The European Union is preparing to take its relationship with Syria to a new level, moving from diplomatic normalization to genuine economic cooperation and security coordination. A European diplomatic document contains a package of proposals that coincides with Monday’s meeting of EU foreign ministers and Tuesday’s launch in Damascus of the “Partnership Coordination Forum for Syria,” with EU participation. Brussels is focused on stability, migration and energy, and is tying its support for Syria’s reconstruction to curbing Russia’s remaining influence.
EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas said the Union had proposed taking relations with Damascus to a new stage because “Syria needs investment and support to build institutions.” She said the EU wants Syrian refugees to return and take part in reconstruction, but appropriate conditions must first be created; stability in Syria serves the interests of both the EU and the region. The document envisages broader rapprochement: security-sector reform, investment and the revival of an Association Agreement provisionally signed in 2008 but never brought to its final stage. The agreement provides a framework for free trade, political dialogue and broad cooperation, and European diplomats are asking EU member states for a new mandate to negotiate amendments. According to Reuters on November 11, the current text could provide a basis for rapidly formalizing relations.
Brussels’ motives span politics, economics and security. Researcher Samer Elias notes that Europe was open to cooperation from the outset, with its priorities falling into three areas: putting the Assad era behind it and turning a new page, addressing migration and the return of refugees, and establishing security coordination. Europe needs a stable environment for the voluntary return of Syrians and cooperation against “hybrid attacks.” Energy projects—transporting oil and gas from the Gulf and Iraq through Syria to Europe—remain long-term prospects and depend on security and major investment. Political scientist Mahmoud Alloush, meanwhile, puts the emphasis on stability in Syria and its new government, shifting from a political agenda to the economy and reconstruction, and the impact the migration issue has had on the EU over the past 15 years.
Alloush expects the November 17 forum to produce a “clear roadmap” for European engagement in Syria, primarily at the economic level. In his view, such engagement matters to Europe because of the significant economic opportunities and the chance to strengthen its own presence in the Syrian context. According to the document, the forum will focus on investment and private-sector participation, paving the way for a possible EU–Syria investment conference in 2027. The European Investment Bank is being urged to resume cooperation, while Damascus is being encouraged to support efforts to join the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Qutaiba Qaddish, Syria’s deputy foreign minister for international cooperation, called the forum a “national platform” for organizing and coordinating partnerships with international bodies, so that support is aligned with reconstruction and development priorities set by national institutions.
The Russian factor remains central to Europe’s calculations. The document states that the EU aims to strengthen its contacts with Damascus in order to limit “the malign influence of Russia and other foreign actors.” Support is planned for security-sector reform, including trilateral cooperation with Jordan to train Syrian police officers. Elias, an expert on Russian affairs, points out that agreements governing Russia’s presence do not guarantee direct military action: according to available reports, the bases are being turned into training centers, but Russia’s military and economic influence remains a source of concern for Europe. Alloush adds that other actors will fill any vacuum in Europe’s role. There are concerns that Russia will try to regain its former position, while Turkey’s growing influence could negatively affect EU interests.
At the same time, Elias offers a restrained assessment of investment prospects. In his view, Europeans cannot currently meet all of Syria’s reconstruction needs because of their own economic crises following Russia’s war against Ukraine. Major construction investment depends on clarity about Syria’s security situation and political future. Moving from political support to real investment requires a secure environment and institutions capable of taking on projects. Without that, even the most detailed proposals risk remaining only a framework.
The success of the partnership therefore depends on the EU’s ability to overcome its domestic economic constraints, offer Damascus tangible incentives, and provide a clear path toward political and security stability. Syria, for its part, needs more than declarations: it needs functioning funding and reform mechanisms, as well as investor confidence. For now, Europe’s approach appears to be a pragmatic combination of security, migration interests, energy and competition with Russia and Turkey.
Overall, the EU’s opening toward Syria is a significant step, but the path from a diplomatic document to genuine economic engagement remains long. The Damascus forum and the possible 2027 investment conference are important signals, but the outcome will depend on stability on the ground, the strength of institutions and Brussels’ readiness to move from proposals to concrete action.
Comments on the News
- What exactly did the EU–Syria Association Agreement, signed in 2008, provide for, and why did it never reach its final stage? — It provided for political dialogue, provisions on human rights and democracy, the gradual liberalization of trade and the creation of a free-trade area, cooperation in services, investment, agriculture, energy, transport, the environment, justice and home affairs, as well as EU financial and technical assistance. The agreement never reached its final stage—ratification by all parties and entry into force—because of the EU’s political conditions. After 2011, Brussels suspended the process and imposed sanctions; the document never entered into force.
- Which Russian military facilities in Syria remain today, and what does their current status as “training centers” mean in practice for European security calculations? — According to public sources, the main facilities still in place are the Khmeimim air base in Latakia and the Russian Navy’s logistics support point in Tartus; smaller training and advisory sites may also exist. Recasting them as “training centers” means a less clearly defined and reduced arrangement, but Russian personnel, an air bridge, logistics and the capacity for surveillance or troop deployment remain. For Europe, this continues to be a source of uncertainty when considering security guarantees, airspace control, reform of Syrian security forces and monitoring Russian influence.
- Why is trilateral cooperation with Jordan seen as playing a key role in reforming Syria’s security sector, and what border or local factors make Amman an important partner? — Jordan is a neighbor with a long border with southern Syria. It controls the key Jaber/Nasib crossing, hosts refugees, maintains ties with tribes and former opposition groups in southern Syria, and has experience combating drug and arms smuggling. Border control, police and army training, countering the “Islamic State” and stabilizing the south are all important to security reform. Amman provides regional Arab legitimacy and a channel for coordination with Western partners. Local factors include instability in Daraa, tribal networks, proximity to the Golan Heights and Israeli interests, as well as captagon-smuggling routes toward the Gulf.
- What existing routes and infrastructure would be needed to transport oil and gas from the Gulf and Iraq through Syria to Europe, and who currently controls these areas? — Historically, the routes in question include the Kirkuk–Baniyas oil pipeline, the Arab Gas Pipeline and the Iran–Iraq–Syria “Islamic Gas Pipeline” project, as well as a possible Qatar–Turkey route through Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Syria. They would require repairs to pipelines, pumping and compressor stations, and the Baniyas, Latakia and Tartus terminals; connections to Turkey’s TANAP pipeline and European networks; and security, transit agreements, financing and insurance. The central part of the country and the ports are currently mostly under the control of the Damascus government. The northeast, including the oil and gas fields of Deir ez-Zor and Hasakah, is under the SDF/AANES, with a US presence. Parts of the north are controlled by Turkish allies. The Abu Kamal/Al-Qaim crossing is important on the Iraqi border, and Jaber/Nasib on the Jordanian border; US forces are present around Al-Tanf, while Israel is on the Golan Heights.
Full version: Security and economy: Is Europe reshuffling its cards in Syria to counter Russian influence?