In Iran, internal disagreements are intensifying over a recently signed memorandum of understanding with the United States and the future of the Strait of Hormuz. The dispute is unfolding amid the continued military escalation between Tehran and Washington. Inside the country, two camps have clearly taken shape: one is betting on diplomacy and locking in the understandings, while the other adheres to hardline military approaches. As analyst Abdel Kader Faez notes, the growing role of the military in political processes is causing serious concern within Iran’s political and strategic elite.
According to Faez, the essence of the dispute is not Iran’s right to sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz, but what strategic objective it serves. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) insists that the strait remain a “security zone under absolute military control.” This is why the statement by the senior leader’s military adviser, Mohsen Rezaei, has been cited: he called the strait “more important than dozens of nuclear bombs” to improve Iran’s negotiating position on other issues, including the nuclear program and relations with neighboring countries. The political camp, by contrast, argues for “flexible” sovereignty that would be recognized at the local, regional, and international levels and would allow the strait to be used as an economic artery in the postwar period.
There is also an obvious split over the memorandum itself. The conservative camp, represented by the director of the seminaries, Ayatollah Alireza Arafi, is demanding an immediate withdrawal from the agreement. On the other hand, former senior officials such as Mohammad Khatami and Mohammad Javad Zarif defend the memorandum as the “only diplomatic way out.” Faez believes the involvement of these influential figures is aimed at supporting President Masoud Pezeshkian and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi so that the political position does not appear vulnerable to pressure from the military structures.
Chief negotiator Mohammad Bagher Kalibaf is trying to navigate between the opposing currents. He hints to conservatives that the memorandum could be abandoned if it does not bring benefits to Iran, but at the same time he assures the public and politicians that the deal “has not strategically failed,” despite the difficulties. The document, signed on June 18 after regional and international mediation, halted military actions that had begun in late February. The memorandum provides for 60 days of talks to reach a final agreement addressing key issues: the nuclear program, shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, and sanctions against Tehran.
In Faez’s view, the decline in political enthusiasm around the memorandum, as well as the logic of “escalation to de-escalate,” have pushed Iranian diplomacy to intensify its efforts through regional mediators—Qatar, Oman, Turkey, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia. The goal is to find a diplomatic way out that would prevent American forces and the IRGC from monopolizing events on the ground. This could lead to regional chaos that policymakers would find difficult to control. Expanding the zone of U.S. strikes—reaching the third tier near Isfahan—only strengthens the military’s position and narrows the space for political maneuvering.
Faez emphasizes that the decisive factor that is currently missing is a clear presence from Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei—both his voice and his image. Historically, it was he who was the only tool capable of restraining the ambitions of the military and defining the boundaries of political maneuver. Without his intervention, the split could lead to any unexpected outcomes. U.S. President Donald Trump, in an interview with Fox News, said there is a 90% chance that the new Iranian supreme leader is already dead. Meanwhile, the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) announced the resumption of a naval blockade of Iranian ports and coastal areas in response to attacks on ships in the Strait of Hormuz.
News Comments
What role does the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) play in Iran’s political system, and why does its influence over national security decisions raise concerns among civilian authorities? - In Iran, the IRGC is not just a military institution, but a parallel center of power directly under the Supreme Leader (Rahbar). It controls a significant part of the economy, including defense industry, construction, and energy, and also has its own elite units and intelligence services. Civilian authorities’ concerns stem from the fact that the IRGC often operates outside the bounds of normal government oversight, setting national security priorities on its own, which can undermine the authority of the elected president and parliament. For example, the IRGC can initiate foreign policy actions or repression without coordinating with civilian leadership.
Who is Mohammad Bagher Kalibaf, and what political weight does he have in Iran, given his past positions as Tehran’s mayor and parliament’s speaker? - Mohammad Bagher Kalibaf is a prominent conservative politician and former commander of the IRGC Aerospace Force. His career includes serving as Tehran’s mayor (2005–2017) and speaker of parliament (since 2020). As mayor, he carried out major infrastructure projects and reforms in the capital, but he was also criticized for an authoritarian style of governance. His political weight is significant: he is considered one of the main representatives of the “principlists” (conservatives), has extensive ties within the IRGC, and advocates economic reforms. However, he is not an unquestionable figure, and his influence is periodically contested by other conservative factions.
What are religious seminaries (hawzas) in Iran, and how does their leadership influence politics—specifically, Ayatollah Alireza Arafi’s call for withdrawal from the memorandum? - Hawzas are traditional Shia religious schools and centers of theology, located mainly in Qom and Mashhad. They train clerics and play a key role in shaping Iran’s religious doctrine and legal system. The leadership of the hawza, including respected ayatollahs, is not uniform, but many of them have considerable influence on politics through sermons, fatwas, and ties with conservative elites. Ayatollah Alireza Arafi, one of the senior instructors in Qom, represents the ultra-conservative wing that opposes any compromises with the West. His call to withdraw from the memorandum (for example, a nuclear deal or an agreement on human rights) reflects the position of those who believe such arrangements threaten Iran’s sovereignty and Islamic values—potentially weakening the position of moderate politicians seeking a diplomatic settlement.
Full version: جنرالات "الحرس" بمواجهة دهاة الدبلوماسية.. هرمز بات حلبة كسر عظم داخل إيران