Recently international media have been registering growing alarm over the aggressive rhetoric and actions from Donald Trump’s circle toward Iran: from renewed bombings and Tehran’s retaliatory strikes to fears that local clashes could escalate into a large-scale Middle Eastern conflict. Reports emphasize that even countries and audiences far from the region view Washington as a key driver of rising instability, and that the escalation of strikes and threats undermines diplomatic deterrence mechanisms and raises the risk of third-party involvement. This piece was prepared based on materials from YouTube, DW and Instagram (Venezuela).
Venezuela between Hormuz and Caracas: how the US–Iran crisis is perceived in the sanctioned country
The escalation of Donald Trump’s rhetoric toward Iran, disputes over control of the Strait of Hormuz and the threat of a new “guerra de sanciones” in Latin America are perceived primarily through the Venezuelan experience. For Caracas this is not just a distant conflict in the Middle East, but a reflection of its own history of sanctions, oil dependence and geopolitical confrontation with Washington. Thus the events in the Strait of Hormuz, described both in the Bloomberg en Español piece and in the Deutsche Welle report and RPP Noticias note, fit into a coherent picture: sanctions as a weapon, oil as a hostage and Venezuela as part of an informal club of “punished countries.”
In the Bloomberg en Español video Trump threatens to strike Iran “very hard.” Formally this is a brief news item focused on a single statement. But in Venezuela such phrases have long been perceived not only as the risk of bombings or a direct strike, but as a code for a whole set of pressure instruments: military presence, economic sanctions, financial blockade and technological isolation. That is precisely the triad that Caracas’ official authorities have for years described as “unconventional warfare” and “imperialist aggression” against Venezuela.
In the local context any hardening of Washington’s stance toward Tehran is automatically associated with the experience of PDVSA and a state under American and European sanctions, with hyperinflation, production collapse and mass migration. When Trump says that Iran will “pay the consequences” for delaying negotiations, as quoted in the Deutsche Welle piece about the crisis around Hormuz and the “secret” US operation to release about 100 million barrels of oil onto the market mentioned in the original DW article, in Venezuela this is taken as a warning directed at them as well: the same words were said about Caracas when personal, financial and oil restrictions were imposed.
Voices inside Venezuela are split into several characteristic lines. The official camp and supporters of Chavismo see Iran as a “brother country” that has also become a target of sanctions and pressure. They fit each new Trump statement into a global pattern: “what they are doing to Iran today, they did and will do to Venezuela.” The increase in pressure on Tehran is presented as further proof of an axis of “besieged countries,” where Washington uses sanctions and military power, and Iran and Venezuela respond with “resistance” and cooperation. This includes joint projects — Iranian tankers with gasoline amid fuel shortages, technical assistance at Venezuelan refineries, energy agreements designed to compensate for the blockade.
The opposition and critical economists view the US–Iran conflict primarily as a factor of instability for the oil market. They emphasize that any escalation in the Strait of Hormuz pushes oil prices up, but this is no longer a guaranteed benefit for Caracas: structural collapse in production, degraded infrastructure and sanctions against PDVSA do not allow Venezuela to convert high prices into sustainable revenues. Moreover, close political alignment with Tehran, in their view, complicates any future full normalization of relations with the US, since it places Venezuela among the states Washington considers problematic.
Independent geopolitical analysts tend to see Trump’s threats as part of a wider turning point in the world order, in which Venezuela’s place is determined not only by ideology but by its status as an exporter under sanctions. They draw direct parallels between the “maximum pressure” strategy against Iran and the same logic applied to Caracas: economic strangulation, isolation from international financial markets, diplomatic pressure and constant references to the possibility of military scenarios. In this context statements about US “control” over Hormuz, heard in the Deutsche Welle piece, are interpreted as a demonstration of Washington’s ability not only to apply sanctions but also to rely on military power to secure energy flows, bypassing Tehran’s attempts to use the strait as leverage.
The key, distinctly Venezuelan interest is oil. The Strait of Hormuz is a bottleneck through which a significant share of the world’s seaborne oil exports pass. Any hint of its “complete closure” by Iran, which Deutsche Welle writes about, in Caracas is immediately translated into Brent quotes and fiscal maneuvering potential. One scenario assumes that pressure on Iran reduces its legal supplies and increases gray schemes — as with Venezuelan oil, routed through flag-changing networks, complex intermediary chains and grade “mixes” to mask origin. Another scenario is rising prices amid global nervousness, which is theoretically favorable to a reservoir-rich exporter, but practically changes little for a country whose production has fallen and whose access to markets and credit is limited.
