Amid reports of progress in indirect talks with the United States and mounting American pressure on Iran to abandon its nuclear program, a heated debate is spreading through Iranian society. The central question worrying both elites and ordinary citizens now is whether Tehran should continue following its previous nuclear doctrine or whether it is time to change it radically. After recent military clashes it became clear that enriching uranium to high levels did not provide the expected deterrent, which has led to a split: some view the nuclear program as a symbol of national sovereignty, others see it as a losing bet that has cost the country decades of isolation and sanctions.
Ordinary Iranians interviewed by journalists on the streets of Tehran increasingly express disappointment with the economic and political price of the nuclear project. 49-year-old Hossein bitterly notes: “For decades we've been going nowhere: we enrich uranium but don't make a bomb, and we suffer from sanctions as if we already have a nuclear arsenal. It's time either to make the bomb and live with pride, or to say we don't need it and rid ourselves of this burden. This uncertainty is killing us.” 45-year-old Nakar adds that because of the sanctions a whole generation lost its youth waiting for results that never came.
Some Iranians oppose the creation of nuclear weapons both for moral and strategic reasons, fearing further isolation of the country. 32-year-old doctor Sara is convinced that a nuclear bomb will not end sanctions and will instead turn Iran into a “target” for a total blockade. In contrast, 56-year-old teacher Mohsen is proud of the achievements in the atomic field but asks a pointed question: “If a bomb deters enemies, why shouldn't we have one?” He insists the country has only two acceptable paths: either acquire the bomb and live in security, or halt enrichment and open the economy.
Among the elite, the debate takes on a deeper strategic dimension. Researcher Mostafa Najafi believes that choosing nuclear armament is no longer an abstract idea but is becoming an inevitable path to which external forces might push Iran. “Before signing a new nuclear agreement, Iran needs to give a clear answer to a fundamental question: do we continue with the old doctrine or move to a new one?” he warns. According to him, if Washington does not offer real benefits, part of the elite will be convinced that current means of deterrence are insufficient and will lean toward nuclear deterrence.
On the other hand, former senior IRGC official Hossein Kanani Mogaddam reminds that the main obstacle to making a bomb is the “religious ban.” He emphasizes that the Islamic Republic has never sought mass destruction. Kanani proposes alternatives to nuclear deterrence, such as control over the Strait of Hormuz and tactical weapons. He argues that Iran possessing uranium enriched to 60% is itself a “deterrent factor,” and that sanctions and attacks are not necessarily a direct consequence of the nuclear program but merely a pretext.
In the context of indirect talks and intensifying international pressure, Iran finds itself at a historic crossroads. Society and the elites are divided: some insist on preserving nuclear rights as a symbol of sovereignty, others call for reassessing the cost of such a policy for the economy and security. The final choice may be dictated by the actions of Washington and Tel Aviv: either pushing Iran toward full armament, or creating conditions for concessions, sanctions relief, and openness. In any case, it will be Tehran’s internal decision that determines the country’s path for decades to come.
Comments on the story
- What role does the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) play in shaping Iran’s nuclear policy and why are there different views among its members on this issue? - The IRGC acts both as the military guarantor of the nuclear program and as a lobbying group with its own economic interests. Disagreements within it are caused by tactical disputes: “hawks” (for example, former commander Mohsen Rezaei) view nuclear weapons as necessary for the regime’s survival, while “pragmatists” (some current commanders) see excessive confrontation as a risk of isolation and economic collapse. Personal competition between factions for influence over the Supreme Leader also plays a role.
- What is the strategic significance of the Strait of Hormuz for Iran and how could control over it serve as an alternative to nuclear deterrence, as some elites suggest? - For Iran the Strait of Hormuz is a “non-nuclear trump card”: its potential closure could crash global oil markets, giving Tehran a powerful lever of pressure on the West and the Arab monarchies. Some Iranian strategists (for example, from the Defense University) argue that the threat of closing the strait creates an “asymmetric deterrence” effect that does not require developing a nuclear bomb. However, this is controversial, since a full blockade could provoke a military response from the US and Saudi Arabia and also damage Iran’s own economy.
- Why is enriching uranium to 60% considered a “deterrent factor” even though creating a nuclear weapon requires enrichment to 90%? What is the difference between these levels in terms of international law and military potential? - The 60% level is a “threshold” point: technically it allows Iran to further enrich uranium to 90% (weapons grade) within days. For the international community, 60% is a “red line” under the NPT framework because this level has no civilian application (medical isotopes are produced at 20%), and therefore indicates military intent. From a military potential standpoint, 60% is not sufficient for an explosive device (90% is required), but it demonstrates technological readiness for one. The difference in international law is formal: the NPT does not prohibit enrichment to any level if a country is a party to the treaty, but UN Security Council resolutions (in particular 2231) constrain Iran. Thus 60% is a political, rather than purely technical, “deterrent factor.”
Full version: الملف النووي في نقاش الشارع.. الإيرانيون بين "ردع القنبلة" و"ثمن العقوبات"