The head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Rafael Grossi, said his organization is fully prepared to begin technical work in Iran. The basis is a memorandum of understanding that provides for inspections of Iran’s nuclear facilities. Grossi said he hopes the agency’s experts will be able to visit these sites soon in order to check how reliably the understandings between Tehran and Washington are being carried out.
Grossi stressed that the IAEA is an independent body and will conduct inspections on its own. Whether the United States or any other party is brought in is still a decision for Iran. The specific details of the agency’s work and the composition of the inspection coordination group will be determined during Iran–US talks. In other words, the agency will act as a technical executor, while the political framework is set by the dialogue between the two countries.
Turning to the fate of highly enriched uranium, Grossi noted that two main options are being considered: diluting it or removing it from Iran. Choosing either option is possible only with Tehran’s consent. At the same time, IAEA experts believe that no nuclear materials were moved since the last inspection in 2025, but a direct check is still required. Grossi linked all steps involving enrichment to understandings with Iran and the agency’s procedures.
Meanwhile, a dispute flared up over shipping in the Strait of Hormuz. Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs said that the basis for navigation management is clause five of the memorandum between Tehran and Washington. However, the naval forces of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps warned that any new routes announced without coordination with Iran are unacceptable and dangerous. Earlier, Oman announced a temporary free route in its part of the strait, to which Iran replied that after a war the situation would change and payment would be required for services.
US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, for his part, said Washington will not allow any charges to be imposed for passage, regardless of what they are called. Thus, three positions converged: Iran insists on its right to set rules and collect fees, Oman proposes a free alternative route, and the United States categorically rejects any charges. The issue remains unresolved and threatens renewed tension in the region.
At the same time, the special envoy of the US president, Steve Witkoff, told members of Congress that Iran will send the IAEA an official invitation for inspections. According to him, attached to the memorandum between the United States and Iran is a separate letter addressed to Grossi. Sources for Associated Press at the agency claim that this letter paves the way for allowing, including, American inspectors to access Iran’s facilities. In this way, the technical verification could take on an international character.
In addition, the sides agreed on a mechanism for deciding the fate of the accumulated highly enriched uranium. The minimal option is to reduce the level of enrichment on site under IAEA supervision. Other issues, including Iran’s future needs for nuclear energy, will be discussed later based on “satisfactory frameworks” that are to be developed in the final agreement. The main thing is that the inspection process has been set in motion, and now everyone is waiting for the first steps on the ground.
Comments on the news
What is the role of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in Iran’s political system, and why do its naval forces have autonomy in security matters in the Persian Gulf? — The IRGC is an elite military-political formation created after the 1979 revolution to protect the Islamic system. It has its own budget, economic assets, and reports directly to the Supreme Leader, which makes it a parallel center of power alongside the government. The IRGC’s naval forces (IRGC Navy) gained autonomy because of their role in asymmetric defense: they are responsible for fast patrol craft, mining and missile batteries in the Persian Gulf, while Iran’s regular navy focuses on blue-water operations. This division allows the IRGC to act more flexibly and aggressively, aligning with its revolutionary mission to deter external threats.
Why does Iran insist on its right to charge for passage through the Strait of Hormuz, and what legal or historical grounds does it cite? — Iran says the strait runs through its territorial waters, and that it has a sovereign right to regulate shipping, citing historical rights to control the strait (for example, agreements from the 1950s). In addition, Tehran argues that it bears disproportionately large costs to ensure security in this narrow route, so “fees” could compensate for those expenses. However, international law (the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea) establishes the right of innocent passage for all ships, and Iran has not ratified the Convention. In practice, this demand is used as a tool of political pressure rather than an official legal position.
What were the main stages of negotiations between Iran and the United States on the nuclear program (the JCPOA of 2015, the US withdrawal in 2018, current negotiations), and how does the current memorandum of understanding relate to them? — Key stages: 1) JCPOA (2015) — an agreement with the “six” (the United States, the EU, Russia, China, the UK, France + Germany) that capped uranium enrichment at 3.67% in exchange for sanctions relief. 2) US withdrawal (2018) — a unilateral break, after which Iran exceeded the limits, accumulated uranium up to 60%, and halted IAEA inspections. 3) Talks in Vienna (2021–2022) — an attempt to revive the JCPOA, but negotiations stalled due to disagreements over guarantees and demands for sanctions relief. The current memorandum of understanding (2023) is not an official “JCPOA replacement,” but an unofficial “gentlemen’s agreement” reached with the mediation of Qatar and Oman. It does not replace the JCPOA and only temporarily froze certain elements of the nuclear program (for example, the suspension of enrichment up to 60%) in exchange for unlocking part of Iran’s assets and swapping prisoners. This is a tactical step aimed at reducing tension, not a full-fledged nuclear-dossier deal.
Full version: غروسي يبدي استعدادا للعودة لإيران وخلاف بشأن إدارة مضيق هرمز