According to analyst Sanam Vakil, both Washington and Tehran are behaving as if they are prevailing in the ongoing confrontation, but the facts indicate the opposite: both sides are incurring increasingly palpable political, economic and strategic costs. The author emphasizes that the notion that time is working in favor of one side or the other is mistaken, since both players are effectively losing both domestically and regionally. The key conclusion is that the current situation is not a victory but a series of multilayered losses.
The ceasefire that came into effect on April 8 is accompanied by intermittent waves of escalation, including new US strikes and Iran’s retaliatory actions that have affected Kuwait and Bahrain, as well as Israeli escalation in Lebanon. Although the parties have so far managed to avoid full-scale war, maintaining this state of affairs risks turning the truce into a chronic stalemate. This stalemate carries serious regional and international consequences, keeping markets and allied regimes in a constant state of tension.
The analyst highlights four key obstacles to political progress. The first is mutual distrust: Tehran does not believe President Donald Trump can deliver a durable deal and fears that US demands will gradually expand — from the nuclear program to missiles and regional policy. The second obstacle is the absence of direct and effective channels of communication between the parties: since the meeting in Islamabad, no mechanism has been established to turn political signals into practical agreements.
The third obstacle lies in the radical divergence of goals: Iran insists on detailed guarantees, including lifting sanctions, clear implementation mechanisms and commitments not to renege on agreements, while Trump seeks a quick and simple deal that can be presented advantageously to voters. The fourth is domestic pressure: in Washington any agreement with Iran would face fierce attack from Republican hawks as well as from Democrats, while in Iran concessions after months of war and bombings could be perceived as capitulation, especially against the backdrop of rising expectations among the younger political generations.
Despite optimistic assessments from each side, the costs are real and mounting. The US faces political and economic costs: energy markets remain anxious, the country’s image as a guarantor of stability is undermined, and the security of allies in the Persian Gulf is threatened. Iran, for its part, suffers economic problems: inflation reaches 77%, the rial is losing value, and domestic protests and repression are aggravating the crisis. The author concludes that the window for de-escalation is still open — but turning the truce into a real political process requires more effective direct dialogue, a clear timetable and a readiness for mutual concessions.
Comments on the news
Why is the meeting in Islamabad mentioned as important, and what does it say about the absence of direct channels between the US and Iran? - The meeting in Islamabad is important because it demonstrates that the US and Iran are forced to use intermediaries (in this case Pakistan) to discuss key issues such as the nuclear program or regional security. This underscores the complete absence of direct diplomatic contacts between the countries since 1980 due to decades of mutual distrust and hostility. The fact that the parties resort to mediation even for indirect talks points to a deep crisis in bilateral relations.
What protests and repressions have taken place in Iran recently, and how are they connected to the economic crisis described in the article? - In recent years Iran has seen large-scale protests, including nationwide demonstrations after the death of Mahsa Amini in 2022 (against mandatory hijab and the political regime), as well as economic protests in 2023–2024 due to sharp rises in food and fuel prices caused by inflation and sanctions. Repression has included the arrest of thousands of people, the use of force by the IRGC and police, and internet shutdowns to suppress coordination. These protests are directly linked to the economic crisis: US sanctions have worsened inflation and unemployment, which provoked public discontent that the regime suppresses to maintain stability.
Who are the “younger political generations” in Iran and why do their expectations affect Tehran’s reluctance to make concessions? - The “younger political generations” are Iranians born after the 1979 Islamic Revolution, who make up the majority of the population. They grew up under sanctions and restrictions and demand greater political freedoms, gender equality and improved economic conditions. Their rising expectations put pressure on the government: if Tehran makes concessions to the US (for example, by relaxing nuclear demands or loosening societal controls), this could be perceived by youth as weakness and spur new protests. Therefore the authorities fear that concessions in foreign policy would lead to loss of domestic control and prefer a hard line.
Full version: مقال في الغارديان: واشنطن وطهران تعتقدان أنهما تنتصران لكنهما تخسران