The British newspaper Financial Times devoted an article to Iran's "mosquito fleet" — a network of fast boats of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) that have become an effective instrument of confrontation with the United States and a lever of pressure on energy markets in the Persian Gulf region. The report, prepared by correspondents from London, Washington and Tehran, details how these small vessels have become a key element of Iran's strategy to disrupt shipping and threaten the passage of oil and gas through the strategic Strait of Hormuz.
Iran hides hundreds of such boats in caves, tunnels and small coves along its southern coast, keeping them on full alert for immediate deployment into the Strait of Hormuz — one of the world's most important energy corridors. These maneuverable boats are capable of rapidly leaving fortified shelters and then disappearing again, which makes them extremely difficult to detect and neutralize. It is precisely their capacity for stealth and rapid movement that gives Tehran the ability to constantly disrupt shipping without engaging in full-scale naval battles.
Some of these boats are simple and lightly armed, others are equipped with short-range missiles and more modern technologies. They all operate in swarms, shadowing ships and creating a persistent threat. Financial Times emphasizes that the "mosquito fleet" perfectly embodies Iran's doctrine of "asymmetric warfare": the use of cheap and fast means to counter more powerful naval forces. This approach allows it to wear down an adversary both psychologically and practically, without the need to maintain a large conventional navy.
The roots of this tactic go back to the Iran–Iraq War of the 1980s, when Tehran began to widely use small boats to attack large ships, lay mines and seize vessels. In this context it is notable that former U.S. President Donald Trump recently boasted that Iran's navy was "completely destroyed," yet, according to experts, the real threat from Iran never came from its outdated regular navy. The true strength lies with the IRGC, its missile arsenal, drones and fast attack boats.
Estimates put the IRGC's number of fast assault boats between 500 and 1,000, as well as more than 1,000 unmanned vessels capable of carrying missiles or torpedoes. Some of them, such as the Siraj-1, are considered relatively modern. On their own these boats are unlikely to defeat the U.S. navy, but their coordination with missiles and drones creates an atmosphere of fear and uncertainty. As the paper notes, even a small amount of chaos can force shipping companies to avoid the strait or pay astronomical insurance premiums — and this immediately affects global energy prices.
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Why does the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), rather than the regular navy, control Iran's "mosquito fleet"? - The IRGC was created after the 1979 Islamic Revolution as an ideologically loyal and independent branch of the armed forces, intended to protect the Islamic system. During the Iran–Iraq War the IRGC proved effective in asymmetric warfare, including the use of small boats. Since then the "mosquito fleet" has become an IRGC instrument, as it is better suited for rapid, low-visibility operations in the Persian Gulf and does not require the complex infrastructure of large ships, which is controlled by the regular navy.
How did the Iran–Iraq War of the 1980s shape Iran's strategy of using small boats against stronger naval forces? - During the war Iran faced the superiority of the Iraqi navy and its allies (including the U.S.) at sea. In response the IRGC began employing a "swarm" tactic — simultaneous attacks by many high-speed boats armed with missiles and machine guns against large ships. That experience showed that small, cheap and maneuverable boats could successfully challenge more powerful forces by exploiting surprise and the complex hydrography of the Persian Gulf. The war entrenched in Iranian doctrine a focus on asymmetric responses, including massed attacks by small forces.
What specific types of missiles can the "mosquito fleet" boats and unmanned vessels carry, and how do they interact with other IRGC weapon systems? - The "mosquito fleet" boats are typically armed with anti-ship missiles such as Chinese C-704 and C-802 (and Iranian copies — Noor and Qader), as well as more modern missiles like Khalij Fars, Zulfiqar and Qeysar. Unmanned vessels (for example, Ababil or Mohajer-6 drones) can carry light missiles or conduct reconnaissance. Interaction occurs through an integrated command network — the IRGC uses ground-based radars and control centers to coordinate attacks: drones detect targets and boats receive coordinates for salvoes. This enables simultaneous strikes from different directions, complicating countermeasures.
Full version: "أسطول البعوض" الإيراني في مواجهة البحرية الأمريكية بالخليج