Part One. And the Ponies Just Keep Galloping

Last year's report from the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) aimed to "decode" and interpret Moscow's nuclear rhetoric. As Russia's war in Ukraine approached its one-year mark, Putin repeatedly threatened to use nuclear weapons, and it would have been good to understand why he was doing this and what could be done about this beauty. Well, for example, if it turned out that Putin was grabbing for the nuclear club when things were going badly at the front, this would have allowed for building at least some kind of strategy. Unfortunately, everything turned out much worse, and perhaps the Americans' main mistake was trying to analyze facts - this doesn't work with Russia. Therefore, based on the interpretation of Russia's nuclear vacillations, the report's authors came to a logical conclusion: "Hell knows what this all means, sir!" Analyst Lachlan Mackenzie suggested that if you try to analyze what appears in the media, "Russian threats seem disconnected and unrelated to each other." Former U.S. Deputy Secretary of State and Director of Policy Planning Heather Conley suggested listening only to Putin and taking his statements seriously, even if they're meant for domestic consumption: "Although Putin and Xi Jinping are autocrats... perhaps they're the ones we should believe." Between the options "all this is done to satisfy the domestic audience and reassure the Russian military elite" and "Putin himself believes that this way he can deter NATO troop deployment and win the war with Ukraine," the authors couldn't decide.

Nevertheless, the report contains much important information. Firstly, the authors described for history three phases of escalation in Russian nuclear rhetoric:

Phase I (February – July 2022): Russia's imitation of deterring NATO intervention in the first months of the war. Russian threats were mainly focused on deterring an allegedly planned NATO intervention in Ukraine and the implementation of a no-fly zone. Under this pretext, in late February, Putin ordered Russia's nuclear forces to move to a heightened combat readiness status, and a couple of months later stood them down, and after the convening of the UN Conference on the Review of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), Moscow quieted down for some time.

Phase II (August – October 2022): with Ukraine's successes on the front, nuclear rhetoric intensifies. When Ukrainian forces began their counteroffensive in August-September, Russian statements about the possibility of using nuclear weapons resurfaced. Putin stated that Russia would use "all available means to protect" the annexed Ukrainian territories, which many interpreted as a hint at the use of nuclear weapons. (I'll note that Putin didn't limit himself to rhetoric: during this time, there was a large-scale transfer of tactical nuclear weapons, which the Americans missed).

Phase III (November 2022 – early 2023): respite and further escalation. Under pressure from China and India, Russian threats to use nuclear weapons temporarily ceased. In late 2022, the G20 summit issued a statement on the inadmissibility of using nuclear weapons under any circumstances, and Moscow's responsive silence was interpreted by many as "Moscow was cooled down by this." It seemed like the danger had passed. But in January 2023, Putin suspended Russia's participation in the nuclear arms reduction treaty without any apparent reason. At this point, the authors reasonably stopped looking for logic in his actions.

Secondly, in the CSIS report, the section "Growing Support for the Ban on Nuclear Weapons" is worth noting. It begins with the statement that "while world leaders try to prevent Moscow from starting a nuclear war," the number of countries supporting the UN-developed draft treaty on the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons "continues to slowly increase and has reached 69 countries." And further: "the list of countries supporting this treaty still doesn't include any nuclear powers." Maybe they weren't invited? - No: many "nuclear" NATO members "attended the council meetings of these countries as observers, cautiously stating that they don't intend to join the treaty." Why? It turns out that the UN-developed draft treaty on the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons doesn't mention Russia at all. Not once! That is, in the UN, there's a fight against a spherical nuclear threat in a vacuum, but there's no Putin who's brandishing a nuclear club and withdrawing from treaties. (Are you also not surprised?) And the CSIS report correctly points out that the UN draft treaty "missed an opportunity to gain greater support by pointing out the danger of Russia's nuclear threats against Ukraine," which indicates "continuing disagreements between the idealistic global prohibition of nuclear weapons and pragmatism in the face of Putin's war. The TPNW may have moral authority on paper, but it has yet to clearly limit the actions of real nuclear forces, such as Russian ones." That's how you find out that the UN not only has problems with its head, but herds of pink ponies are parading in formation there, and there's still much to deal with regarding them.

