Iraqi Prime Minister Ali az-Zeidi found himself in an extremely precarious situation: he needs to preserve the partnership with the United States, avoid provoking a direct confrontation with Iran and the armed groups linked to it, and also prevent the country from turning into a battlefield for a broader regional power struggle. Escalation between Washington and Tehran makes this task almost impossible, and every decision by Baghdad’s leadership is now being scrutinized both in the White House and in Iran’s corridors of power.
As Lahab Higeel, deputy director of the Middle East and North Africa Programme at the International Crisis Group, explains, recent reciprocal strikes between American and Saudi forces on the one hand and Iran-aligned formations in Iraq on the other have made clear the dead end in which the prime minister finds himself. Az-Zeidi has just returned from Washington, where several dozen memoranda of understanding were signed; yet instead of strengthening his position, he has faced a military threat that could draw Iraq into a conflict whose trajectory Baghdad cannot control. The end-of-September scheduled conclusion of the international coalition’s mission also carries a double meaning: on the one hand, cooperation with the United States will shift to a bilateral format; on the other, that in itself will not weaken the armed groups.
Higeel emphasizes that for many Iran-aligned formations, the presence of American troops is only one of several reasons to keep their weapons. They present themselves as part of the so-called “axis of resistance,” which extends well beyond Iraq’s territory and is directly tied to Tehran’s regional strategy. Therefore, withdrawing most foreign contingents will not solve the problem of “runaway weapons.” Moreover, attempting to forcibly seize these arsenals now would be extremely dangerous: such a move could trigger a large-scale internal clash. The realistic goal at this stage is not to eliminate all weapons, but to gradually bring them under state control.
Az-Zeidi has, in essence, inherited the dilemma faced by all previous Iraqi prime ministers: slow action strengthens parallel centers of power, while fast action threatens to fracture the Shiite camp—an outcome that would be difficult to contain. Judging by the government’s approach, it is not seeking total disarmament and has instead chosen a step-by-step integration tactic: separate negotiations are being conducted with each formation. Some formations have already officially handed control of their brigades to the armed forces’ commander-in-chief; others have expressed an initial readiness to follow suit, while the groups most closely tied to the “axis of resistance” publicly reject this path. The priority should be to strengthen the chain of command of those units that receive salaries from the state budget and operate within the structures of the security forces, as well as to establish a clearer command hierarchy within the Hashd ash-Shaabi.
Higeel delivers an important warning to Washington: instead of pressuring the prime minister and demanding immediate military confrontation with the groups, the United States should strengthen Iraq’s state institutions. Continuing to train the military, exchanging intelligence, and increasing the army’s capacity will yield more benefit than ultimatums on disarmament. In the expert’s view, such pressure will only expose the weakness of the central government and complicate the crisis rather than bringing it closer to resolution. In other words, turning the process into a sequence of military orders from outside is counterproductive.
Finally, an important element of the strategy should be expanding Iraq’s economic and political ties with the Gulf states. This would reduce Baghdad’s dependence on Tehran, without turning Iraq into a hostile Iran. Diversifying partnerships, attracting investment, developing trade, and building energy infrastructure will give Iraqi leadership more freedom in foreign-policy decisions. Success for az-Zeidi, Higeel concludes, will be measured not by whether he can disarm all the groups within a few months, but by how effectively he can strengthen the state, subordinate armed formations to legitimate authority, and give Iraq room to maneuver between Washington and Tehran.
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What is “Hashd ash-Shaabi,” and how does this structure relate to the official Iraqi army and Iranian influence? — Hashd ash-Shaabi (Popular Mobilization Forces) is an umbrella structure created in 2014 out of Shiite militias to fight ISIS. Formally it is subordinate to the Prime Minister of Iraq and recognized as part of the state security forces, but many of the groups inside it retain their own command, funding, and close ties with Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). In practice, this means that Hashd operates in parallel with the official army, and the most influential factions follow Tehran’s instructions—especially on regional-policy matters—making it an instrument of Iranian influence within the Iraqi state.
Which groups belong to the “axis of resistance” and why do they see themselves as part of Tehran’s regional strategy? — The “axis of resistance” (or Tehran’s “axis”) usually includes Lebanon’s Hezbollah, Palestinian groups (Hamas and “Islamic Jihad”), Yemeni Houthis (“Ansar Allah”), the Syrian government and the militias supporting it, as well as Iraqi Shiite formations such as Kataib Hezbollah and Asaib Ahl al-Haq. These groups are united by an ideology of opposing Israel and the United States, and by recognition of Iran’s supreme leader as a spiritual and strategic reference point. For them, participation in the axis means not only ideological solidarity, but also receiving military, financial, and logistical support from Iran—enabling them to influence regional conflicts in Tehran’s interests, from Lebanon and Syria to Iraq and Yemen.
Why do Iran-aligned formations in Iraq retain autonomy from Baghdad despite their formal integration into state structures? — The autonomy of these formations is explained by several factors: they have independent sources of income (including Iranian funding, control over economic assets, and unofficial taxes), their own military stockpiles and training camps, as well as sustained political positions in Iraq’s parliament. Integration into state structures was in large part formal: the Iraqi government was forced to recognize Hashd because of its military might and popular backing, but it did not gain real control over the appointment of commanders or over their actions. In addition, for Tehran, maintaining such semi-independent groups is a key tool for pressuring Baghdad and a convenient channel for redeploying forces to Syria and other countries. Therefore, Iran consciously encourages their autonomy, weakening the monopoly of the Iraqi state in the use of force.
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