Israeli leaders repeatedly point out that their positions on Mount Hermon are about 35 kilometers from Damascus. This is more than a military detail; it is a political signal: Israel is demonstrating its ability to threaten any target on Syrian territory. Benjamin Netanyahu, in effect, regards Syria after the fall of the Assad regime not as a potential front, but as an active one. Israel is also seeking to preserve sources of instability in the country, backing armed groups in Suwayda and, since the change of power in Damascus, has repeatedly carried out strikes and operations to show that it can intervene at any moment.
If Netanyahu really pushes the Syrians into a situation where war becomes inevitable, a decision to go to war will not necessarily deter Syria. It is more likely to lead to open conflict whose beginning is clear, but whose course and outcome are difficult to predict. The key question then will not be how much damage Israel can inflict on Syria, but what it can do and control after the war. In this context, comparison with Assad is useful not because of his military might: he was the actual ruler of an authoritarian system, able for decades to harm Syrians and subjugate their will by relying on the army, intelligence services, militias, hundreds of thousands of security personnel, and millions of supporters. And yet, after 14 years of open war, he could not impose his political will on them.
Israel has an advantage over many countries in air power, intelligence, and technology, but the nature of its power is different: it strikes from the air and returns to its bases. This gives it exceptional capacity to destroy, but not to control the political and social environment that emerges after the strikes. Even if Israel mobilizes tens of thousands of soldiers for ground combat or carries out targeted killings in the first phase, that will not be enough to confront a society of nearly 30 million people in a war that could last for years. In this respect, Israel is less capable than Assad: its technological superiority can hit targets, but it cannot shape the desired political and social landscape or prevent local and regional forces—including Turkey, which could intervene directly, and cross-border jihadist groups—from filling the vacuum after the collapse of institutions.
So the most such a war can achieve, without control over its political and social consequences, is to “open up space for instability.” If Israel were to succeed in undermining the new Syrian state, would that make the Syrian front safer? This would be one of the biggest gambles imaginable: what guarantee is there that creating chaos will produce manageable chaos? In recent years, Syria has endured a war many called a civil war, but it quickly ceased to be purely Syrian and became an arena that drew in fighters and regional and international powers. If the Syrians’ war against Assad triggered such extensive foreign intervention, it is hard to imagine what would happen in a direct and open confrontation with Israel.
Syria is not an isolated island: in such a war, it would become an open front in the broadest sense. Any Israeli gamble could quickly create an arena that draws in actors beyond Israel’s control. This is where the paradox lies. Israel wants to prevent a new security threat from emerging on its borders, but by weakening the Syrian state, it could itself create conditions in which such a threat becomes more likely and takes shape faster. If Israel believes that weakening the new Syria is the shortest path to security, it may discover too late that the greatest danger to it could come after the state has been weakened.
This does not mean that a weak Syrian state would benefit Syrians. On the contrary, it is vital for them to avoid being drawn into an unequal war without preparation, because such a conflict—even if Israel fails to achieve its aims—would deprive Syria of the chance to recover and only prolong its tragedy. In other words, Israel’s bet on force and managed chaos could turn into a trap: destruction is easier than controlling the consequences, and the cost of instability will fall primarily on Syrians themselves.
News Background
- What is Suwayda, and why is this southern Syrian region considered especially vulnerable to local armed groups and foreign intervention? — Suwayda (As-Suwayda) is a governorate in southern Syria with a predominantly Druze population. Its vulnerability stems from its peripheral location, weak state institutions, the proliferation of weapons, smuggling, the presence of local Druze armed groups and clan networks, and intervention by Damascus, Iran and Hezbollah, Israel, and Jordan. Protests and local armed groups have grown stronger there since 2023, making the region susceptible to rapid escalation.
- Why is Mount Hermon strategically important in the Israeli-Syrian confrontation, and how is its status linked to disengagement zones and armistice lines? — Hermon (Jabal al-Sheikh) is a mountain range that commands approaches to the Golan Heights, Damascus, the Beqaa Valley, and Galilee. It provides observation, early warning, air-defense and electronic-warfare capabilities, and control over water resources. After 1967, Israel occupied part of the Golan Heights and the western and southern slopes of Hermon. The 1974 Disengagement Agreement established the UNDOF buffer zone, Lines A and B, and areas of armaments limitation. Any dispute over Hermon is therefore seen as a question of changing the armistice lines and the strategic balance.
- Which cross-border jihadist groups operate in Syria, and why are its borders so porous that a local conflict can quickly become regional? — The main groups operating in Syria include Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham in Idlib; Hurras al-Din, linked to al-Qaeda; Islamic State cells in the Badia and near the Iraqi border; and foreign formations such as the Turkistan Islamic Party and Katibat al-Tawhid wal-Jihad. Remnants of pro-regime and smuggling networks also remain in the south, near the borders with Jordan and the Golan Heights. The borders are porous because of the desert terrain, long and weakly controlled frontiers, smuggling, tribal networks, numerous armed proxies, and rivalry among outside powers—Iran, Israel, Turkey, the United States, Jordan, and Russia—which causes local clashes to internationalize quickly.
Full version: Netanyahu’s threats to Damascus: Will weakening Syria protect Israel’s security?