A confidential report by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) confirmed that Syria’s former authorities were building a nuclear reactor in the Deir ez-Zor area in the east of the country without informing the agency about the related facilities, materials, and activities. In doing so, Damascus violated its obligations under the safeguards agreement concluded within the framework of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The project included a reactor under construction, a fuel-production facility, and a storage site.
IAEA inspectors visited Deir ez-Zor on August 29 to examine traces of construction work and the cooling system. The agency concluded that the structure discovered corresponded to elements of a nuclear reactor. Israel destroyed the facility in an airstrike in 2007, after which the Syrian authorities leveled the site. Later, analysis of samples taken in 2024 revealed uranium particles; Damascus had previously failed to provide the agency with full answers to its questions. North Korea is believed to have possibly participated in developing the project.
Three other facilities were functionally linked to the project: one was used to process or manufacture fuel, another for the temporary storage of construction materials, and the third to store materials transported to and from the site, as well as for planned reprocessing operations. During a separate trip, IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi visited a previously undeclared facility whose existence Syria’s new authorities reported to the agency on July 17 and where they authorized an inspection.
At the facility, inspectors found about 73 metric tons of natural uranium in the form of sheathed fuel rods, approximately 55 tons of which were located at the site linked to Deir ez-Zor. All the material is currently subject to IAEA safeguards and monitoring measures. The agency positively assessed the cooperation of Syria’s new authorities, saying that access to the facilities helped clarify long-standing safeguards questions. In a separate report, the IAEA also expressed concern over its inability to verify Iran’s uranium stockpiles following US-Israeli strikes on Iran in June 2025.
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Why was the Deir ez-Zor area chosen for the Syrian nuclear project, and what role did its remoteness and location in the east of the country play? — The Deir ez-Zor area, located in eastern Syria along the Euphrates River, was convenient because of its distance from the capital, major cities, and international scrutiny. The desert terrain made it easier to establish a restricted facility with limited access, while the distance hindered independent inspections and allowed construction work to be concealed. The site’s proximity to the Euphrates could have supplied water for the reactor’s cooling system. In addition, the facility’s eastern location provided greater strategic depth and made it possible to disguise the project as an ordinary industrial or military installation.
How could North Korea’s alleged involvement have affected the reactor’s construction, fuel production, and the concealment of the project from IAEA inspectors? — North Korea is believed to have potentially provided engineering expertise, design solutions, and assistance in constructing a reactor resembling the North Korean facility at Yongbyon. However, there is insufficient reliable public data on full-scale nuclear fuel production in Syria: the fuel may have been manufactured abroad or supplied through clandestine channels. Possible cooperation could also have involved intermediaries, secret shipments, restricted access for workers, and disguising the facility as a military installation. Such measures made the project more difficult to detect, although definitive conclusions about the extent of North Korea’s involvement remain subject to international assessment.
Full version: A nuclear reactor and 73 tons of uranium: Secret report reveals what the Assad regime concealed