wound in the animal’s right shoulder, a severe infection, and remnants of fishing nets in its stomach. The possibility of local fishermen’s involvement is being considered.
Thus, this link cannot serve as a source for conclusions about Venezuela’s response to U.S. policy, Trump’s oil decisions, the conflict around Iran, or relations between Caracas and Washington. It contains no Venezuelan context, views from politicians or experts, data on economic consequences, or factual analysis of the international situation.
