In June, the United States and Iran signed an electronic memorandum of understanding aimed at stabilizing the situation in the Strait of Hormuz. However, just three weeks later, Donald Trump announced it had been nullified, saying Tehran had violated the understandings. From the U.S. side came threats of “powerful” strikes, while mutual accusations of provocation against civilian vessels only further heightened tensions.
Iran responded that the American side had shown no patience and had not waited for the 30-day period to elapse for fulfilling obligations. Meanwhile, the Pentagon carried out a series of strikes on targets near the strait, and in early July Iranian media reported that a foreign container ship had run aground due to a deviation from the agreed course—fueling doubts about navigation safety.
In an effort to ease the situation, indirect talks took place in Doha, with Qatar and Pakistan acting as intermediaries. The sides agreed on a week-long ceasefire, but on July 4, Kazem Garibabadi, the deputy head of Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, warned the UK and France against any military presence in the strait. Ship movements sharply decreased, and some captains attempted to bypass the strait via alternative routes despite Tehran’s objections.
The ceasefire collapsed on July 7, when three oil and gas tankers were attacked off the coasts of Oman and the UAE. The United States blamed Iran, raised the threat level to “critical,” and revoked a license that allowed the sale of Iranian oil. Iran’s foreign minister, Abbas Araghchi, said talks on a final agreement would not begin while threats continued—and within hours, U.S. aircraft carried out pinpoint strikes on naval bases in the provinces of Hormozgan and Bushehr.
A wave of political escalation followed: Trump said Iran had allegedly put him on a “kill list,” and CNN, citing sources, confirmed the involvement of Israeli intelligence in uncovering the assassination plot. In response, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps promised a “punitive strike.” Reports then emerged of attacks on Kuwait, Bahrain, and Jordan, while satellite data recorded almost a complete halt to shipping through the strait.
The climax came on July 12: an official spokesperson for the IRGC announced the complete closure of the Strait of Hormuz “until further notice.” “The era of unilateral deals has ended,” Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf wrote. “Either the U.S. keeps its promises—or pays the price.” In response, U.S. Central Command said about 140 military facilities on Iranian territory had been hit, and Tehran struck American bases in the region. The two countries once again exchanged strikes, while control of the strait remained the main fault line: Washington imposed a 20% fee for passage under U.S. management, while Tehran called the strait “more important than dozens of nuclear bombs” and pledged to defend it at any cost.
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What is the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and what influence does it have on Iran’s foreign and domestic policy? — The IRGC is an elite military and political formation created after the 1979 revolution to protect the Islamic system. Unlike the regular army, the IRGC controls missile forces and intelligence, and also has powerful economic assets (construction, energy, and finance). The IRGC directly affects foreign policy by supporting allied forces in the region (Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, militias in Iraq and Syria), and domestically through ideological control and participation in suppressing protests. In effect, the IRGC is a “state within a state,” whose commanders often hold key positions in government.
Why are the provinces of Hormozgan and Bushehr strategically important for Iran? What is located there? — These provinces lie on the Persian Gulf coast and include Qeshm Island, the port of Bandar Abbas, and a nuclear complex in Bushehr. Hormozgan controls the Strait of Hormuz—a narrow passage through which about 20–25% of global oil trade flows. Bushehr is home to Iran’s only operating nuclear power plant (with Russia’s assistance) and major petrochemical plants. Any instability there directly threatens both Iran’s economy and global energy supply.
Who is Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, and why does his statement about closing the Strait of Hormuz carry special weight in Iran’s establishment? — Qalibaf is an influential conservative politician, former mayor of Tehran (2005–2017), and the current speaker of Iran’s parliament (Majles). His position is third in importance in the state hierarchy after the Supreme Leader and the president. Qalibaf’s statements—especially on foreign and defense policy—often reflect the consolidated position of the top leadership rather than only his personal view. His mention of closing the strait signals that the establishment sees the move as a real tool of pressure in the event of conflict escalation.
Why does Iran call the Strait of Hormuz “more important than dozens of nuclear bombs”? What historical, economic, or ideological factors lie behind this rhetoric? — The phrase emphasizes that control over the strait gives Iran not only economic leverage but also an existential weapon. On one hand, nearly all of Iran’s oil passes through the strait—its main source of budget revenue. On the other hand, Iran remembers the “tanker war” of the 1980s and the U.S. invasion of Iraq (2003) through neighboring countries. Ideologically, the regime portrays itself as the protector of the Islamic world against Western domination, and the threat to the strait is a demonstration that Tehran can paralyze the global economy even without a nuclear arsenal. For Iran’s leadership, this lever compensates for a military-technological gap and serves as a bargaining chip in international negotiations.
Full version: رسوم الـ20% وعودة الحصار البحري.. كيف وصل التصعيد بين ترمب وإيران إلى هنا؟