Thomas Friedman, in a column for the New York Times, poses two key questions about the US war against Iran: how many "bitter cups" will Donald Trump have to drink to end the conflict with minimal gain, and can he call that "repast" a sumptuous dinner? The author is not opposed to temporary concessions if they deprive Iran of about 1,000 kilograms of near-weapons-grade uranium. However, he warns that such a partial success would not be a perfect deal — it would only strengthen the regime and leave it in power with other uranium stockpiles.
In exchange for relinquishing that uranium, Iran, in Friedman's scenario, would receive the lifting of an oil embargo and the easing of parts of the American sanctions network. That would give Tehran huge financial resources to bribe the opposition, continue repression, and fund its allies in Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen. The author cites expert Robert Litwak, who believes Trump started the war with the aim of regime change, but is now ready to end it with an agreement resembling the 2015 nuclear deal — the same deal he recklessly withdrew from in 2018.
Friedman criticizes the failed planning of Trump's team, which believed Netanyahu's promises that the Iranian regime would fall quickly after massive bombings. Iran's first response was to close the Strait of Hormuz, through which about 20% of the world's oil passes. This caused price hikes and showed that Tehran can choke the global economy with simple means — drones and cruise missiles. The author notes: Trump and Netanyahu thought overwhelming military power would guarantee capitulation, but they encountered what experts call a "weapon of mass disruption."
The journalist draws a parallel with the Ukrainian experience and describes an imagined dialogue with Zelensky. If Trump and Vance had shown more curiosity, Ukraine could have explained how drones changed modern war, allowing the weak to act like the strong. "Mr. Trump, Mr. Vance, let me explain..." Friedman writes, suggesting such a conversation might have prevented surprises. Instead, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps effectively gained the ability to block the strait at a chosen moment, creating an analogue of nuclear deterrence.
Friedman condemns Trump's chaotic policy, which sends an alarming signal to both allies and Iran: the US is an unreliable partner. He refers to the reaction to Trump's sudden proposal for countries to immediately sign the "Abraham Accords," including states that have their reasons to refuse or tie normalization to a resolution of the Palestinian issue. The idea of Iran participating in peace agreements with Israel after the war strikes the author as "laughably unrealistic" and reflects a lack of planning and expertise.
In the end Friedman acknowledges that toppling the Iranian regime and ending its nuclear ambitions would benefit the Middle East, but that would require a thoughtful strategy, broad alliances, and international legitimacy. Instead, Trump and his "chaotic team" offered nothing, giving the regime a chance to survive, maintain influence over global oil supplies, and gain additional resources to destabilize the region. The author's bleak conclusion: history will remember that this very team gave Iran new life at a moment when it was most vulnerable to its own people.
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Which specific units of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) control the Strait of Hormuz and what is their operational structure? - The Strait of Hormuz is controlled by the IRGC Navy, which is a separate branch from Iran's regular navy. Their operational structure includes high-speed boats, coastal missile batteries (including anti-ship missiles), small-class submarines, and mine-laying capabilities. Command is exercised through the IRGC Navy headquarters, which coordinates actions with reconnaissance units and air-defense batteries along the coast. In case of escalation they can employ "swarm" tactics for asymmetric attacks.
How are Iran's allies — Hezbollah in Lebanon, Popular Mobilization Units in Iraq, and the Houthis in Yemen — connected to Tehran's nuclear program, and how might a possible agreement affect their funding? - The connection is that Tehran uses its nuclear program as leverage to obtain concessions in international negotiations, which indirectly strengthens its regional influence and ability to fund allies. Hezbollah, Iraqi militias (for example, Kata'ib Hezbollah), and the Houthis receive financial, military, and logistical support from the IRGC in exchange for participating in proxy conflicts. A potential nuclear agreement could lead to the lifting of some sanctions and the unfreezing of Iranian assets, some of which could be redirected to support these groups. However, strict monitoring mechanisms by the IAEA and the US could limit such flows, forcing Tehran to seek unofficial channels.
How does the Iranian regime use revenues from lifting the oil embargo to finance repression against internal opposition, and what specific control mechanisms are applied? - Revenues from lifting the embargo are primarily directed to the budgets of the IRGC and security forces (Basij, police) through Iran's Central Bank and formal state programs. Specific control mechanisms include: 1) use of parallel banking networks and cryptocurrencies to circumvent sanctions and finance "shadow" operations; 2) allocation of funds for fuel and food subsidies, which reduce social discontent and decrease protest activity; 3) direct financing of internet censorship and mass surveillance (for example, via the "Smart Firewall" system); 4) procurement of equipment for suppressing protests (tear gas, surveillance systems). Thus, the economic benefit from easing sanctions is converted into strengthening the repressive apparatus.
Full version: توماس فريدمان.. كم كأسا مُرّة سيتجرعها ترمب في حرب إيران؟