In April 1967, the magazine The People’s Army, published by the Syrian army, printed an article by an officer, Ibrahim Khallas, on the need to create a “new Arab socialist man.” The author called God, religions, and former values “embalmed dolls in the museum of history.” The article reflected the Baathist view of religion as an obstacle to progress, while its appearance in an official military publication gave it particular political weight. After the Baath came to power in 1963, the regime did not immediately confront all believers. Instead, it began restructuring the religious sphere and recruiting loyal religious leaders.
The position of Islamic figures gradually changed after the coup, although political life in the country remained relatively open to them after Syria withdrew from its union with Egypt. In 1964, the authorities supported the election of Sheikh Ahmad Kaftaru as Syria’s mufti: he defeated his opponent, Hasan Habanaka al-Maydani, by just one vote. Kaftaru was not a creation of the Baath, but his influence grew through his work in mosques and on the radio. He believed that cooperation with the authorities could achieve in a week what preaching would not achieve in a year. He even supported secular and Baathist candidates, which led to accusations that he was a political opportunist.
After coming to power in the early 1970s, Hafez Assad sought to avoid a direct conflict with the Sunni majority. In the 1973 Constitution, the wording stating that Islam was the state religion was replaced with the provision: “The religion of the president of the republic is Islam.” To establish that Assad met the constitutional requirements, the regime invoked a fatwa by Imam Musa al-Sadr that recognized the Alawites as part of the Twelver Shiite tradition. However, concessions to religious sentiment were accompanied by harsh repression: the regime crushed the Muslim Brotherhood movement, and in 1982 sent troops into Hama, where thousands of civilians and religious figures were killed, including the city’s mufti, Muhammad Bashir al-Murad.
Kaftaru supported Assad in his struggle against the Muslim Brotherhood and provided religious justification for the regime’s policies by issuing fatwas prohibiting opposition to the ruler. At the same time, he remained silent about the destruction of Hama, its mosques, and residential neighborhoods. His supporters took advantage of the religious vacuum that emerged after the massacre and occupied many mosques. Meanwhile, the authorities pursued an ambivalent policy: they restricted independent religious life, closed mosques between prayers, and monitored Quran study circles, while allowing certain religious institutions to operate, including the Abu al-Nur Center and the al-Fatih Institute, without fully recognizing their diplomas.
In addition to official muftis, the regime relied on theologians who enjoyed broad popularity. The most prominent among them was Muhammad Said Ramadan al-Buti, an opponent of Salafism and political Islam who advocated a moderate Ash‘ari tradition with Sufi ethics. He rejected the transformation of religion into a political project capable of challenging the authorities. His direct relationship with the regime began around 1980 and grew stronger during the events in Hama, following his criticism of the Muslim Brotherhood and his silence about the authorities’ crimes. In 1990, Hafez Assad commissioned him to host a religious television program, Quranic Studies, and began consulting him on Islamic affairs.
Al-Buti’s rapprochement with the regime reached its peak in 1994, when he led the funeral prayer for Basil Assad, the president’s son. He later continued to support Bashar Assad until his death in 2013, even comparing regime soldiers who killed Syrians to the companions of the Prophet Muhammad. Thus, Hafez Assad’s rule created a network of loyal sheikhs, attracting some through their desire for influence and others through ideological convictions, while placing the religious sphere under the control of the security services. For many Syrians, this era became a time when religiosity was perceived as an accusation and public activism as a source of fear. Yet memories of that period coexist with memories of the victims who played a role in the fall of one of the Arab world’s most enduring and brutal regimes.
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How did relations between Syria’s Sunni majority and Alawite minority develop historically, and why did the president’s religious affiliation have such political significance? — The Alawites, who make up approximately 10–15% of Syria’s population, historically lived mainly in coastal and mountainous areas and for a long time belonged to socially marginalized communities. After independence, many Alawites joined the army and state apparatus, and after Hafez Assad came to power in 1970, members of the community occupied key positions. This did not mean that all Sunnis opposed the Alawites, but the concentration of political power in the hands of Assad’s family and allies heightened sectarian suspicions. The president’s religious affiliation therefore mattered as a symbol of legitimacy: some Sunni opponents considered the Alawites insufficiently “orthodox” Muslims, while the authorities sought to present the regime as secular and above sectarian divisions.
What were the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria during the 1970s and 1980s, and how did their movement differ from the country’s other religious and political forces? — The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood was a Sunni Islamist movement opposed to the Baathist state, authoritarian rule, and the dominance of the Alawite elite. Unlike official religious institutions subordinate to the state, it sought a more active politicization of Islam and demanded that legislation and governance rely more heavily on Islamic norms. The movement included moderate preachers and community activists as well as radical armed groups. In the late 1970s, some of its supporters turned to armed struggle; the culmination was the uprising in Hama in 1982, which was suppressed by the government. The Muslim Brotherhood was not the only Sunni opposition force, however: it competed with secular nationalists, left-wing forces, independent ulama, and local protest networks.
What role did Syrian muftis, mosques, and religious educational institutions play in the system of state control, and how much independence did they retain from the security services? — The state controlled the appointment of muftis and many imams, the content of official sermons, the registration of religious organizations, and the operation of major mosques. Religious educational institutions, including Islamic institutes and schools, had to follow state regulations and avoid political mobilization. Muftis and official ulama provided the regime with religious justification, called for order, and condemned armed opposition. Yet independence did not disappear completely: influential theologians could shape public sentiment, conduct charitable activities, and express cautious criticism. Their room for action was limited by surveillance from the security services, censorship, personnel controls, and the risk of arrest. As a result, the independence of religious institutions remained restricted and depended on their relationship with the authorities.
Full version: A Beard on Assad’s Face: How Did the Fallen Syrian Regime Create Its Sheikhs?