Jordan is watching with alarm the sudden worsening of tensions between Iran and the United States, believing the current round of the conflict is more dangerous than previous flare-ups. Unlike earlier clashes, Tehran, according to Amman, has now targeted strategic sites within the kingdom — the port of Aqaba and an airport — not only American military bases. This fundamentally changes the nature of the threat: Iran appears to view Jordan as a central arena for its retaliatory operations, going beyond the earlier, more limited attacks on U.S. interests.
The turning point came last Friday, when an attack on U.S. forces at one of Jordan’s bases killed three servicemembers. According to U.S. accounts, damage was inflicted at two sites, and Amman called the incident the most serious in a series of Iranian aggressions. Particular concern is the precision and range of the strike: the missiles reached their targets from Iranian territory, making a repeat of such attacks a very realistic scenario.
It is worth noting that Jordan previously reached an agreement with Washington on military cooperation, which allows U.S. troops to be present on its bases under strict limitations. In return, the kingdom gains access to modern weapons, training, and technology to combat terrorism and smuggling. However, what happened is precisely what Amman was trying to avoid: turning the country into a theater of direct hostilities, even if the targets are allies rather than Jordanian citizens.
Within Jordan, the question is growing louder: what prompted Iran to shift from low-intensity attacks to a direct, high-level threat? Judging by the signs, the leadership of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps is seeking to expand the range of targets, demonstrating that its capabilities have not been weakened and persuading Tehran that surrender would be pointless. In addition, an attack on Jordan, while painful, costs the world economy less than strikes on oil fields — something Iran has already done in Gulf states.
At the regional level, Amman has found itself caught between two fires: on one side, Iran’s relentless escalation, which spares no neighbors; on the other, uncertainty and U.S. involvement in the war with no clear end in sight. Iran, according to analysts, is persistently trying to take control of the Strait of Hormuz and restore influence for its proxy forces after setbacks in Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq. In this situation, Jordan is placing its hopes in diplomacy: together with the Gulf states, it is trying to renew a memorandum of understanding between the parties, and it is also using Qatari channels to achieve a short-term ceasefire — no more than 10 days.
However, Amman has no illusions about the durability of any possible pause: U.S. and Iranian positions remain hardline, and, in the view of Jordanians, the Netanyahu government is only fanning the flames in an effort to broaden the conflict. Nevertheless, Jordan remains determined to defend its security — as it has already done by downing dozens of rockets — and, together with the Gulf monarchies, to try to prevent a third full-scale war. The main course of action, according to Amman, is a new diplomatic track involving Iran’s nuclear program and the future of the Strait of Hormuz, as well as mandatory dialogue between allies after this war to clearly align shared interests.
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Who are the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and what role do they play in Iran’s military and political structure? — The IRGC is an elite military-political formation created after the 1979 Islamic Revolution to defend the theocratic regime. Unlike the regular army, the IRGC has its own ground forces, naval forces, air forces, and intelligence services, and it also oversees the ballistic missile program. The organization is deeply integrated into the economy (it controls major construction and energy projects) and politics: many IRGC members hold senior government posts. The IRGC is also responsible for supporting proxy forces abroad (for example, Hezbollah) and suppressing internal protests.
Why is the Strait of Hormuz strategically important for Iran, and how could controlling it affect global oil prices? — About 20–25% of all global oil trade passes through the Strait of Hormuz. By controlling one of the straits’ shores, Iran can block or hinder the passage of tankers. Blocking the strait could trigger a sharp spike in oil prices (historical precedents include 1973, 1979, and 2019). Iran often uses the threat of blocking the strait as leverage in negotiations over its nuclear program or sanctions, creating enormous risks for the energy security of importing countries.
What proxy forces does Iran use in the region, and why might their weakening in Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq have prompted Tehran to launch direct attacks on targets in Jordan? — Iran relies on a network of allied armed groups: Hezbollah (Lebanon), the Houthis (Yemen), Shiite militias in Iraq (“Kataib Hezbollah,” “Asaib Ahl al-Haq”), and also Iran-aligned formations in Syria. These forces serve as Iran’s “shield,” allowing it to strike opponents (Israel, the United States) without direct involvement. The weakening of these proxies due to Israeli strikes (in Syria and Lebanon) and the loss of momentum in Iraq reduces their deterrent power. In such circumstances, Tehran may shift to direct attacks (for example, missile strikes on Jordan) to demonstrate strength, compensate for losses in its proxy network, and prevent the further narrowing of its “strategic rear.”
Full version: Between Tehran’s strikes and U.S. ambiguity.. This is the path Jordan will take