The Iranian and Venezuelan narratives respond to U.S. pressure with a firm rejection of Donald Trump’s version of events while highlighting Tehran’s ability to control the situation in the Strait of Hormuz. The focus is not on confirming American claims, but on the escalating confrontation between Washington and Tehran. Based on publications by RFI and Instagram (Venezuela).
Hormuz and Cartels: Venezuela Sees Growing U.S. Pressure
Two international developments—the U.S.-Iran dispute over control of the Strait of Hormuz and the expansion of the American anti-cartel coalition in Latin America—may be viewed in Venezuela through a common lens of sovereignty, sanctions, and confrontation with Washington. Although Caracas has offered no direct comments in either case, the political and economic context makes these developments sensitive for a country dependent on oil exports and engaged in a prolonged confrontation with the United States.
An RFI report describes the clash between Tehran and Washington over the Strait of Hormuz. Hossein Taeb, head of Iran’s Basij paramilitary forces, said: “The Strait of Hormuz is under the management and control of the Islamic Republic.” This position contradicts Donald Trump’s statements about “full control” by the United States and the naval blockade he described as a “steel wall.”
The report appeared amid claims that the strategic sea route had effectively been blockaded following U.S. and Israeli strikes on Iran. A significant share of global oil supplies passes through the Strait of Hormuz, meaning that any restrictions on shipping could trigger sharp price fluctuations, logistical disruptions, and instability in energy markets.
For Venezuela, this situation has a dual significance. On the one hand, higher oil prices could theoretically increase Caracas’s export revenues. On the other, market instability, difficulties with maritime transport, and the possibility of further sanctions pressure pose additional threats to an economy already facing financial, trade, and logistical restrictions.
Iran remains a politically close partner of Venezuela, and its confrontation with the United States may fit a familiar pattern for part of the Venezuelan audience: a state under American pressure publicly demonstrates its ability to resist. However, the RFI report contains no reaction from Venezuelan authorities, experts, or representatives of the oil industry. It does not examine the consequences for PDVSA, Venezuelan oil exports, fuel supplies, or bilateral energy cooperation between Caracas and Tehran.
Nor does it draw a direct parallel with U.S. restrictions on Venezuelan oil trade or Iran’s earlier assistance to Venezuela’s oil-refining sector. As a result, the Venezuelan perspective in the story about Hormuz remains largely contextual: it can be inferred from the country’s dependence on oil, the authorities’ anti-sanctions rhetoric, and its strategic ties with Iran.
The other development concerns U.S. security policy in Latin America. In an Instagram post, U.S. Secretary of War Pete Hegseth said that cartels designated by Donald Trump as foreign terrorist organizations should be viewed in the same category as al-Qaeda and ISIS. This gives the fight against drug trafficking a tougher military and political framework.
For Venezuela, such language is particularly sensitive. In Caracas, American accusations linked to drug trafficking, terrorism, or cross-border crime have long been viewed as potential tools for sanctions, diplomatic isolation, and foreign intervention. From this perspective, comparing criminal groups with international terrorist organizations may blur the line between a law-enforcement operation and an expansion of the U.S. military presence in the region.
Hegseth also welcomed Colombia’s joining the American Coalition Against Cartels Forum, or A3C, as its 19th member. In addition, he called on coalition states to withdraw from the International Criminal Court, claiming that the ICC seeks to strip countries and their national judicial systems of sovereignty.
This argument coincides with the politically important issue of defending state sovereignty in Venezuela. Venezuelan authorities regularly criticize international legal mechanisms and U.S. sanctions policy as selective and politicized. The American secretary’s call to abandon the ICC may therefore be perceived not only as a dispute over international law, but also as part of a broader struggle over who sets the rules for security and justice in the region.
Colombia’s participation is especially significant for Caracas, as Colombia is Venezuela’s neighbor and a longtime Washington partner. The expansion of the anti-cartel coalition could be interpreted as a strengthening of the U.S. military and political infrastructure along Venezuela’s borders. Against the backdrop of difficult relations between Caracas and Bogotá, this creates a risk of new accusations of cross-border crime, increased regional oversight, and additional grounds for pressure on Venezuela.
No direct statements by Venezuelan officials or experts regarding Hegseth’s initiative are cited. Nevertheless, the set of emphases—equating cartels with ISIS, expanding the A3C, including Colombia, and criticizing the ICC—corresponds to a widespread view in Venezuela’s information space that Washington is linking security, migration, drugs, and international justice into a single strategy of influence.
Thus, the developments surrounding the Strait of Hormuz and U.S. anti-cartel policy formally concern different regions, but in the Venezuelan context they converge around several themes: oil vulnerability, sanctions, international isolation, the alliance with Iran, and concerns about the expansion of American influence in the security sphere.
