The Knesset elections scheduled for October 27 are of particular significance to Damascus: they will determine the future of Benjamin Netanyahu and his far-right coalition, as well as the party makeup of the next government. Security issues remain at the forefront of Israel’s election discourse, with Syria regarded as one of the priority fronts in the regional confrontation. Israel’s approach to Syria, however, rests on a strategic consensus: to treat it as a sphere of influence and an opportunity to consolidate military advantages, regard the occupied Golan Heights as part of Israel and refuse to discuss them, fear the emergence of a strong central government, and prevent military threats along its northern border.
The opposition does not take fundamentally different positions on Syria: the differences between the camps are limited, and Netanyahu’s main rivals have military and security backgrounds and share his views on security and regional dominance. Gadi Eisenkot, former chief of staff, leader of the Yashar party and former member of the war cabinet, is said to view Israel’s incursion into southern Syria as leverage for securing political and security arrangements. He links an agreement with Damascus to firm security guarantees, assurances from the United States, and a review of the Turkish and Russian military presence. Naftali Bennett takes a harder right-wing line on buffer zones and the Golan Heights and makes no secret of his wariness toward Syria’s new administration, although media reports say he is willing to consider a change in its behavior.
The real divisions in Israel, then, concern how to manage its security strategy, when and to what extent to use military force, and how far to respond to U.S. diplomacy—not its fundamental objectives toward Syria. Damascus should therefore distinguish between a possible change in the coalition that forms the next government and a possible change in Israeli policy itself. It should not assume that Netanyahu’s defeat will automatically end the strikes or lead Israel to withdraw from occupied Syrian territory. A new government might change its methods and its willingness to reach an agreement under U.S. mediation, but a shift from unilateral measures to negotiations will depend on the cabinet’s position, as well as regional and international conditions.
Three main scenarios are now emerging: the right-wing camp wins enough seats for Netanyahu to form a government again; the opposition bloc wins and forms a cabinet led by Eisenkot or another agreed candidate; or the result is a deadlock that makes a stable government impossible, leading to an extension of the caretaker cabinet’s term or new elections. There is also the risk that Netanyahu will launch a war with Iran: the overthrow of the Iranian regime has already been openly declared as a goal, and reports say Washington thwarted a major Israeli strike planned for October, while Israel’s military leadership disagreed over whether it was necessary and when it should take place. Netanyahu hopes that threats against Iran will give him leverage in government formation even if he loses the election—through an emergency cabinet or by extending the caretaker government’s mandate for several months.
The Syrian government rejects Israel’s policy of justifying aggression on “security grounds” and considers it a violation of Syria’s sovereignty and international law. Damascus has repeatedly demanded that occupation forces withdraw to their positions before December 8, 2024, and that the 1974 disengagement agreement be restored, after Netanyahu unilaterally abandoned it. During his election campaign, Netanyahu presented the occupation of areas entered by the Israeli army as a supposedly necessary measure to protect security and prevent new threats. He also sought to capitalize on events in As-Suwayda in July 2025, releasing a phone conversation with President Ahmed al-Sharaa and claiming that his threats had helped protect the Druze.
A fundamental shift in Israel’s position on Syria is difficult to imagine after the election, though changes in the methods of engagement and negotiations cannot be ruled out, especially if the United States takes a more active role in security initiatives. Syria should therefore not make its policy contingent on the outcome of Israel’s elections or expect Netanyahu’s defeat alone to bring about an automatic settlement. It would be wiser to focus on actions on the ground, prepare for different scenarios, and retain the ability to respond to changing tactics without abandoning core demands.
The most important task for Damascus is to strengthen the domestic front and bridge divisions in Syrian society through legal institutions and open political dialogue that guarantees the participation and rights of all communities and social groups. At the same time, it must firmly defend sovereignty and territorial integrity, reject aggression, and remain flexible in negotiations over implementation mechanisms and security guarantees. This approach will help prevent Syria’s future from becoming hostage to Israel’s election struggle and allow it to act in the interests of lasting domestic consensus.
News Explainers
- What is As-Suwayda, and why did the events there in July 2025 become an argument for Netanyahu during his election campaign? — As-Suwayda is a city and province in southern Syria, with a predominantly Druze population. It is a strategically important area near Damascus and the Golan Heights. In July 2025, clashes broke out between Druze armed groups and Bedouin tribes, followed by the intervention of Syrian security forces and Israeli airstrikes. Netanyahu used these events to portray Israel as the Druze’s protector and an “indispensable” guarantor of security in southern Syria, bolster his image as a strong leader during the Israeli election campaign, and justify Israel’s military presence.
- Who are Syria’s Druze, and why is their situation particularly sensitive for Damascus and Israel? — The Druze are a closed ethno-religious community, a branch of Ismaili Islam, living mainly in As-Suwayda and the Hauran region; they make up a few percent of Syria’s population. Their situation is sensitive for Damascus because of autonomist sentiments, the presence of armed groups, and ties with Druze in Israel and Lebanon. Any conflict could provide a pretext for foreign intervention. For Israel, the Druze are important both as a minority community it regards as “its own” and as a moral argument for operations in Syria, although Syrian Druze are wary of their fate being used as a pretext.
- What is the 1974 disengagement agreement, and what changed along the disengagement line after December 8, 2024? — The Israeli-Syrian Agreement on Disengagement of Forces, signed on May 31, 1974, under U.S. mediation after the Yom Kippur War, established a buffer zone on the Golan Heights, Lines A and B, arms restrictions, and the UNDOF observer mission. After the Assad regime fell on December 8, 2024, Israel declared the agreement effectively void, sent troops into the buffer zone and onto the strategic heights of Mount Hermon, and struck Syrian military sites. The former disengagement line ceased to be observed, and UNDOF’s operations were restricted.
- Who is Ahmed al-Sharaa, and why was his phone conversation with Netanyahu politically significant? — Ahmed al-Sharaa is a Syrian politician and former leader of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham. After the fall of Assad, he became Damascus’s de facto leader and Syria’s interim president. He has sought to present himself as a moderate politician, distancing himself from his radical past. His conversation with Netanyahu was politically significant as a signal of direct contact between Israel and Syria’s new authorities: for Netanyahu, it demonstrated his handling of security; for al-Sharaa, it offered an opportunity to prevent escalation and gain de facto recognition, albeit with the risk of accusations of collusion with Israel.
Full version: If Netanyahu Disappears: These Four Principles Will Shape Israel’s Approach to Syria