Israel is preparing for a new U.S. military campaign against Iran, but for now it is not moving into direct hostilities. In Tel Aviv, officials are compiling an updated target list, boosting readiness, and deepening intelligence work with the U.S. Central Command. However, Washington is keeping Israel’s air force out of the strikes, and the key question now is when Israel’s involvement will become necessary for the Americans—or when it will be triggered by an Iranian response.
According to Israeli sources, the temporary window for a possible operation runs from the end of the FIFA World Cup until September. This timing is linked to Donald Trump’s approach: first applying military and economic pressure to push Tehran toward a deal, and if diplomacy fails, moving to expanded combat operations. This is not about a specific date for an Israeli strike, but about the moment when the United States will reassess the target list and the scope of the campaign.
Three scenarios are being considered for Israel’s entry into the conflict: a direct U.S. request for Israel to participate in a broader wave of attacks; an Iranian strike on Israeli territory; or the discovery that Iran is preparing an attack—which would provide justification for a preventive strike. According to a representative of the security services, the army is ready for any of these options, and coordination with U.S. Central Command has reached a one-hundred-percent level.
Meanwhile, the United States is increasing its military presence in the region. Dozens of additional fighter jets have arrived, including an F-16 squadron deployed in Jordan, and F-35 and F-16 squadrons have been reinforced at other bases. The number of tanker aircraft arriving in Israel has reached five to eight per day. U.S. strikes have already reached the outskirts of Tehran and more important targets, changing the previous situation that did not allow Israeli involvement. There is also consideration of hitting power plants and additional nuclear facilities, including an underground complex inside Mount Maqush.
Inside Israel, calls are growing for a new round of bombings, as some in the military believe the previous campaign ended before the target list was exhausted. It includes missile factories, elements of the nuclear program, command posts, and electricity and oil infrastructure. However, the proposal runs into a strategic question: will destroying additional power stations or missile bases lead to the regime’s collapse or a change in its behavior? One senior official was skeptical, saying: “What can we achieve that we haven’t already achieved?”—highlighting that the disagreement is not about operational capability, but about the absence of a political goal that would justify the price.
Despite the fact that Israel has not yet taken part in the bombings, it is deeply involved in intelligence sharing and operational planning. Plans are in place and awaiting Trump’s decision, with roles divided: the U.S. carries out the strikes, while Israel provides knowledge about targets and capabilities. Critics of involvement warn that direct entry could paralyze the economy, tourism, and aviation; deplete Israel’s stockpiles of missile interceptors; and open the door to drones—against which Israel does not have full protection. In addition, it could renew the threat from Hezbollah along the northern border.
Against this diplomatic backdrop, amid military preparations, attempts are being made to secure a 10-day ceasefire that would include a halt to attacks and the opening of corridors in the Strait of Hormuz. According to sources, Trump told the intermediaries that if a ceasefire is not reached within a week, escalation will follow. This means diplomacy is not an alternative to war, but the last delay before it expands. Thus, the most likely conclusion is that Israel will join the campaign when the ceasefire fails, when Washington needs its capabilities to strike strategic targets, or when Iran directly attacks Israeli territory.
Comments on the news
- What is the underground complex in Mount Maqush (possibly referring to the Fordow nuclear facility) and why is it considered a strategic target for strikes? — The reference is to the Fordow nuclear facility, located inside a mountain near the city of Qom. It was built for uranium enrichment and protected by a multi-meter layer of rock, making it practically invulnerable to conventional airstrikes. Its strategic value lies in the fact that it houses modern centrifuges capable of producing highly enriched uranium, as well as command-and-control points for Iran’s nuclear program. Destroying this facility would require special munitions or a ground operation, which is why it is considered one of the most heavily protected targets.
- What role does the Lebanese group Hezbollah play in a potential conflict between Israel and Iran, and what does it threaten on Israel’s northern border? — Hezbollah is Iran’s key proxy ally in southern Lebanon. In the event of a major conflict, it could open a second front against Israel by shelling its northern territories with short- and medium-range rockets (including precision-guided ones), as well as conducting cross-border raids. The threat to Israel’s northern border lies in massed rocket salvos that could overwhelm air-defense systems, and in Hezbollah’s underground tunnels and shelters, which makes neutralizing it more difficult.
- Why is the Strait of Hormuz a key element in the Iran–U.S. standoff, and what consequences could blocking it or opening corridors have? — Around 20% of the world’s oil supplies pass through the Strait of Hormuz. Iran has the ability to temporarily close the strait using mines, anti-ship missiles, and fast attack craft. Blocking it would cause a sharp spike in oil prices, a global energy crisis, and likely a military response from the U.S. and its allies. Opening alternative corridors (for example, via Iraqi oil pipelines) would reduce dependence on the strait, but it would require multi-year infrastructure projects and would not eliminate the threat entirely.
- How did the previous U.S. and Israel military campaign against Iran (referred to in the article as the “previous campaign”) end, and how much did it affect Tehran’s nuclear program or military capability? — By the “previous campaign,” this typically refers to a series of cyberattacks (such as the Stuxnet virus in 2010) and sabotage at Iranian nuclear facilities, as well as targeted killings of scientists (in particular Mohsen Fakhrizadeh). These actions led to a temporary disruption of centrifuge operations and a delay in enrichment progress, but they did not stop the nuclear program. Iran restored capacity, expanded it, and strengthened protection at the facilities. Tehran’s military capability (missile program, drones) was affected minimally; instead, it received an impetus to develop asymmetric means of deterrence.
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