Domestically the consequences appear contradictory. Rising oil prices could improve currency inflows, but mass problems in extraction and refining, worn-out infrastructure and counterparties’ fear of secondary sanctions erode that effect. At the same time, higher costs for shipping, fuel and imported goods hit domestic prices and intensify the inflation Venezuela has suffered for many years. Therefore Trump’s talk of a “very hard strike” against Iran, as well as his boasting about a “secret” operation to move more than 100 million barrels through Hormuz and ensure the passage of “more than 200 ships,” as DW recounts, are perceived with mixed feelings: as a possible short-term price stimulus, but also as a source of instability that almost always ends up costing Venezuela.
A separate layer of perception forms around sovereignty and control over strategic arteries. By closing Hormuz, Iran demonstrates that it holds a real lever capable of shaking the world market. Venezuelan political mythology long built itself around the role of an “energy superpower” and the idea that a country with enormous oil reserves could dictate terms. But reality — the collapse of PDVSA logistics, loss of its own tanker fleet, dependence on foreign ships — shows that Caracas has no “Hormuz,” no single chokepoint whose closure would force the world to react immediately. Thus watching Iran’s strategy is tinged with envious undertones: Tehran possesses a lever of pressure that Venezuela has lost.
Cultural-political filters add an emotional backdrop. In state and pro-government media any tough phrase from Trump — whether a promise to “strike very hard” or a statement like “the US must, if necessary, respond to this attack,” as in the reaction to an Apache helicopter shot down by Iran in the Strait of Hormuz reported by RPP Noticias — is presented as an illustration of Washington’s “belligerence.” The emphasis is on the fact that the helicopter was shot down without casualties, but even the absence of fatalities does not prevent the White House from talking about the inevitability of a response. In Venezuelan official discourse this serves to confirm the thesis that the US allegedly looks for any pretext to use force, and that the question of actual damage and proportionality of response is secondary to them.
On the opposition and critical flank there is also no enthusiasm about the risk of war in the Persian Gulf. Here concerns are not about “imperialism” as such, but that global shocks traditionally worsen chaos in domestic markets and make life in a crisis economy even more expensive. Moreover, many remember the precedents of the 2003 Iraq campaign and manipulations of information about “weapons of mass destruction.” Therefore announcements of an “inevitable” retaliatory strike, like those cited by RPP Noticias, are met not only with distrust toward Trump but also with skepticism about the completeness and accuracy of the initial data on the incident.
A common theme across all camps is the idea of sanctions as a form of warfare. Venezuelan experience shows that a “hard strike” can mean not bombings but the freezing of accounts, bans on operations with sovereign debt, an oil embargo and restrictions on the supply of equipment and technologies. In this sense Trump’s words captured in the Bloomberg en Español video resonate with Venezuelan memory of the recognition of an “alternative government,” sanctions against PDVSA, blows to the gold sector and the financial system. Each new round of pressure on Iran is perceived as confirmation that these instruments will continue to be used against “disobedient” regimes, among which Venezuela stands alongside Tehran and Moscow.
Venezuelan audiences, accustomed to an ideologized international agenda, rarely read such news as a mere chronicle. Where Deutsche Welle carefully recounts Trump’s statement about Iran “totally” closing Hormuz, about a “secret” American operation in May and hundreds of tankers passing the strait, in Venezuela a more complex picture is immediately constructed: the impact on the price per barrel, on Caracas’ negotiating conditions with Washington over possible sanction relief, on the US need to diversify imports through shale, Africa or conditional reintegration of Venezuelan crude via OFAC licenses and deals with individual companies like Chevron.
And where the short RPP Noticias post simply records: “helicopter shot down, no casualties, but the US must respond,” Venezuelan imagination immediately places this episode into the familiar matrix of “block versus block”: Iran as an allied country under siege, the US as the main opponent, Venezuela as a less influential but ideologically close player on the side of sanctioned states. The conversation about the Strait of Hormuz resonates not only with anxiety for the global market but also with the sense that Caracas’ fate is largely decided in the same offices that issue orders concerning Iran.
As a result, the same set of facts — threats to “strike very hard,” the story of a “secret” passage of 100 million barrels through Hormuz, the statement about the “inevitable” response to the downed helicopter — becomes for Venezuela another episode in a well-known series. It is not just about the US and Iran; it is about how a world of sanctions, oil and military power shapes the space of opportunities and constraints for a country that has itself become a symbol of how geopolitics can collapse an oil economy without firing a single missile at its territory.