Part Two. "Russia Launches Low-Yield Nuclear Strikes on Polish Infrastructure"

On October 18, 2024, the same Center for Strategic and International Studies released its next major study "Project Atom 2024." (The subtitle "Nuclear Deterrence: What Does Washington Think?" is almost symptomatic here: having despaired of finding any logic in Moscow's actions and statements, the experts decided to focus on a simpler task. But in reality, work on the study began in early 2024, when leading American nuclear weapons experts gathered in Washington to discuss the most unpleasant scenario: what to do if nuclear deterrence fails?)

The study's authors acknowledge that neither treaties nor old nuclear deterrence models developed during the Cold War work anymore, new approaches are needed that take into account both the changed balance of powers and the emergence of new players on the world stage. Deterring monkeys with nuclear grenades may end in failure. Should we prepare for nuclear war? Yes. ("But that's not certain"). So, what's this about?

At the center of the current confrontation is the real opponent. China. Russia is viewed as an unhinged but very serious player, capable not only of decisive actions but also of pushing China toward starting a nuclear conflict. This wasn't always the case, and American analysts view Putin's war with Ukraine as the turning point. "The failure of deterrence is rooted in 2014 when Russia annexed Crimea," notes Rebecca Davis Gibbons. In her opinion, it was the anemic Western reaction to the occupation of part of Ukraine that significantly influenced Moscow's subsequent strategic calculations and prompted it to begin nuclear blackmail.

Moving to the present, American experts are trying to rationalize Russian nuclear doctrine as conceptually amounting to "the use of tactical nuclear weapons under the pretext of de-escalating military actions." It would seem this only applies to Ukraine, but - no. As Ankit Panda notes: "Russia may be more inclined to go all-in and try to preemptively destroy U.S. nuclear forces." (At this point, you start to better understand Europeans' concern for their own security and the helplessness of claims that "we are protecting the West from Putin").

Meanwhile, Europe is strictly speaking absent from the confrontation formula: experts point to the unequivocal and overwhelming superiority of Russian nuclear forces over European ones. "European allies cannot count on British and French nuclear forces as a real alternative to the American nuclear umbrella." (Here it should be noted that although formally the effectiveness of the American missile defense system supposedly exceeds 80%, even one Russian nuclear bomb exploding on European and U.S. territory is considered a catastrophic scenario).

And what about China? Two directions are important here. On one hand, it's clear that Americans are extremely concerned about partnership with Russia: China coordinates its actions with Moscow, conducting joint naval exercises, Russia is ready to provide China with any resources to strengthen military and economic cooperation, both countries share a "vision of a multipolar world" opposing American hegemony. Well, everything is clear here, and this wouldn't cause concern if Beijing wasn't simultaneously building up its nuclear arsenal. Meanwhile, China views "reunification" with Taiwan as a key goal, and its leadership is ready to use military force (including nuclear weapons) to achieve it, and this is truly frightening.

Now - the most fascinating part. The document doesn't present direct evidence of China's readiness to use nuclear weapons, but part of the study is devoted to the "2027 scenario." This is a hypothetical scenario where the use of nuclear weapons is considered as a "last resort." The hypothetical scenario for the start of nuclear war considered by the Center for Strategic and International Studies looks like this.

In 2027, growing tensions around Taiwan lead to a large-scale military clash. The situation begins to escalate after pro-independence sentiments strengthen in Taiwan, and presidential candidates make statements supporting the island's independence. In response, China begins military preparations in Fujian province, bordering the Taiwan Strait.

During this same period, Xi Jinping and Putin hold a joint summit, where Putin expresses support for China's position on Taiwan. The countries announce joint naval exercises in the Pacific Ocean, which are to coincide with Russian military exercises near western borders, including both conventional and nuclear forces.

