Khaled al-Yakoubi, an official representative of the Iraqi presidential administration, said that placing all weapons under state control requires reciprocal commitments from major powers, especially the United States: Washington must respect Iraq’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and refrain from interfering in its internal affairs. According to him, this is not merely a wish but an obligation for any prime minister whose legitimacy rests on parliament; the issue is usually included in the government’s programme.
Al-Yakoubi said Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi had persuaded the US side to extend the deadline for handing over weapons until the end of June 2027 during a meeting with US President Donald Trump on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly. Washington had previously set September 30 of last year as the final deadline and hinted at economic measures if it was not met. The official believes the new deadline gives political forces and the government enough time to resolve the issue.
He attributed the complexity of the matter to the legacy of developments since 2003 and the fight against al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. In his view, the problem cannot be solved by “pressing a button”: it will require a long series of steps that take into account both security concerns and political agreements.
Speaking about the risk of a new confrontation between the United States and Iran, al-Yakoubi described neutralising Iraq as extremely difficult. The last war spilled across borders and disregarded international agreements: US and Israeli aircraft used Iraqi airspace to strike Iran, while Iranian missiles flew through it in response. Iraq filed complaints with the UN Security Council, but, he said, was not heard and failed to secure any action. Any new escalation, he added, would place the country at the centre of events “whether it wants this or not,” particularly amid economic pressure. He also ruled out any current mediation by Baghdad between the United States and Iran, saying that the issue was “beyond Iraq’s capabilities,” while calculations had become complicated and the conflict’s objectives had become intertwined. Baghdad had previously tried to use its ties with both sides, but now seeks to avoid the consequences of confrontation. Regarding Iranian-Saudi mediation, he said he had no up-to-date information, although he recalled Iraq’s earlier key role before the agreement announced in China.
On the economic front, al-Yakoubi noted that Iraqi oil exports continue to face difficulties because shipments pass through the Strait of Hormuz; deliveries are subject to fees and sums different from those applied previously. The issue of exports was raised during earlier Iraqi-Iranian meetings, but he was unable to confirm whether Iran had rejected or accepted Iraq’s demands, and did not know whether the matter had been discussed at a meeting between the two countries’ foreign ministers.
Comments on the News
What are the “Popular Mobilization Forces,” and which Iraqi armed groups must be integrated or disarmed as weapons are placed under state control? — The PMF (al-Hashd al-Shaabi) is an officially recognised umbrella structure in Iraq consisting primarily of Shiite militias. It was established in 2014 to fight ISIS and formally forms part of the security system under the administration of the PMF Commission and the commander-in-chief of Iraq’s armed forces. As weapons are placed under state control, the issue is not a single official list, but bringing all brigades under genuine state command. The main focus is on groups that maintain separate command, military and economic structures, particularly those linked to Iran: Kata’ib Hezbollah, Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba, the Sayyid al-Shuhada Brigades and the Imam Ali Brigades. Some PMF units, including Badr, have already been formally integrated, but the extent of their actual subordination to the state remains disputed.
Which agreement announced in China is being referred to in the context of Iranian-Saudi mediation, and what role did Iraq play in it? — This refers to the agreement to restore diplomatic relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia, announced in Beijing on March 10, 2023. Iraq was not a signatory, but beginning in 2021 it hosted rounds of direct Iranian-Saudi talks in Baghdad, mediated first by Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi and later by Mohammed Shia’ al-Sudani. The Baghdad venue helped bring the parties closer, later serving as a foundation for the Chinese agreement.
Why does Iraqi oil exports depend on the Strait of Hormuz, and what alternative routes or fees are being discussed to reduce this dependence? — Most Iraqi oil is exported through the southern terminals of Basra in the Persian Gulf, and tankers must pass through the Strait of Hormuz because Iraq lacks sufficient pipeline capacity to bypass it. The northern Kirkuk–Ceyhan route through Turkey is under discussion, but it has limited capacity and periodically becomes inactive. Other possibilities include the Basra–Aqaba project through Jordan, which has not yet been implemented; the old Kirkuk–Baniyas route through Syria, which is unusable; and possible swaps and new corridors through Saudi Arabia or the Red Sea. In this context, “fees” refer mainly to transit tariffs charged by Turkey, Jordan or Syria, as well as insurance costs and expenses associated with military risks—not a fee for passage through the Strait of Hormuz itself.
