At the funeral of former Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in Mashhad, shortly before the burial, not only the customary calls of “Death to America” and “Death to Israel” were heard, but also a new slogan—“Death to Traitors.” The shout reflected the sharp internal struggle over a possible deal with Washington, and added heightened sensitivity to the negotiations within one of the most symbolic political ceremonies in Iran. The dispute spilled beyond government offices and became street knowledge—charged with emotion and political fervor.
During the mourning ceremony in Tehran, President Masud Pezeshkian and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi were met with hostile chants: “Death to the merchant” and “Death to the traitor who sold the homeland.” A wave of outrage also reached the speaker of parliament Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf—an establishment conservative whom radicals also consider involved in the negotiation process. In this way, three key figures—political, diplomatic, and institutional—found themselves targeted for embodying a course of dialogue with America.
Attacks on Ghalibaf are especially telling, as he does not belong to reformers or moderates, but represents the traditional conservative wing. However, his inclusion in the “top three” alongside Pezeshkian and Araghchi turned the speaker into a target for ultra-conservatives. In their view, anyone who supports negotiations—regardless of political background—becomes a “traitor.” This means the fight is not only about government rhetoric, but about the entire framework of the system through which diplomatic outcomes are carried out.
Analyst and journalist Reza Ghabishavi, in a comment for Al Jazeera, emphasized that such slogans should be understood as expressions of radical forces that exist in any open society. He noted that he has “serious indicators” of these forces’ ability to influence policy beyond ordinary pressure. They are furious at the government’s talks and demand that dialogue be halted and that the war continue until “Trump is defeated and Israel is destroyed,” which he said is unrealistic even for moderate conservatives.
International relations professor Abbas Aslani argues that opposition to negotiations is not limited to political circles and has a real mass base. In his view, rejection is based on two reasons: the belief that Americans do not keep their commitments, and anger over recent events that have intensified suspicions toward Washington. At the same time, a significant part of Iranians—both supporters and the wavering—assess any agreement from an economic standpoint: will it lift sanctions, improve people’s lives, and prevent war?
In the context of the talks, a major economic package is being discussed, including an investment fund of $300 billion for reconstruction and development, funded by the private sector, with an emphasis on energy, logistics, manufacturing, and transportation. However, according to Aslani, radicals doubt the feasibility of such promises, especially under the Trump administration. They point to earlier U.S. steps in Gaza, Ukraine, North Korea, Syria, and Venezuela, as well as the United States’ withdrawal from the 2015 nuclear deal.
Thus, the slogans “Death to Traitors” and insults aimed at Pezeshkian, Araghchi, and Ghalibaf are not merely a flare-up of anger. They indicate that the battle over the deal has shifted from the elite level to organized street politics, where slogans become a tool of pressure, and the price of diplomacy turns into an element of an internal struggle over the meaning of “resistance” and the boundaries of negotiations after an armed conflict.
Comments on the news
What does the slogan “Death to Traitors” mean in Iran’s political culture, and why did it ring out specifically at the funeral of the former Supreme Leader? — This slogan is part of revolutionary rhetoric rooted in the events of the 1979 Islamic Revolution. It symbolizes rejection of those whom power or the crowd regards as collaborators or opponents of Islamic rule. At the funeral of a former Supreme Leader (for example, Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989), it was not heard as a personal insult to the deceased, but as a demonstration of mass political vigilance: at the moment of the transfer of power, the crowd emphasized loyalty to the course and warned against possible “traitors” among elites. This is a typical Iranian way of legitimizing a successor through street loyalty.
How do political factions in Iran differ (reformers, moderate conservatives, and ultra-conservatives), and how does their stance toward negotiations with the U.S. affect the internal struggle? — Reformers (for example, Mohammad Khatami) advocate greater social freedom and dialogue with the West as a way to lift sanctions. Moderate conservatives (such as Hasan Rouhani) support negotiations but with regard for the principles of the revolution, seeking pragmatic deals. Ultra-conservatives (the hardline wing, such as Ibrahim Raisi) view any concessions to the U.S. as betrayal and demand an economy of resistance. Their struggle intensifies precisely in the context of negotiations: each faction uses the topic of the U.S. as a tool to discredit opponents—reformers are accused of naivety, while ultra-conservatives are accused of isolationism that destroys the economy.
Why did Ali Khamenei’s funeral take place in Mashhad, and what significance does this city have for the Shiite world and Iranian political symbolism? — Mashhad is the second holy city of Shiism after Karbala, where the shrine of Imam Reza (the eighth Imam) is located. For Iranian political symbolism, Mashhad represents the link between the institution of the Supreme Leadership (rahbar) and popular religious sentiment. Holding the funeral there underscores that the deceased leader was not just a politician, but a religious authority. In addition, Mashhad has historically been considered the “cradle” of conservative clericalism, so choosing this city strengthens legitimacy in the eyes of the most traditionalist segments—unlike more secular Tehran.
What is the investment fund of $300 billion mentioned in the article, and how realistic are such economic promises under existing sanctions? — Most likely, this refers to the so-called National Development Fund (NDFI)—a reserve drawn from oil revenues intended for non-oil projects. However, its actual volume is much smaller than what is promised (usually 15–30% of the stated figures due to sanctions constraints and corruption). Under sanctions, such promises are part of populist rhetoric: they mobilize domestic support, but are not backed by real liquidity. A significant portion of the fund is frozen abroad or devalued by inflation. Therefore, for an external analyst, these figures should be viewed as a political statement rather than a verified budget.
Full version: From Mashhad to Tehran.. Iranian street slogans open a battle over a deal with Washington