The U.S. and its allies, perceiving the situation as an immediate threat, strengthen their military presence in both regions and warn that "wars of conquest will be punished." The situation sharply escalates on May 14, when China begins missile strikes on Taiwan as part of preparation for a full-scale invasion. The next day, Russia strikes Polish transport infrastructure and attempts an invasion. The U.S. and allies successfully counter these actions: American and allied forces intercept Chinese landing ships, while Polish and Lithuanian forces repel the strikes and enter the Kaliningrad region.

In response to military failures, both Russia and China resort to using nuclear weapons. Russia launches low-yield nuclear strikes on Polish infrastructure and NATO forces, resulting in approximately a thousand casualties, including American military personnel. China delivers a 50-kiloton nuclear strike on a U.S. naval base in the Philippines, resulting in about 15,000 deaths.

Part Three. "Let Whatever Burns Burn, As Long As There Will Be No War"

The hypothetical scenario of the start of nuclear conflict described in part two, developed by CSIS, is an analytical exercise aimed at helping politicians and military strategists better understand the complexity of decision-making in extreme situations. The document's authors repeatedly emphasize that due to the absence of historical precedents for the use of nuclear weapons in conflicts between nuclear powers, any assumptions about the development of such events remain purely theoretical.

At the same time, in general, the authors view China as a rational economic partner who has so far demonstrated measured strategic decision-making. According to Ankit Panda's analysis, China "adheres to a more cautious approach to nuclear deterrence," and the main regional risk is associated with China's policy toward Taiwan. Russia, however, is viewed as "more inclined to take risks and more ready for preemptive actions" (and we've all repeatedly seen these "preemptive actions" - in Georgia, Ukraine, Syria).

Christopher Ford believes that even in the case of territorial gains, "Moscow lacks the economic, demographic, and material resources to hold them in the long term," and this too could push the irrational Putin toward unhealthy actions. This variant of starting a nuclear conflict is considered the most likely: beyond the "2027 scenario," experts primarily consider the scenario of unmotivated use of tactical nuclear weapons by Russia under the pretext of de-escalation.

And, let's say, Putin starts a nuclear conflict. What do the experts recommend? In the short term, in case such a scenario develops, they suggest the U.S. focus on preventing full-scale nuclear war, even if this requires certain tactical concessions. Meanwhile, the military response should be decisive enough to demonstrate readiness to protect allies, but not so aggressive as to provoke further escalation.

Based on Project Atom 2024, several response scenarios can be identified.

In case of a single use of tactical nuclear weapons, the "moderate scenario" is considered most likely. It assumes a "restrained but decisive reaction," including:

• A powerful conventional response against military targets
• No immediate nuclear response
• Intensive diplomatic campaign
• Complete international isolation
• Demonstrative increase in NATO nuclear forces' readiness.

In general, "the main goal [at this stage] should be preventing further nuclear escalation leading to large-scale nuclear exchange."

There's no consensus on what to do in case of multiple nuclear weapons use. Melanie Sisson suggests continuing conventional response: seeking diplomatic paths to de-escalation and readiness for compromises to prevent global catastrophe. Gregory Weaver's approach: inevitable nuclear response, use of tactical nuclear weapons against military targets, readiness for further escalation, and demonstration of determination to protect allies.

What will determine the response type? Formally, the main factor is the context. The reaction will depend on the scale of destruction, chosen targets, collateral damage, and military situation at the moment. Here, Ankit Panda makes an important observation: "the president's personality plays a critical role." A normal U.S. president "will seek to avoid the risk of full-scale nuclear war, even at the cost of losing allies' trust," and even 10 years ago one might not have worried about the sanity of American leadership. But now it's impossible to exclude the factor of the Trump factor: we remember how he boasted that he has a nuclear button on the first floor and can get down and press it at any moment.

However, that's a separate sad topic. Let's return to our subject. In the scenario where Putin unilaterally starts a nuclear war with tactical weapons, China's reaction is considered an important factor. Although Putin has repeatedly shown that he can ignore everyone, including Xi, the authors hope that China will take a rational position, and Putin's dependence on China will play a deterrent role.

