The article examines Israeli strikes on Syria, including the bombing of the runway at Abu al-Duhur military airbase in Idlib province, as part of a “preventive” war. In the author’s view, its aim is to prevent the emergence of a modern Syrian army or independent security structures along Israel’s borders. The article argues that this policy targets not only armed forces and cities but also the destruction of the conditions needed to build a modern state in the Arab world.
The author emphasizes that a modern state rests on a monopoly over the use of force, an effective administration, and legitimacy that develops over time. However, constant wars and external intervention have prevented these foundations from taking shape. Unlike European wars, which ultimately helped strengthen centralized states, Arab-Israeli conflicts, according to the article, have led to the destruction of institutions and the disruption of long-term development. The responsibility of Arab elites is acknowledged, but it cannot be separated from the unfavorable regional environment.
One of the earliest consequences was the destruction of regional ties. After Israel was created in 1948, railway routes between Egypt and the Levant were severed, and the region was transformed from a single market into a collection of isolated parts. Intra-regional trade in the Middle East and North Africa accounts for about 8 percent, compared with 66 percent in the European Union and approximately 25 percent in ASEAN. The closure of the Suez Canal from 1967 to 1975 led to the destruction of the canal cities, the displacement of around 500,000 Egyptians, and enormous reconstruction costs, slowing the modernization project of the Nasser era.
Particular attention is devoted to the consequences of the Palestinian exodus. In 1948, more than 700,000 Palestinians were expelled, while the number of refugees later registered by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency reached approximately six million; around one-third of them live in 58 camps. This increased pressure on vulnerable states, above all Jordan and Lebanon, intensifying crises of identity, sovereignty, and the economy. In Lebanon, these processes contributed to the civil war, whose reconstruction was estimated at roughly $20 billion. The permanent state of emergency also turned Arab politics into an “endless present,” obstructing planning and institutional development.
The article describes the so-called “Dahiya Doctrine” as a strategy of destroying civilian infrastructure—bridges, energy networks, and markets—forcing capital and specialists to leave the country and returning the economy to its starting point. It also associates this with the “Begin Doctrine,” which took shape after the 1981 strike on Iraq’s Osirak nuclear reactor. According to the author, attacks on scientists, engineers, and technological supply chains hindered the development of advanced industries. With military spending in the Middle East reaching around $200 billion in 2023, education and infrastructure receive fewer resources, while sanctions and technological monopolies reinforce the dependent position of Arab economies.
In conclusion, the author argues that perpetual war distorts the private sector and the social contract: investors move toward speculative and extractive industries, the national bourgeoisie weakens, and citizens rely more often on family, sectarian, and tribal ties than on the law. The destruction of Arab states is presented not as an accidental side effect but as something consistent with certain Israeli strategies, including Oded Yinon’s 1982 ideas about fragmenting strong states into weak ethnic and sectarian entities. Modern Arab reality is therefore described as the existence of a “deferred state,” while the emergence of a stable, modern, and independent Arab state is portrayed as Israel’s greatest fear.
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What role do Idlib province and Abu al-Duhur airbase play in the current system of territorial control and military routes in Syria? — Idlib remains a key area in northwestern Syria: much of the province is controlled by armed groups, primarily Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, while the territory’s security and political order also depend on Turkey’s presence and agreements with Russia. Idlib is important as a contact zone, a refuge for displaced people, and a hub for routes linking northern Syria with the areas around Aleppo, Hama, and the coast. Abu al-Duhur airbase, located in the eastern part of the province, was returned to the control of Syrian government forces in 2018 with support from Russia and Iran. It has operational significance as a military facility and a potential point for controlling roads toward Aleppo, Hama, and the desert regions. However, its actual role depends on the state of its infrastructure, security conditions, and the overall balance of forces; the base itself does not provide control over the entire province.
What is the “Dahiya Doctrine,” and to what extent is its application in Lebanon, Gaza, and Syria confirmed by independent research? — The “Dahiya Doctrine” is a term introduced after Israel’s 2006 operation in the Dahiya area of Beirut. It is generally used to describe a strategy of inflicting extremely extensive damage on infrastructure and civilian areas associated with an armed organization in order to raise the cost for the adversary and force it to halt its attacks. Independent investigations by the United Nations, human rights organizations, journalistic groups, and academic researchers have documented the destruction of civilian infrastructure, mass displacement, and possible violations of international humanitarian law in Lebanon, Gaza, and Syria. However, the claim that a single formally adopted doctrine exists, and that all specific operations fully conform to it, requires caution. Sources differ in methodology, access to data, and legal assessment, so it is more accurate to speak of a recurring type of military practice rather than a proven universal plan.
How do sanctions, territorial division, and the activities of various armed groups affect the Syrian state’s ability to restore its monopoly over the use of force and build effective institutions? — These factors significantly complicate state reconstruction. Sanctions restrict access to financing, technology, trade, and humanitarian-related supply chains, although their impact is compounded by internal corruption, economic destruction, and governance problems. The division of the country among the government, the Kurdish administration in the northeast, opposition structures in the northwest, and areas of foreign influence prevents the creation of a unified tax, legal, and security system. Armed groups control territories, resources, and routes, and are sometimes incorporated into state structures only formally while retaining their own chains of command. As a result, the state may expand its administrative presence without always possessing the legitimacy, resources, and independent institutions required for a sustainable monopoly over the use of force and effective governance.
Full version: The Nightmare Israel Fears in Syria