Part Four. Ballet and Ceramics

What will follow? Under any scenario, the authors predict that one should expect complete international isolation of Russia, maximally harsh economic sanctions, increased NATO military presence in Europe, and a complete revision of the global nuclear deterrence system. The experts pay special attention to the question of U.S. allies. According to Ford, even if the U.S. doesn't respond with an immediate nuclear attack to a Russian strike, they must demonstrate readiness to protect allies by all means. (I'll add from myself that this reads almost like "When they start bombing, then call us, we'll definitely think of something." But on the other hand - what else can be done?)

Further follows a rather detailed list of recommendations for preventing such a scenario. I don't know how interesting all the details are (the study is actually significantly broader than just looking at China or Russia and considers possible reactions from a wide spectrum of countries, including other nuclear states), but I'll list the key points. U.S. leadership is recommended to:

1. Strengthen preliminary planning and coordination with allies. Pay special attention to the necessity of conducting joint war games and exercises that will help better prepare for such scenarios.
2. Discuss possible actions in crisis situations with allies in advance.
3. Develop a more flexible nuclear arsenal, especially in terms of regional capabilities. This will allow for more response options in case of limited nuclear weapon use by an opponent.
4. Strengthen strategic communications with both allies and potential adversaries. It's important to clearly indicate intentions and "red lines," while avoiding ambiguity that could lead to miscalculations.
5. Pay special attention to maintaining ally unity. The document emphasizes that losing allies' trust could have more serious long-term consequences than tactical military failures.

The report notes that the main goal of all these measures is "not preparation for war, but its prevention through convincing deterrence and demonstration of readiness for decisive action if necessary."

What else? When discussing long-term prospects, the study reports that "economic restrictions, demographic problems, and limited material resources for maintaining long-term confrontation with technologically developed opponents" can drive Russia to the edge in the long term. But we know this ourselves: a couple of times per century, Russia is bound to collapse due to internal problems.

Well, that's about it. 90 pages in small print. The authors don't even ask the most important questions like "What can actually justify a nuclear strike?" or "If any outcome of nuclear war will be unconditionally worse than its cause, can one win a nuclear war?": in the world of Putins and Trumps, not seeking justifications and passing off the bombing of civilians as victory has become commonplace.

But, since we've ended up in a world where "red buttons" are in the hands of people bound neither by moral obligations nor treaties, the authors offer a choice between dying standing and living on your knees. Based on the pragmatic postulate that peace means when they're not bombing you, they essentially suggest living with the hope that Putin will use nuclear weapons against someone else and - only once. They propose not solving the problem but postponing it, hoping that somewhere in the distant perspective, Russia, like the USSR, will collapse from systemic problems.

The "preemptive strike" option isn't considered: if you kill tens of millions of people with the best intentions, you become the villain. And if you're fighting a monster, the line beyond which you yourself become a monster is always closer than it seems, so it's best not to even approach it.

I'll add from myself that an atomic bomb continues to be an atomic bomb, and somehow we need to stop calling it a weapon: this is self-deception. Nuclear arsenals are not weapons, but destroyer of worlds. Let's call it as such. And Russia will continue using it to its advantage: to scare, manipulate, divide and concur. And if that fails, Putin will have only two options: destroy millions of people or admit before the whole world that this was a bluff.

Therefore, the words of George Kennan, architect of the USSR "containment doctrine," remain valid: "The Kremlin's neurotic view of world politics is traditionally based on an instinctive sense of insecurity, fear of more competent, stronger, better organized society... Russian rulers have always felt that their power doesn't stand up to comparison with Western countries' political systems." This is how Kennan explained to President Truman that the Kremlin's aggressiveness was caused by Russia's primordial inferiority complex, it cannot be appeased by gestures of goodwill. As we know, this worked, and the authors of "Project Atom 2024" in a milder form essentially propose the same thing: strengthen, establish, develop...

I read that Robert Oppenheimer once said that not that there's no alternative to a nuclear war, but that we are not smart enough to see the alternative. Isn't that a scary thought?